KU LEUVEN

FACULTEIT SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN

‘What is new about what has always been’: Communication technologies and the meaning-making of Maasai mobilities in Ngorongoro

Jessika NILSSON

Proefschrift aangeboden tot het verkrijgen van de
graad van Doctor in de Sociale en culturele antropologie

Promotor: Prof. Dr. Noel Salazar
Onderzoekseenheid: Centrum Interculturalisme, Migratie en Minderheden [IMMRC]

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Glossary of terms:

Aang	(Maa) Home, in the sense of a house or a hut.
Aariya	(Maa) A Knowledgeable person and higher level of being, closer to God. The older you are the closer you are to God.
Age-set	An age-set is a permanent grouping of men. Every 15 years or so a new age-set is initiated, meaning that the oldest members of an age-set can be 7-8 years older than the youngest, but they form one whole. All men graduate together; a sense of community is formed through the ritual but also through the tasks each age-set takes up.
Arere Nkejek	(Maa) To go take a walk, pleasure walking.
Babu	(Swahili) Old man. Also used in Maa, the term is very informal, almost disrespectful. For instance, a senior elder who is drunk is a drunk Babu.
Boma	(Swahili) Homestead, also used in Maa (original Maa word Enkaang). Refers to the outer kraal, the huts and the inner kraal. As small enclosures, bomas are units that hold together the moored necessities for survival.
Chadema	(Swahili, Acronym) The main opposition party. Tanzania first introduced a multi-party system in 1992. For the October 2015 elections, Chadema formed a union, UKAWA, with the other oppositional parties, losing Presidential elections in mainland Tanzania but winning the Zanzibar vote; this vote was, however, nullified.
CCM	CCM or Chama Cha Mapinduzi is the major ruling party in Tanzania. It was formed in 1977 as a merger between Tanzanian/Tanganyikan ruling

	party TANU and Zanzibar's ASP. Seen as a continuation of TANU it is the longest ruling party in Africa. Once socialist, adopts a centre-left stance.
Datoga	(Swahili) Agro-pastoralists living mainly around Lake Eyasi. Also known as Barbaigh. There are a few Datoga villages within the NCA, although most Datoga were evicted by the Maasai, until a peace agreement was signed in 1992.
Enkanyit	(Maa) To have or be respected. Also synonymous with greatness. Respect is generally earned through maturing in age; a young boy holds no enkanyit whilst the oldest elder has the most. It is important to note that this is a form of respect directly related to age-sets and a seniority rule and it is not the only way of looking up to someone as other forms or types of respect not incorporated under enkanyit include wealth, wit and physical strength.
Hadzabe	Hunter-gatherers living around Lake Eyasi. Communities forcefully removed from the NCA by Maasai.
Iloshon	(Maa, plural for Oloshoo). The English translation used by research participants (and by me in this work) is section. Iloshon are nations or peoples, Maasailand (Oloshoo) is arguably comprised of sixteen Maa speaking groups, peoples or sections, some of which intersect the border with Kenya. The Samburu and Warusha are not included, the Parakuyu, who many Maasai (and Parakuyu) argue are not Maasai, are counted as a section by indigenous NGOs. Each section has a certain degree of cultural distinctiveness and historically sections have often gone to war against each other. Clans are sub-groups of sections and essentially 'big families' such as the Mollels and the Laizers. These are common last names although many Maasai use 'Son of + father's' name as their last name

Ilotot	(Maa) The formal word for walking. Walking is a plural word.
Iraqw	Cushitic speaking agriculturalist group. Main ethnic group in Karatu, Traditionally, they would build their cattle kraals and homes under-ground or on hills so that they could hear the thumping of feet of Maasai warriors looking to steal cattle.
Kanga	(Swahili) A two-piece fabric usually worn by women, colourful and imprinted with a quote. Quotes used to be (and sometimes still are) of a political nature. Kangas were integral to Nyerere's operation, dressing up using clothing as a vehicle for propaganda.
KiMaasai	(Swahili) Popular word for the Maa language (Ki is language in Swahili, so the language of the Maasai). Used by the Maasai when describing their language.
Klein's Camp	Private Serengeti concession north of the NCA, bordering Kenya.
Kraal	(Afrikaans, Dutch, Other) Protective structure, usually a fence of acacia thorn bushes.
M-pesa	Mobile payment system, SMS based technology created in Kenya in 2008 and the main payment system in rural areas such as the Ngorongoro.
Murrani or Ilmurran	(Maa) Warriors, members of the warrior age-set. Literal translation: The circumcised ones.
Nyama choma	(Swahili) Grilled meat (barbeque).

Oloshoo	(Maa) The Maa nation, territory or home, used synonymously with Maasailand in this dissertation.
Ormeek	(Maa) Modern Maasai or someone who does not know how to take care of cattle
Shashlik sticks	(English, other languages) Sticks with meat held into the fire to grill.
Shuka	(Swahili, Maa) Maasai traditional attire, a heavy blanket. Prior to wearing this strong, durable cloth, animal skins were worn. These were phased out by the Maasai as colonisers arrived.
Siringet	(Maa) Endless plains, the Serengeti. The Maasai were evicted from the Serengeti in 1959 and most Serengeti Maasai were rehomed in the Ngorongoro.
Ulaya	(Swahili) Europe, also used in Maa, used for many foreign things and concepts (also Asian).
Ujamaa	(Swahili) Socialist project implemented by the first Tanzanian President, seeking to unify Tanzanian culture. One Ujamaa policy was the uprooting of (mono-ethnic) villages and the creation of multi-ethnic Ujamaa farming villages/towns.
Vochas	(Swahili) Vochas are vouchers with money for mobile phone cards.
Wahindi	(Swahili) Plural for people of Indian descent.
Wakala	(Swahili) An agency or sales point.
Wazungus	(Swahili) Plural for people of European (often also Asian) descent.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Opening remarks

The title of this dissertation has changed many times, just as my research question and objectives were also different at the starting point of this journey. I went to the Ngorongoro, and to the Maasai specifically, with the rather unfocused aim of studying 'mobility'. Both 'technology' and 'communication' were central to the work from the outset, due to the netnographic research that I conducted in the lead up to fieldwork on the ground. Problematically, I was thinking of technologies as being unsettling, culture-altering devices; disruptive gadgets, lacking any and all historical context. Over the course of the project I came to ask, 'What is new about what has always been?' because the case of the Maasai shows how communication technology becomes integrated into socio-cultural, political and economic constellations, extending well-established and historically influenced practices. This dissertation illustrates how a history of technology not just creates new technology, but how newer technologies also permeate historic ones. Throughout this dissertation, I aim to show how cultural processes are shaped and reproduced at the interstices between mobility, technology and communication.

1.2. Research question and objectives

The research question is: how are human mobility practices continuously constructed and (re-)produced, through communication technology, in dialogue with members of a cultural group, and in its reaction to non-members? The objectives of this dissertation are to study the cultural processes at the interstices between communication, technology and mobility, and the imaginaries shaped there, and to examine 'what is new about what always has been' with regards to communication,

technology and mobility. I aim to de-construct the discourses that shape mobility. The conceptual question addressed within this work involves a variety of sub-questions. The central premise, around which these questions revolve, concerns the effects, usage and meaning-making that technologies of mobility and communication technologies have among the Maasai in Ngorongoro. The usage of communication technologies is examined in relation to how mobility, and intricate social networks, have played a decisive role in 'place-making' and the shaping of one of the largest areas claimed by a single ethnic group in Africa.

More specifically, I ask: How is a culture of mobility created and (re-)produced through communication? How is a mobile identity forged in relation to the use of technologies of mobility? How does the meaning-making of place and mobility come about and how do imaginaries shape this meaning-making?

1.3. Theoretical framework and literature review

The following sections provide a conceptual overview of the dissertation and of the case study of the Maasai specifically. Firstly, the Maasai case study and significant academic contributions related to the Maasai and pastoralism are introduced. The sections that follow are dedicated to introducing important scholarly literature that has influenced the work, as well as explaining and defining key concepts such as mobility, technology, communication and, lastly, the concept that I place at the intersection of all the aforementioned concepts, namely imaginaries. Further literature addressing particular sub-questions is reviewed in their relevant individual chapters.

1.3.1. The Maasai, a case in point

'The type of a person u want to be is a person of yesterday who will live tomorrow SUCCESS IS NEVER AN ACCIDENT'

Emmanuel, junior elder, Facebook status, 14 November 2015

The Maasai are a pastoral (some agro-pastoral) people group of northern Tanzania and southern Kenya and are speakers of the Eastern Nilotic Maa tonal language. They are considered semi-nomadic as, traditionally, they move seasonally and settle temporarily. Many Maasai now lead sedentary lifestyles and substitute pastoral production with trade or tourism activities. Young men often move to towns and cities to work as security guards, in the field of tourism or in office jobs. Due to their distinctive dress code (elaborate jewellery and iconic red or blue *shukas*), customs and wide presence on the borders of, or within wildlife conservation areas, they are recognised world-wide as the tourism ambassadors of Kenya and Tanzania or as the flag-bearers of Tanzanian tourism (Salazar, 2009). Everyone 'knows' the Maasai (Spear and Waller, 1993).

In popular imagery, the group is often thought to represent the people of Africa, as a whole. Googling 'African People' results in eight of the first ten pictures shown being Maasai, even though less than 0.1% of African people are Maasai.[1] The Kenyan flag features the Maasai shield and spear and symbolizes freedom and defence.[2] Imaginaries of the idealized indigene, whose life is unspoiled by modernity, lures numerous travel companies, as well as Maasai organizations, who seek to cash in on this portrayal through cultural safari enterprises (see Chapter 5).

[1] https://goo.gl/wvZ4kf
[2] https://flagspot.net/flags/ke.html

In Maa terms, the Maasai are simply the people of the cattle. God gave the Maa people all the cattle of the world; cattle are both currency and sacred, and it is the Maasai's duty to herd all of the world's cattle. Maa knows no words like nomadic or semi-nomadic, although the words 'nomad' and 'pastoral' are often used by Maasai in English these are political and colonial terms. Colonisers did not have to recognize the Maasai as owners of land, given their denotation as nomadic. The social organization of the Maa people is based around age-sets, in which men graduate to warriorhood and other stages in life through rites of passage.[3]

Roles in Maasai society are divided strictly between men and women (see Chapter 5 section 2, or in short, see 5.2.).[4] Women do not graduate into age-sets. They are, however, recognized as belonging to their husband's age-set when they marry. My research participants describe graduating into an age-set as a journey and the birth of a new culture (see Chapter 6). As a rite of passage, it enables social mobility in a society in which one gains influence, respect and a new set of tasks as one progresses to a new age-set. The Kenyan population census estimates there to be 841, 622 Maasai in Kenya (2009 National Census). The Tanzanian National Census does not inquire into their ethnic belonging; the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) represents and recognizes four indigenous groups in Tanzania (Maasai, Datoga, Akie and Hadzabe) and estimates a Tanzanian Maasai population of 430,000.[5] However, no reliable statistics suggest the exact number of Maasai; Saitoti writes that they 'do not like to be counted' (1980:17) and cattle numbers are equally misrepresented for various political and economic reasons (see 4.6.).

[3] See Morton (1979) for a comprehensive description of age-sets.
[4] Throughout this dissertation, I will cross-reference to specific sections of Chapters in this abbreviated way.
[5] http://goo.gl/vdKAzQ and http://www.iwgia.org/regions/africa/tanzania.

Having big herds places the Maasai at odds with the government and conservation doctrines on 'sustainable herding'. The Maasai have a strong perception of themselves as being either mobile or nomadic (topics explored in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6), though many Maasai are semi-nomadic in practice, many even leading sedentary lifestyles. Nomadism is achieved through the mobility of herding. The mobility of the animal translates into the some people's mobility and this mobile identity is then infused through the sharing of imaginaries and through language. For instance, walking, *ilotot*, is a complex plural word with implications of the physical act of movement and the meanings attached to shifting in place (see Chapter 3).

While a lot of skills and knowledge are taught through walking and spending time together with elders, it is compulsory for all Maasai (like all Tanzanians) to send their children to primary school. Most Maasai in the area comply with 30% of children following through to secondary school, according to the employees of the Pastoralist Council (PC) of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA). This gives youngsters more time with teachers, and less with elders. Most secondary schools are boarding schools, which lie outside the NCA, and here the youth study together with classmates of different ethnicities. Schooling is one factor impacting upon the possibility for families to practice semi-nomadic herding, since it ties families, mothers and children at least, to a homestead near the school. Secondary schooling also shortens the rites of passage for junior warriors living together in *emanyatta*. After *emuratta*, the circumcision ceremony, they live separately from their homesteads, with members of their age-set. *Emanyatta* is, traditionally, a liminal place and phase in which warriors live together in unfenced camps built by their mothers. This strengthens their bond to their age-set and they prepare for their role as warriors in Maa society with designated leaders. Today, with the proliferation of secondary

schooling, *emanyatta* resembles more a vacation activity for many young warriors; one could compare it to the Western practice of a 'summer camp'.

Most Maasai practice Christianity, a religion that for decades was largely ignored by the Maasai as missionaries held no political power (Waller, 1999). Hodgson (2005) notes that Christianity was ushered in by Maasai women. Despite disapproval from both the Catholic and Pentecostal churches, polygamous marriage is still widely accepted. Heijs (2014) writes that, prior to the 1980s, Christianity did not have widespread recognition in Maasailand; my research participants in Ngorongoro attest to the arrival and success of the Catholic and Pentecostal Churches in the region in the 1970s. Christianity has largely replaced a monotheistic religion in which the volcanic mountain, *Ol Donyo Lengai* (Mountain of God) in the north of the Ngorongoro district, is believed to house God, or *Lengai/Engai*. Churches, be they Pentecostal or Catholic, interfere with mobile traditions in the sense that they are moorings, fixed points of gathering at fixed times (usually once a week).[6] Churches and priests (some of whom are not Maasai) do not migrate with cattle, unlike traditional leaders, whose spiritual ceremonies and guidance are not confined to one particular mooring.

Though fascinating to study, this dissertation does not inquire into the Church's school's impact on Maasai mobility/immobility.[7] Rather, I have chosen to focus on the dialectical construction of mobility practices through communication technology. Further studying the role of the Church may lead to answers concerning why clans, such as the Ilkunono, who were once well-respected as the innovators of the Maa

[6] Urry (2003) describes how mobile systems are supported by immobilities he refers to as moorings, these structures permit mobility.

[7] For an intricate analysis of the Church in Maasailand, see Hodgson (2000). Bishop (2007) writes on schooling and how it encourages a more sedentary lifestyle.

peoples with the ability to cast spells, are now marginalized, nearly cattle-less and mostly sedentary, disenfranchised from 'being Maasai' as their alleged spell-casting abilities are considered to be bad. Neither is it the aim here to study how political decision-making has marginalized the Maasai. How technologies of mobility are used to navigate policymaking is, however, addressed in this work (see Chapters 7 and 8). The Maasai have been forcibly relocated a number of times by colonial powers (Hughes, 2006), despite the persistent images that heavily romanticize the Maasai's perceived freedom from authority and closeness to nature (Sobania, 2002). Kenyan and Tanzanian authorities have continued the policies of uprooting the Maasai from game reserves and farmlands into reserves or marginalised land.

Maasailand is one of the larger territories claimed by one ethnic group in Africa. I use the term 'claim' because strong feelings are anchored to the land. The Maasai's semi-nomadic position makes land right negotiations complex, urging every non-Maasai stakeholder in Maasailand to argue that the land is not theirs; this is the case because, so the understanding of opposing stakeholders goes, you cannot have land if you are nomadic. The classic understanding of indigeneity, as a static presence of residing on land over vast periods of time (Bandelier, 1881), further weakens the Maasai claim. The United Nations views indigenous peoples to have a strong link to a specific, ancestral territory often having 'been there' before the settlers, who became dominant thereafter, arrived (See Chapter 8). The Maasai, however, arrived relatively late (16th century) to what is present-day Maasailand. They evicted other ethnic groups, such as the Iraqw, Hadzabe or Datoga, whose presence in the area dates back thousands of years, from the Ngorongoro.. Maasai indigenous rights activists have a more mobile approach to indigeneity, one driven by the necessity to move with cattle (comparable to the Saami situation in the Nordic countries and in Russia).

Being the people of cattle, cattle are what motivate Maasai economic and sociocultural practices. During the pre-colonial era, pastoralist migrations, ranging from daily herd movement to seasonal transhumance, were limited principally by disease and more occasionally by insecurity. Colonial and post-colonial policies have added the occupation of land by cultivators, while wildlife and new boundaries also impede Maasai's free passage (Schneider, 2006). Traditionally, the wealth of a man was measured by the number of cattle in his possession and how many wives he had. Both men and women can own cattle. A wealthy Maasai man is still the owner of a large herd of at least fifty cattle; other members of Maasai society, who are seemingly challenging this notion by having fancy cars, a high level of education or jobs in the cities, for instance, also often own large herds that they tend to via the phone with professional herders.[8]

Herding is the logic behind a semi-nomadic lifestyle. Herding is the coordination of a set of techniques aimed at bringing animals together in a group, of looking after and controlling livestock such as cattle, goats, sheep or reindeer. The technology of herding is inherently mobile. Herding, a meta-technology in a sense, is aided by an expanding number of technologies aimed at coordinating, simplifying, diversifying and increasing the activity's economic productivity (see Chapter 4). Nomadic pastoralism is a mobile system of pastoralism in which livestock is herded in order to find fresh grazing pastures.

The customary Maasai diet consists largely of milk (and meat). However, the Maasai reject the hunting and eating of wildlife. The practice of semi-nomadic herding, in addition to the shunning of wild meat, is believed to have preserved large

[8] A calf trades for roughly 300 USD, while a strong bull can be worth 1,000 USD. Kenyan cattle are worth more, especially when imported to Tanzania. I use USD along with Tanzanian Shilling throughout this work, given that USD is also a popular currency in the NCA.

parts of East African land as conservation areas, protecting these areas from poachers and from agriculturalists (Homewood et al., 2009). Most Maasai live in small hamlets commonly referred to as *bomas*; these are round enclaves of huts often inhabited by a single family. A series of *bomas* makes up a village. A *boma* is a fortress designed either to protect cattle from wildlife or from those people trying to steal cattle. Today, many Maasai live in *Ujamaa* villages, towns and cities (see 1.4.). Although I speak of the Maasai as comprising a society in their own right, they actually form part of the larger Tanzanian society, participating in mainstream society to varying degrees, be it through trade connections or through (partially) living as 'Modern Maasai' (see Chapters 3, 4 and 8).

The Maasai, who live in Maasailand, have few maps that demarcate the areas that dissect, contest and merge with land used by a large number of other ethnic groups. Maasailand's size is highly contested, although Saitoti (1980) estimates its 'original' size to have been 700 miles (ca. 1,100km) north to south and 200 miles (ca. 300km) wide. Maasailand is not demarcated along the lines outlined in Appendix One. This is a classic 'ethnographic map', in the sense described by Gupta and Ferguson (1992). It purports the wish early ethnographers and policy makers possessed to map the spatial distribution of ethnic groups. Gupta and Ferguson criticize that '[…] space itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on which cultural difference, historical memory, and societal organization are inscribed.' (1992:7). Maasailand can be divided into between 12 and 16 sections, with the Kenyan-Tanzanian border dissecting several sections.

Historically, wars between sections and even clans were common and the history of the Maa people is one of both divergence and convergence between Maa speaking sections, especially pastoralist versus agro-pastoralist, or 'related' sections

such as the Warusha. The Samburu, for instance, are seen as Maasai by many indigenous rights activists seeking to expand Maasai territory, whilst others see the Samburu as being 'relatives' that speak a Maa dialect. The case of the Ilkunono, viewed by some (activists and the Kenyan government) as a Samburu clan, further attests to the complexities and politics around whether, and to what extent, Maa people are a unified culture or not; this is an on-going discussion within Maa society (see Chapter 8). Overall, indigenous rights activism, and the politics behind identity formation, serves to (re-)position the Maasai as one people group, as opposed to a number of pastoral sections speaking Maa dialect (See Chapter 8). Socio-economic realities, organization, activism and cultural patterns all shape Maasailand as a constantly moving constellation, rather than as a homogenous cultural and geographical area. For many Maasai, mobility and land are intimately intertwined, due to pastoral herding. What distinguishes mobility as a concept from mere movement is that mobility is imbued with socio-cultural, economic and political meanings (Salazar, 2013).

Maasailand is a moving landscape in the sense that using what is often semi-arid dryland to herd (as opposed to farming cattle) gives the land meaning. In this context, Van Wolputte's work (2000, 2004) on conceptualising space and investigating belonging and human cattle relations (among the Himba) provides intriguing incentives to further analyse the Maasai's intertwined relationship with land and cattle. The relationship between the intellectual conception of Maasailand and the actual, physical movement there through is rarely isomorphic; this means that the Maasai's understandings of being mobile does not always reflect physical movement through Maasailand. Rather, Maasai identity as a mobile people is, and was, formed in dialogue with forces such as colonial policy makers (see Chapter 8). Identity is about

knowing your place in a culture and is understood as the distinct representations and characteristics shared by a specific group (Rummens, 1993).

Identity is formed in relation with, and distinction to, others as a social self-expression (Hall, 1990). The process is of a dialectical nature, and is one I explore in greater depth in Chapters 5 and 6. Early ethnographers and colonialists framed the Maasai as being a dangerously mobile, nomadic people. With the image of the intrepid warriors in mind, the colonial regime could marginalize the Maasai, thereby trying to sedentarize its people. If they were nomads, then they had no land, so one could give them little land. And if one sedentarized them on very little land, one could control them easier, as it is easier to control people than it is an entire territory. Conversely, an identity was and is forged that stresses mobility and the idea of a highly mobile past. For many of today's Maasai, Maasailand becomes an ideal, a dreamscape of unrestricted mobility. Maasailand is, here, not used in its colonial sense (Maasailand as a reserve with clearly marked borders), but instead as a translation of *Oloshoo*, given that the Maasai also interpret the word as nation or the nation of the Maa peoples (the *iloshon*). In English or when writing in activist terms online, my research participants would use the word *Oloshoo* in place of Maasailand.

Place is not necessarily a fixed or static concept, but is a moving and intersecting concept of space infused with multiple and sometimes contesting layers of meaning and purpose (see 3.1.). Mobile practices have socio-cultural, spiritual, economic and political meanings. I take the Maasai to be a case study that allows for the analysis of the embodiment of novel and customary mobile communication technologies into a semi-nomadic culture. Technologies must not be studied from an apolitical, ahistorical perspective. As Emmanuel's Facebook status (at the beginning of this section) reveals, the prevalent stereotype of the Maasai's perceived resistance

to ‘change and progress’ is a grave misunderstanding of their situation.[9] The status, in which he had tagged most of his Maasai Facebook friends, reveals the desire to innovate based on respecting the past.

I would like to point out the relevance of the following works, specifically regarding my studies on the Maasai and pastoralism: Homewood et al. (2009) have focused specifically upon land use and income, generating useful insights for my work on mobilities and land access. Leading scholars on the Maasai include Galaty (1982, 1992, 1993, 2013) and Hodgson (1999, 2000, 2011), Little (1998) Spear and Waller (1993) and Kipury (1983, 2005, 2008). Galaty’s research maintains a very pragmatic and straightforward approach, in which the Maasai are agents, as opposed to merely victims, of modernity or capitalism. This approach has certainly informed my own analysis, especially in Chapter 3 section 5, in which I analyse the Maasai notions of modernity and the ‘out of place’ in place-making and in Chapter 8, in which I discuss land tenure and land rights.

Hodgson has written extensively on the Maasai. Her research on Maasai history (1999) and gender (2000) and the indigenous rights movement (2011) have been tremendously useful in grasping questions of identity and gender (which I discuss further in Chapter 5) and the developments leading up to online indigenous activism (analysed extensively in Chapter 8). Little (1998) writes on development issues, globalisation and pastoralism, and his insight into societal structures, which are essentially state-less, have also informed my reflections on the Maasai and ‘modernity’ greatly (see 3.5.). Spear and Waller (1993) discuss pastoral identity; the politics of belonging and of identity are very much the subjects of Chapters 6 and 8.

[9] For the prevalent stereotype in East Africa, see for instance: http://silomasays.com/maasai-not-stupidnot-arrogant/

Kipury, a Maasai activist herself, has written a series of studies which adopt a development approach. I find her auto-ethnographic insights to be of particularly interest, much like Saitoti (1980) whose work, however, must be reflected upon, bearing in mind that it is popular science literature.

1.3.2. Making sense of mobility, technology, communication and imaginaries

This study aims to bridge and to enhance the anthropological bodies of work on mobility studies, technology and communication. Mobility is defined here as movement imbued with meaning. It encompasses social, political, physical, historical and imagined dimensions (Salazar, 2013). Technology is here understood as a device, set of techniques, systems, skills, practices or methods of organisation serving to adapt to the socio-cultural, political, economic and ecologic environment. The study of culture cannot be separated from the study of communication and language. I call on important works in linguistic anthropology that further examine this connection. Hymes lay the foundations for an 'ethnography of communication' (1964), distinguishing distinct cultural patterns in language and studying habitual practices through language. In an influential work on communication practices, Goodwin and Duranti (1992) note that dialogue is one of the most pervasive social activities. In the following sections, I will first address the mobility studies discourse, and how it has influenced this dissertation, followed by an engagement, primarily a disentanglement, of understandings of the combinations of technology, mobility and communication. The research question that the study of these key concepts will help in answering, throughout the chapters of this dissertation, is: How are human mobility practices continuously constructed and (re-)produced, through communication technology, in

dialogue with members of a cultural group and in its reaction to non-members? The sub-questions to the research question highlight the interrelation between the four key concepts of the dissertation, namely, how is a culture of mobility created and (re-)produced through communication? How is a mobile identity forged in relation to the use of technologies of mobility? How does the meaning-making of place and mobility come about and how do imaginaries shape this meaning-making?

1.3.3. Mobility

Mobility studies is a multidisciplinary field, focusing on both historic and contemporary movements to explain the social implications of the movements of people, ideas and things (Engel and Nugent, 2010). It is the anthropologist's role to disentangle the meanings that are attached to movement (Salazar, 2013). Mobilities are here viewed as being 'at the centre of constellations of power, the creation of identities and the microgeographies of everyday life' (Cresswell, 2011:551). As Sheller and Urry (2006) write, mobilities cannot be studied without their moorings, the interdependent systems through which mobilities are enabled.

> 'The emergent mobilities paradigm problematises two sets of extant theory. First, it undermines sedentarist theories present in many studies in geography, anthropology and sociology. Sedentarism treats as normal stability, meaning and place, and treats as abnormal distance, change and placelessness… Second, our critique of 'static' social sciences also departs from those that concentrate on postnational deterritiorialisation processes and the end of states as containers for societies.' (Sheller and Urry, 2006:208-210.)

The 'new mobilities paradigm' (Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006) serves, albeit in a cautious manner, as the epistemological basis for this dissertation, given that it takes a

stance against stasis and categorization in the social sciences. It forms a departure from work conducted on place and meaning (Clifford, 1988 or Tucker, 1994). In Chapter 3, I will further argue why place and meaning are actually central to understanding mobility practices, in which the parting from place and meaning, which the 'new mobilities paradigm' represents, is thought to be unfortunate. I hope to close this schism between the 'new mobilities paradigm' and the work undertaken prior thereto, by allowing readers to think about the reconfiguration of place and processes of mobility created therefrom.

The mobilities paradigm must also be interpreted with great care, so as not to neglect patterns that may be unbefitting thereto, such as processes of immobility, given that this might create binaries of mobility vs. immobility discursively. Therefore, I would like to draw attention to the work of Salazar and Smart (2011) who urge scholars to pay attention to processes that might go unnoticed if the focus remains on mobility solely. On a similar note, Jaume (2011) warns that mobility studies scholars may contribute to the creation of a schism between mobility and immobility. This work pays attention to meaning and place-making, and to the dialectics between mobility and moorings and continuity and change, or in other words to 'what has always been about what is new' and vice versa; to this end, I attempt to capture how the mobile relates to the immobile and to examine what consequences this has for power production and distribution and the creation of knowledge.

Although the analysis of mobility has a long history in anthropology, Salazar (2013) argues that its study is often understood in terms of mobility as comprising a contained and cyclical manner of motion or as a defining characteristic of a specific group, traveling people or hunter-gatherers for instance. Undermining sedentarist

theory is especially important in analysing cultures that have been exoticized, and inadvertently analysed as being akin to 'noble savages'. Analytical errors made by early anthropologists, as well as work delivered at the request of colonial administrators and the stereotyping of mobile people, as per the definition of landless, informs political and developmental doctrines and can have devastating political consequences.[10]

Clifford (1997) has paved the way for the entry of mobility into mainstream anthropological and social science discourse. Glick-Schiller and Salazar (2013) have called for an engagement with mobility, from an ethnographic perspective, in order to address the interrelationship between mobility and stasis. By studying not just mobilities, but also moorings, I hope to answer this call. Salazar (2013) provides a comprehensive critique and analysis of anthropology and mobility. In the context of anthropology, the sensibilities of ethnography allow researchers to situate mobility within a broader context of cultural complexities.

Notable anthropological contributions to mobility studies have been made by Kirby (2009), Nyirí (2010) and Salazar (2013). Scholars from other disciplines, such as literature (Greenblatt 2009), sociology (Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006), geography (Cresswell, 2006, 2010; Adey, 2006), and history (Clifford, 1997, 2003), have also influenced the mobility turn in the social sciences. Appadurai (1996) has popularised the idea of mobility with his concepts of 'flows' and 'scapes', while Urban (2001) has analysed the processes that make culture circulate. Salazar (2010) and de Bruijn et al. (2001) have paid academic attention to mobility issues in Africa,

[10] In the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, the Swedish government denied Saami peoples' land rights claims on the basis that nomadic people have, as their way of living, no right to land. On the 29th of January 1981, the Swedish Supreme Court overruled the government's mandate by recognizing customary, or as they are called in Sweden, 'immemorial rights' to land.

arguing that the study of mobility is essential to any analysis of African social life. A series of studies (such as Schrooten, 2012 or Dekker and Engbersen, 2012) examines the intersections between social media studies and migration studies. Much of this work, although focusing on international migration, is of value to analysing semi-nomadic mobilities and how online interaction enhances possibilities of maintaining ties.

As well as disentangling the 'constellations of mobility' (Cresswell, 2010), the patterns, representations and practices creating mobility within the context of my research, another such constellation that needs to be disentangled is time. With a culture structured around age-sets (Rigby, 1995), and which uses a lunar twelve-month calendar to predict environmental changes, the Maasai have historically been a time-conscious culture. People move, not just in response to seasonal change, but in planning ahead towards it. Space or distance are measured in days-walking. The rise of novel mobile and communication technologies allows for new planning in terms of time, given that these compress time and space.

Throughout this dissertation I analyse Maasai culture as a 'culture of mobility' and what I mean by this is that both cultural processes shape mobility and that mobilities shape culture (Salazar, 2010). Maasai culture is organized along the lines of age-sets and gender (see Chapter 5). Culture is born and reborn with the initiation of a new age-set (see Chapter 6) and age-sets are instrumental to structuring who is mobile and how they are mobile, both in terms of physical mobilities (such as herding, see Chapter 4) and social mobility (graduating an age-set comes with new tasks, responsibilities and opportunities in society). A junior warrior may qualify to be a youth leader; a junior elder may also be asked to take up the lifelong task of being a 'traditional leader' (see Chapter 6).

Conversely, mobilities inform culture, as culture is not static, but is involved in an 'emergent' process relating to the past, the present and to future prospects. This analysis makes the role of imaginaries visible in configuring culture (Chapter 5) and how the mobilities of 'others' or the 'out of place' (see 3.5., Chapter 5 and 6) also inform cultural processes. The former, in my understanding, characterises a culture 'in motion', while the latter completes the circle, describing a culture of mobility. Furthermore, contemporary human mobility practices change, relate and adapt to already existing socio-cultural assemblages. The following sections aim to first clarify my understanding of technology, communication and then to clarify the specific meanings applied to the intersections of these key concepts, which are applied throughout the text, with specific attention being paid to the concept of imaginaries.

1.3.4. Technology

When I started this research I looked at technologies as gadgets that were just 'there'. During my fieldwork, I increasingly came to question my perception and began to study technology with regards to social and cultural perspectives, because the study of 'technology alone' is 'physically sterile' (Malinowski, 1935:69). 'Technology' is deconstructed here not with the aim of understanding technology as such, but in order to understand processes of human interaction that are mediated through it. I define technology as a device, set of techniques, systems, skills, practices or methods of organisation that serve to control and to adapt to the socio-cultural, political, economic and ecological environment. A technique is a way of doing something, while a technology is a complete tool. A technology, combined with other technologies in order to construct or produce

something larger, combine to form techniques in that specific setting. The word technology stems from the ancient Greek tekhnologiā, the science or systematic treatment of skills.

Ingold (2001) highlights how common understandings of technology obscure its ancient meaning, abandoning the connotation of skill. Instead, skill is regarded as a practical ecological adaptation. This view places the development and curation of skill as something of an inferior quality to technology; I concur with Ingold here. When discussing what technology is, with friends, family, colleagues and especially with people who have advanced training in engineering, I often find myself discussing a very different idea of technology than the person with whom I am exchanging thoughts. This could possibly have to do with their placing a hierarchy or levels of advancement concerning what a technology is or is not. 'I am really not following you. Herding is not a technology. Technology is the application of science. What the Maasai are doing is not technology; it's a pre-stage of technology, you have to write that! Make a distinction!' Christer (my father, a civil engineer).

My definition of technology is one that acknowledges its ancient meaning but also, since this ethnography is about Maasai people, incorporates the Maa understanding of technology, which I will examine later. Varela and Maturana (1997) have built a case that technology is autopoieitic (self-creating). Similarly, Schiffer (2001) defines technology as a living and adaptive system. The argument is that technology builds upon previous technology in an unstoppable process. The stance is also picked up by Arthur (2009), who argues that technologies have a recursive nature. What he means is that it takes pre-existing technologies, a history of technology and its use, to create technology. He also argues that, while we often know every single detail of specific technologies (how they work, how they are constructed,

which techniques have been implemented) no science has made a deep enough effort to define and to understand what technology, in itself, actually is.

The Maasai case shows how technology is adopted into socio-cultural, political and economic networks in which it becomes an extension of well-established and historically influenced practices. This shows how it is not just a history of technology that creates new technology, but how newer technologies become merged with historic technologies. There is nothing 'novel' about communication technology as such. Technologies take shape organically as novel components become combined with old ones. Therefore, this makes online platforms such as Facebook, as it is used by the Maasai, a slightly different technology to Facebook used somewhere else, given that its historical build-up is different. This is all in the service of answering the question of 'what is technology?'

Saitoti, a junior elder in Narok and a Maasai rights activist, explains technology like this (in Facebook chat): 'You can say *tekinoloji* because the Maasai had no word for technology, because traditionally the elders are custodians of knowledge. Before, young people should not innovate.' Ben, a warrior from Nainokanoka (via Facebook messenger): '*Engariyano* is technology. I am sorry for delay, network connection is very slow!' Ibrah, a human-wildlife conflict specialist, refers to the *Ilkonuno* as the technologists of the Maa people; now largely outcasts (as explained in 1.3.1.), they used to craft weapons and advance the skills necessary to defending Maasailand.

There exists, within Maa culture, an understanding of technology as knowledge production or as an intelligent system, *engariyano*, traditionally reserved for elders, but challenged by warriors; *teknoloji*, in terms of novel devices such as the smart phones, are disrupting the ways in which knowledge is produced, shared and received

by younger people, as elders often complain (see Chapter 7). In line with this understanding, brought forward by many research participants, I too treat the process of acquiring and sharing knowledge as an understanding or definition of technology. Saitoti comments (via Facebook messenger): 'It [e*ngariyano*] comes from the word *aariya*, meaning a higher level of intelligent person or knowledgeable person.. eg [sic] God.. So in essence, it means intelligence.' *Engariyano* is the knowledge of how things are done and this knowledge is passed down by elders. Women are the key to the passing down of knowledge; mothers in teaching their sons and daughters, senior elders, are considered to be closer to God and act as 'walking encyclopaedias'. Women hold a more important role than men in preserving and passing down knowledge and perhaps it is not coincidental in this context that the higher level, God, *Engai*, has a feminine pre-fix.

Technocratic language has led many to believe that only what is 'high tech' (airplanes, the CERN accelerator, power plants) is technology (Lull, 2002). This understanding of technology is spurned even by those scholars seeking to conceptualize technology within historical cultural processes, including Lull's use of the buzzword 'communication age' or Castells (1996) coining the 'information age' as characterizing the advent of the 21st century. These notions create the idea that there is a disruption between what was (an allegedly pre-technological era) and what is (a so-called communication/information age) when, instead, the relation between cultural systems and practices has been constructed and reproduced continuously throughout time with the aid of systems of knowledge production. This dissertation suggests the breaking down of the evolutionary hierarchy between 'high tech' and customary technology (such as language for instance).

Technologies of mobility are tools, instruments, skills, techniques, systems, practices or methods that enable mobility. Mobile technologies would include technologies that are portable, such as shoes, whereas technologies of mobility also encompass moorings that enable human mobility. Herding, for instance, is a technology of mobility that relies on moorings (the homestead, the cattle pen, women as household caretakers) to function. Technologies of mobility are systems that enable, replace, support and give meaning to a broad variety of movements. Scholarly analyses of the intersection between mobility and technology have focused mainly upon 'spatial, infrastructural and institutional moorings' (Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006:3) or upon the ties and nodes through which information is mediated (Freeman, 2006). Instead, I examine the cultural processes mediated at this intersection. Key thinkers within mobility studies (Cresswell 2006, 2010; Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006) have examined technology amidst other aspects of mobility. De Bruijn, Nyamnjoh and Brinkman (2009) place African mobilities and technologies at the forefront of mobility studies in analysing the (re-)shaping of social spaces through mobile technology in Africa. Technologies of mobility play a crucial role in how strategies of economic and ecologic mobility are negotiated around environmental and political constraints.

1.3.5. Communication

Communication is the imparting or exchanging of information through speaking, writing or other mediums (shared systems).[11] Lindlof and Taylor (2002) study

[11] http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/communication

communication as a constant flow of information. Information travels either down a one-way street or in between multiple nodes: be they human, animal or electronic. This dissertation does not inquire into the imparting of information specifically; instead, communication becomes interesting when there is an exchange, when there is dialogue, the back and forth in communication (Phillips, 2011), the sharing of ideas with functional, political and ontological senses. I have always taken a particular interest in what dialogue is and what it does and wish to highlight how Geertz (1966) locates culture at the interstices between people and their dialogical relations; his analysis is why I place great emphasis on 'dialogue' throughout this dissertation. I also concur with Jakobson (1953) that dialogue is the basis for a shared system. Sharing is also at the heart of the original meaning of communication. Communication stems from the Latin word commūnicāre, to share. Like Schegloff (1987), I believe that communication is the primary locus for any sociality. Culture emerges out of dialogue between people and the passing down of collective stories, with each storyteller and recipient creating something new and unique, as Mannheim and Tedlock (1995) have argued. On a similar note, Jakobson (1990) writes that stories or myths are never passed on in a monological way. Although speaking and dialogue are often not the same thing, I believe that Sherzer's (1983) comments on how speaking shapes socio-political patterns and world-views are most relevant to the analysis of how dialogue constitutes the production of a shared language and a shared system, namely a culture.

Specifically, this research project enquires into the dialectical construction of mobilities. In reference to 'what is new about what always has been' I wish to quote Lull (2002:1): 'Symbolic exchanges facilitated by high technology and new networks of complex connectivity (Tomlinson 1999) are contemporary elaborations of what is

really a very basic activity – human communication'. In exploring how dialogue is mediated, I use the following understandings of communication technology: Communication technology transports information (Coates et al., 2009). It enables the exchange of information between multiple nodes or multiple people (Chang et al., 2012). Language, by this definition, is a technology, given that it mediates and translates communication between people, or between people and animals (Dascal, 2001).

Mobile communication is the act of bridging space through communication, such as passing on a message through a courier or through a mobile device, which brings us to the final intersection explored here, mobile communication technology. Urry (2003) has illustrated how mobile systems are supported by immobilities (moorings) that permit mobility. While his work has addressed infrastructure and advanced technology systems, I find similar principles apply to semi-nomadic people, such as the Maasai and to their mobile communication systems.

1.3.6. Imaginaries

Having shifted focus from mobility to technology and on to communication, I have arrived at the 'interstices' between this dissertation's key concepts: Mobile communication technology lies at the heart of technologies of mobility, communication technology and mobile communication. This section is devoted to the disentangling of a specific key concept, situated at this intersection between mobility, technology and communication: Imaginaries. Here, I define imaginaries in a manner similar to Salazar, as 'socially shared and transmitted representational assemblages that are used as meaning-making devices' (2013:234). As such, they are vehicles with

a mobile quality. They are world-shaping when operationalised and they communicate and help to materialise dreams and ideas. Through their discursive nature, they function as tools of knowledge, shared dreams and, ultimately, power. The human capacity to imagine, and to imagine others, is paramount to the formation of human identity (Salazar, 2011). Throughout this work, imaginaries are treated as an interconnector of mobility, technology and communication. Through this systematic approach, the interrelations between the key concepts of this study are made clearer.

Maasai imaginaries of land and mobility are greatly intertwined; they carry with them the possibility of mobility (motility), and supplement mythscapes of endless plains with shared and memories passed on of endless freedom. I treat imaginaries as mobile communication technologies throughout this work, respecting how senior elders, valued as *aariya,* 'higher forms of intelligence', maintain their roles in keeping imaginaries of Maasailand alive as 'walking encyclopaedias'. The concept of imaginaries is crucial to the Maasai understanding of their mobile identity, because much of their mobility is carried out through story-telling and by enacting imaginaries of a mobile past. Here, mobility has less to do with actual physical displacement and more with a mind-set derived from imaginaries.

Historically laden sociocultural imaginaries become vehicles of (im)mobility at both the physical and abstract or virtual levels. Imaginaries function as a shared cultural ethos, through which individuals make sense of the world (Gaonkar, 2002). The human capacity to imagine, both oneself and others, is important for the construction of identity. Following Fitzgerald (1995), identity is conceived in a dialogue that takes place between culture and communication, and I wish to highlight the communicative, dialectical power of imaginaries in this process. Imaginaries are studied through images and discourses (Salazar and Graburn, 2014) and the practices

through which they manifest themselves. Repeating and distributing other discourses imaginaries are re-entextualized and replicated in different forms.

The patterns, representations and practices creating mobility need disentangling. This dissertation inquires specifically into the dialectical construction of mobilities. Dialogue being the back and forth in communication, the sharing of ideas. Cultural processes shape mobility and mobility shapes culture. Cultural processes have been constructed, contested and reproduced throughout time through the systematic treatment of skills and the passing down of knowledge. Imaginaries are here considered such tools of knowledge, as technologies. They are both meaning-making devices and products of meaning-making (Ricoeur, 1994). Mediating human interaction through patterned representational assemblages they often promise motility (the possibility of mobility) or they contribute to the restriction thereof and processes of Othering (Fabian, 2002).

Situated at the interstice between mobility, technology and communication, imaginaries enable transcendence between the present, the past and the future. These are temporal orderings that this body of work repeatedly addresses, beginning with the question of: 'what is new about what always has been?' The dissertation encourages readers to think in terms of processes, in which notions of the present, past and future are in constant relation to each other. In the identification of these dynamics among the Maasai, imaginaries are mobile communication technologies and imaginaries of the past are drawn upon to navigate contemporary society and to envision, and to shape, a future.

1.4. The historical and political context

This section presents an overview of the history and socio-political context relevant to this dissertation. It does so by displaying a kind of broad kaleidoscope, moving from Tanzania to the Maasai specifically and on through Maasailand, before finally arriving at the Ngorongoro Conservation area, this work's primary fieldsite.

1.4.1. Tanzania

Tanganyika gained independence in 1961, when British-educated Julius Nyerere came to power with the one-party rule of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Nyerere followed his vision of stamping out ethnic diversity and of bringing an end to the ceaseless argumentations between, and among, the different ethnic groups. He saw ethnic diversity and tension as a hindrance to development (Miguel, 2004). In 1964, Tanganyika merged with Zanzibar, forming the Republic of Tanzania (See map in Appendix 3). The Tanzanian approach to development was, from a very early time on, one of cultural homogenization, towards which the Maasai seem to have been defiant. Nyerere promoted a form of Pan-Africanism and African socialism called *Ujamaa*; Nyerere (1962) defines traditional African society as being a socialist one, arguing that Africans must return to this allegedly African model. As a result, cross-country mobility, and the uprooting of families, deprived Tanzania of much of its cultural and ethnic diversity. Nyerere sought to build a peaceful nation-state, in which people strived for a common goal of peace, economic prosperity and a classless, collectivist society. Nyerere was a modernist, in the sense that the economic focus of *Ujamaa* lay on agriculture. Later on, and despite the economic shortcomings of *Ujamaa*,

advocates of structural adjustment argued for the strengthening of the agricultural core of Africa, rather than favouring building industries (Oya, 2007).

Ujamaa was a cultural sledgehammer, one made possible by strategic propaganda. The government deported hundreds of thousands of people and set up cross-ethnic, model-farming towns (Hyden and Mukandala, 1999). Early on, Nyerere clarified that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was unwelcome and that private land ownership was not allowed. The Arusha Declaration recognized Tanzania's natural heritage, continuing colonial policies on wildlife conservation to an extent unprecedented in other African countries. This ensured that 40% of Tanzania's land was preserved for conservation. However, Nyerere continued the colonial legacy of conservation at the cost of nomadic and hunter-gatherer people, who were vigilant towards *Ujamaa*. Throughout the period in which Nyerere's policies were implemented, the Maasai refused to commit to an *Ujamaa* redressing program, in which clothing was used as a vehicle to transmit political messages, shunning clothing such as the kanga for women or shirt and trousers for men for the traditional *shuka* (Schneider, 2006). The attempt to neutralize cultural diversity was something about which ethnic groups, such as the Maasai, were at a loss and policies to stigmatize those groups refusing to integrate into sedentary lifestyle still prevail to this day.

The Nyerere legacy, and the resulting wide-scale cultural insensitivity to approximately 120 ethnic groups in Tanzania, deprived the people of rich cultural histories. Nevertheless, the national policies contributed to the building of a nation-state massively. The foundations, laid by Nyerere, prevented internal conflict and created unity beyond ethnic demarcation. On the other hand, following neo-classical definitions and argumentation, the economic and political model devastated the economy (Kanaan, 2000). Import substitution strategies and communal agricultural

land tenure led to little exports. Farm production was on the brink of subsistence. All the while, the state paid little attention to city infrastructure, even shunning a busy port, the original and natural capital of the nation, to stamp out a new capital from the ground-up at the very centre of Tanzania.

In recent years, and as seen during the 2015 elections, the rise of the opposition (Chadema) poses a threat to a political system deeply engrained within communities. FDI was not in effect in Tanzania for a long time, despite its rich mineral resources. Tourism figures are modest compared to Kenya, despite its having significantly fewer wildlife areas, but also because this is a conscious choice made by the government (Wade et al, 2001).[12] Tanzanian tourism does generate higher revenues, with less mass tourism and high-income generating activities, such as hunting safaris. Eventually, in the 1980s, the Nyerere policies were largely abandoned and trade channels were opened up. Yet, Tanzania was marked as a developing nation and one not ripe for investments (Mkandawire, 2014). Between 1965 and 1995, 25% of Tanzania's GDP came from foreign aid (Hyden and Mukandala, 1999). 12.7% of the 2013 GDP was generated by the tourism industry, which is the biggest employer in Maasailand territories. Profits were lower in 2014 (10%), and are expected to be likewise for the year 2015, due to the 2014 Ebola outbreak on the other side of the continent. Today, Tanzania's GDP is $49.18 billion (World Bank, 2015b), and the countries rural population is 35,072,897, up from 32,329,528 in 2010 (World Bank, 2015a). There are over 120 ethnic groups in Tanzania and most Maasai live in rural

[12] Tanzania remained relatively unknown as a tourist destination until they adopted neoliberal policies in the late 1980s. Unlike Kenya (and with Zanzibar as the exception) it has developed a more high-end approach to tourism. Unlike in Kenya, hunting is allowed in Tanzania, attracting a luxury hunting clientele to both public and private game reserves.

areas of North Western Tanzania, although settlements stretch far south of the country's political capital, Dodoma.

1.4.2. Ngorongoro Conservation Area

My main research site was the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA). The NCA is a UNESCO world heritage site, one which is governed by a government conservation agency, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA). According to representatives of the authority interviewed in this research, it is home to an estimated 84,000 Maasai. The NCA is a multiple land use or man-and-biosphere reserve in which interests of human development are, in theory, balanced with the conservation of wildlife, flora and fauna. Rather than separating human livelihood from the protection of wildlife, as practiced in the vast majority of wildlife reserves, both are promoted by the authorities, making it a unique experiment in conservation. The Ngorongoro means 'gift of life' in Maa and no other description is better fitting, given that the Ngorongoro is believed to be the cradle of mankind and the Ngorongoro Crater, the largest intact caldera in the world, has the richest large mammal density world-wide.[13]

My fieldwork strongly indicates that the NCAA is generally perceived of as being a hostile master by the indigenous communities. Apart from the Maasai, small Datoga and Hadzabe hunter-gatherer communities persist on the periphery of the NCAA, though most were driven out by the Maasai. Few non-indigenous (indigenous here being a government categorization of Maasai, Datoga and Hadzabe) people live

[13] http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/39

in the NCA, given that most NCAA employees are bussed out to Karatu at night and workers in the tourism industry are also encouraged to migrate in and out of the area on a daily basis. The socio-cultural dynamics of the Ngorongoro Maasai make for interesting analyses of political resistance and dealings with economic and ecologic restraints, with technologies of mobility playing into both the organisation of livelihoods and political activism. The government of Tanzania allocated the NCA to the Maasai people as a consolation for their 1959 eviction from the Serengeti. The governor of Tanganyika issued the following statement to the assembly who represented the Maasai at the time:

> 'I should like to make it clear to you all that it is the intention of the Government to develop the Crater in the interests of the people who use it. At the same time, the Government intends to protect the game animals in the area, but should there be any conflict between the interests of the game and the human inhabitants, those of the latter must take precedence' (URT, 1990:5).

The economic potential of the area was quickly discovered by post-colonial Tanzanian rule and Maasai autonomy over the area came to a swift end in 1959. Today, it is Tanzania's most visited tourism site and, according to the accountants at the NCAA, less than two percent of entry fees and taxes on accommodation flow directly to the Maasai communities through their representative body, the Pastoralist Council. The remaining 98% stays with the NCAA, with parts of the funds being invested in conservation efforts, road maintenance, employee wages and plans to build a casino, skyscraper, conference hotel and golf course in Njiro, Arusha.[14] More funds flow through tourism attractions, such as 'cultural *bomas*', the selling of jewellery by the road (despite the fact that doing so is largely prohibited by the

[14] There are no online sources on the plans. However, a large model of the city-within-the-city is displayed in the main entry hall at the NCAA's Head Quarters. The chief of finance spent an afternoon showing me the model and explaining the plans.

governing regime) and the employment of Maasai at lodges or by tourism companies.[15]

1.5. Chapter overview

This section presents an overview of this thesis's structure and shows how individual chapters contribute to answering the research question posed. The research question is: how are human mobility practices continuously constructed and (re)produced, through communication technology, in dialogue with members of a cultural group, and in its reaction to non-members? In the second chapter, I discuss the work's methodology, including field research practices, reflexivity and netnography as well as research ethics. The chapter examines why I came to study the Maasai in Ngorongoro, how I conducted my research and how I chose my research participants. The research ethics section enters into a dialogue with literature on ethics in anthropology and presents my own ethical stances as well as dilemmas encountered while writing and researching for this dissertation. I particularly inquire into the ethics of online research and the challenges for anthropologists in navigating a research environment in which the lines between public and private spheres are blurred.

In the third chapter, I investigate how a culture of mobility is constructed with respect to a mobile conception of land. Chapter 3 demonstrates that, in order to understand human mobility practices, we need to first examine place-making. It is by laying this 'groundwork' that the dissertation can move on to study the construction of

[15] Cultural Bomas are villages in which the Maasai enact a (sedentary) version of Maasai life to tourists. Families live in these staged villages, often widowed women with children or cattle-less Maasai are 'sent out' to live in these villages for a few years, performing a static and immobile version of culture.

Maasai mobilities in Ngorongoro. Through which technologies might the use of space and the making of place in Maasailand be disentangled? Four place-makers are explored in order to answer this question; these place-makers include marriage, *arere nkejek*, home and *Ulaya*. While mobilities can often be explained as cultural characteristics, I examine the complex and variable factors in cultural processes.

In Chapter 3, I explore key technologies used to occupy 'space' to make it 'place'. First I study the interwoven lines created by marriage. Marriage, I contend, is a communication device that constructs place. Secondly, I analyse how pleasure-walks have shaped, and are actively shaping, Maasailand and how it functions as a mobile technology that is enhanced, complemented and, to some extent, replaced by the telephone. Next, concepts of home are explored. By analysing the Maasai interpretation of *Ulaya*, I explore the logics behind the shunning of some technological advancements and the swift embracing of others and how this topples Euro-centric or Western notions of 'modernity'.

As established in Chapter 3, home is with cattle; the fourth chapter builds on this specific analysis and looks at cattle as a non-human entity of sociability and the effect of mediated communication upon herding. The chapter explains how Maasai's mobile relation to land is experienced through the technology of herding cattle and how this technology is, today, fuelled by extensive communication tools. I explore the interspecies interdependencies that generate mobilities; herding, as a daily ritual, is a constant re-enforcement of mobility and is the physical core of the 'nomadic' experience of the Maasai. (As many Maasai do not herd, more abstract experiences and imaginaries of nomadism are explored in Chapter 5). Chapter 4, then, presents individual narratives about herding as representations of the contemporary herding system that is increasingly applied throughout Tanzania's Maasailand. It distinguishes

between both herding and the herder, thereby generating novel insights into the technology of mobility that is herding.

Herding is the coordination of a set of techniques aimed at bringing animals together in a group, of looking after and controlling livestock such as cattle, goats, sheep or reindeer. The technology of herding is an inherently mobile act, enforcing daily and from the earliest age (toddlers as herders) the dynamic of mobility. This is the most physical symptom of a culture of mobility. Herding is aided and abetted by an expanding number of technologies aimed at coordinating, simplifying, diversifying and increasing the economic productivity of the activity.

In the fifth chapter, I ask how a culture of mobility is created and (re-)produced through imaginaries as communication devices. Chapter 3 introduces readers to how imaginaries shape identity, and so Chapter 5 builds on this by looking into its parenthetical gender and power dynamics. It presents these imaginaries as being technologies of collective dreaming, while deconstructing tourist desires and examining how gender roles are acted out according to their imaginaries. Imaginaries, it is argued, lie at the interstices between technology, communication and mobility. The chapter dissects why imaginaries of the mobile 'warrior/herder' man versus the woman as a homemaker, as the stable entity, can exist despite female migration, such as in the case of marriage.

Another masculine imaginary is that of the noble savage, often a tourismified imaginary. These imaginaries are powerful, collectively shared and transmitted images, wishes and ideals that are often shared by tourists descending upon Ngorongoro. They are meaning-making devices often transmitting dreams and ideas of the 'African primitive'. On the receiving, Maasai, end these imaginaries form technologies of persuasion, communication and an increasingly important livelihood

strategy. This chapter asks how the Maasai in Ngorongoro, who engage heavily with tourists, interpret and act upon the desires of tourists. To what extent does staging the literary figure of the 'noble savage', thereby acting as ambassadors of the last frontier of wild Africa, interfere with their daily life and culture? Arguments about the Maasai 'dying out' have been made for over 100 years, an aspect of the research alluded to above. This is a contention made both internally, with elders frowning upon younger generations, and more strongly by policy makers, writers, conservationists and tourists.

Chapter 6 examines representations of cultural rites and practices and investigates the mechanisms that attempt to commodify and to brand Maasai culture. It analyses culture as an emergent process, reborn through ceremony. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 analyse the construction of human mobility practices and the interplay with communication and technology. This chapter turns to the final part of the research question, '[..] the dialogue with members of a cultural group and in its reaction to non-members', and what this dialogue does for Maasai culture. This chapter is framed from the perspective of power and agency and cultural self-determination. Culture is analysed from a Maasai perspective of what culture is or is not. Maasai culture is undergoing transformations in terms of it commodification, in which internal agency is driving change, a culture of mobility that is transforming and is never static. The chapter further explores new trends, such as the quest for developing intellectual property rights to goods and services that are branded as either 'Maasai' or 'Masai'.

This chapter gives specific attention to the sub-question: How is a culture of mobility created and (re-)produced through communication? It is formed through dialogue, with both the Maasai and non-Maasai as well as ritualized communication in the shape of ceremony. The premise analysed here concerns the idea that only the

Maasai have culture, a sense-making tool both for the curiosity of Others about the Maasai and in order to justify cultural practices. This is a sense of exclusivity developed in relation to the confusing colonial and nation-state policies geared towards either integrating or excluding the Maasai from Tanzanian culture. Moreover, the sixth chapter examines the devices utilised so that culture can be consumed, popularised and archived in terms of digital remembrance. This approach is beneficial to the understanding of cultural commodification, as it is not a mere reaction to the expectations of foreigners, but is something that has more of an internal demand that is pushing a Maasai pop culture, of sorts, forward.

In Chapter 7, I ask how customary mobile practices have enabled the successful integration of mobile communication technologies, such as the mobile phone. I inquire specifically into the continuity wherein human mobility practices are constructed and reproduced and how the 'high tech' does not do much more than reflect basic human activity, such as the need to communicate. The objective is to explore: 'what is new about what always has been'; the chapter examines how novel technologies, such as mobile phones, have been adopted into a socio-cultural, political and economic network in which their use becomes an extension and a catalyst of well-established and historically influenced practices. As an elaboration upon that topic, I argue that customary mobile practices have enabled the successful integration of mobile technologies, such as the mobile phone, into Maasailand in the first place. Although younger Maasai research participants report how their lives have improved, senior elders complain that mobile technologies aid younger generations in superseding traditional hierarchy structures. While it is true that mobile phones enable new social mobilities, within both Maasai culture and within Tanzanian society in general, I argue why it is wrong to assume that technology causes radical cultural

change. The Maasai are agents of change and technologies, such as the phone, emulate historical mobilities in what is an evolving and revolving culture.

In Chapter 8, I ask how the Maa people mobilize themselves for indigenous rights, through social media as a communication technology and in dialogue with both Maa and non Maa people. Most fieldwork was carried out on Facebook, on different pages and in among different groups, often with activists from both Kenya and Tanzania, despite their political realities and their problems being acutely different in kind. The petition platform 'Avaaz' has also played an increasingly important role, provoking presidential tweets and in generating millions of global signatures demanding that the Maasai not be displaced from their 'ancestral lands'. Spearheading this debate, at the time during which I started my research, were Maasai indigenous rights activists. They form a sort of scorned elite and their social mobility within and outside Maasai society, explored within this chapter, is complex and often contradictory. These 'Modern Maasai' find themselves accused of turning on Maa culture, something that is necessary and respected in the pursuit of land right campaigns. Since then, and with the proliferation of smart phones in ordinary households, this has become an increasingly 'democratic' debate. 'Ordinary' herders, mamas, elders, high school students and other members of Maasai society join in, not just protests on the ground, but also in global debates on the rights of the indigenous peoples.

The chapter discusses both the online mobilization, for a higher degree of autonomy, as well as the networking that takes place on the ground. While the netnographic research engages with both Kenyan and Tanzanian struggles, fieldwork on the ground is narrowed to the Ngorongoro (that is to the NCA and to Loliondo specifically). The netnographic research created opportunities for comparisons,

highlighting discrepancies both in debate culture and in the socio-political realities that Maasai, on both sides of the border, find themselves experiencing. Chapter 8 is a culmination, of sorts, of the research presented in previous chapters; it shows how, for some, more specifically for a young elite, certain technologies allow them to occupy a place that is new (and presents the challenges associated with this) while showing how technologies fit into a pre-existing structure of home and belonging. In previous chapters, I have observed a 'landless people' that define a sense of identity through mobile animal husbandry, but also a surrounding structure that grants rights on the basis of land. It is here that the tensions are teased out and the contradictions studied in greater depth.

The concluding chapter synthesizes and reviews the dissertation and investigates further avenues of research, including the further unravelling of the relation of mobility/immobility regarding technology. It highlights both the possibilities and the limitations of this study, such as not having examined the role of the church or education in relation to mobility more thoroughly. The conclusion further revisits the ethical dilemmas posed in Chapter 2. I also deal with recurring questions for which I am still seeking answers, questions that have intensified and led to additional uninvestigated questions. Here, I encourage readers to think along with me and would be delighted to enter into dialogue with other research directions. I also return to the subquestions elaborated in in each chapter. The conclusion asks what we can learn, beyond the specific case study of the Maasai, and how this dissertation contributes to anthropological knowledge in general.

Chapter 2: Methodology

2.1. Introduction

> *'The Maasai are a warrior tribe. They conquer. All the land they say is theirs, it's all been conquered from other tribes, brutally. They are the most feared of all tribes in Eastern Africa. For hundreds of years it's been their tactic to pillage and murder.'*
>
> Michael, lodge manager, 29 March 2013

I will never forget the quotes which follow that I noted down in my fieldnotes, or the people who told them, during my fieldwork in Tanzania. This is perhaps because they stand out in their crassness, brutality or honesty, or the ways in which these individuals were convinced of their 'truths' about the Maasai and about Maasailand. Being exposed to a great many people who work with the Maasai, I found that so many people have a very double-sided sort of respect towards them. Double-sided in the sense that there is an admiration and that that admiration stretches out towards what is more of an imaginary of the Maasai, and of their past, than it stretches to the actual people with whom they work. Simultaneously, there is also a great deal of frustration and a lack of empathy, alienation and mistrust.

> *'So now the Maasai are complaining about evictions. They scream and shout it's their land. Maasailand. And it's not fair that the government or others are taking their land. But look at the Maasai, they are a tribe of warfare! All the land they say is their land, it's been taken from other tribes. They have evicted and destroyed and now they are being evicted and destroyed. It's war, only now they are losing. It's not a question of their land or somebody else's land.*
> *The strongest wins. This talk about indigenousness is nonsense. It's not their land! It was never their land! They took it, now it's being taken. That's just the way it is'*
>
> Julia, conservationist, 26 April 2013

I was always surprised by the frustration and the way of looking at the Maasai as an obstacle, viewing them as a hindrance one is entitled to get rid of for the sake of a higher aim, which many tourism service providers, officials and conservationists in the Ngorongoro display about the Maasai. This is not their land, they do not know how to take care of it, they have evicted others and hence we should evict them; these are the logics with which the side-lining of the Maasai, in all matters regarding the management of Ngorongoro's incredible natural resource were justified, logics which were consistently baffling to me. Most matters boil down to the question of 'whose land is it anyway?' And, frustratingly enough, this is a question, or rather an ethical dilemma, that I have never been able to answer; this is perhaps because there is no clear-cut answer, no one singular truth, no legal framework through which to grasp all of the complexities regarding who is entitled to land access in Maasailand and who is excluded.

> *'If a Maasai crossed into Tatoga [sic] territory he would be killed. Also, the same for a Tatoga if he comes into a Maasai village they would kill him. And we would steal each other's cattle, also we believe that all cattle is kept for us, so we can steal it rightfully. […] Official peace talks were held in 1993 and traditional leaders signed a peace agreement. Now we are friends, we even sponsor many Tatogas in secondary school or college. […] One day when I was a child I was herding cattle outside Endulen and I came across two Tatoga men, they had caught a Maasai and they killed him with a knife in front of my eyes. I ran home!'* Loserian, Research Assistant, 9 May 2013

'What is new about what has been'? I have asked, and disputes regarding the use of land, for one, are nothing new. The paths through which they are navigated are shifting, though, and so are the technologies that mediate them. The following sections explain the ways in which the research of this dissertation was carried out and presents ethical reflections. While the bulk of research was ethnographic and

conducted in Ngorongoro, netnography allowed for a more dynamic way of doing fieldwork, better grasping the mobile core of contemporary Maasai identity. My decision to do this research project, and the ways in which I went about conducting the research, were both informed by my upbringing in Tanzania and a master's thesis based upon the Maasai in Ngorongoro concerning conservation and development (Nilsson, 2011). I first lived in Arusha, Tanzania from 1997 to 2001, moving to Germany thereafter at age 12. Disillusioned by post-9/11 Heidelberg, I vowed to return to Tanzania as quickly as possible. It was not so much Tanzania that attracted me, but it was an imaginary of Tanzania, an ideal state, blind to the risks that had made us leave the country.

Ethnographic fieldwork was backed up and complemented by netnographic research. Social media platforms serve the purpose of strengthening Maasai rights and establishing an international-local rapport. I seek to expand the knowledge gained through Hodgson's (2011) detailed study of indigenous rights activism, with a focus on online activism. The purpose of this exercise, which required the employment of netnography as a research method (see 2.1.3.), is to show how the Maa people mobilize for one purpose and seek to strengthen and establish their rights to Maasailand through this communication technology, and in dialogue with both Maa and non Maa people.[16]

2.2. Ethnography in the field

My ethnographic account aims to provide detail on rituals (Chapter 6), daily rhythms

[16] I speak of Maa people here because online activism often includes Maa-speaking sections whose Maasai identity is often questioned (both by themselves and by Maasai), the Samburu or Warusha for instance.

(Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 7) landscape (Chapters 3 and 4) and politics and ideology (Chapters 4 and 8) through the taking and keeping of fieldnotes. I wish to provide a rich and critically developed context, brought out in the ethnographic vignettes which introduce each of the subsequent chapters, as well as the topics to which those chapters are devoted. I hope to enable readers to temporarily insert themselves into the life-worlds of research participants. In-depth and reflexive field research (Barnard, 2004) was conducted between March and October 2013, in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area primarily (See map in Appendix 2).

2.2.1. Sampling method and research sites

My sampling method was participant-driven; I started with a small pool of initial informants (the key informants being my research assistant as well as Solomon and Sululu, employees of the Pastoralist Council, junior elders in their early to mid-thirties). Through their wide-reaching social networks, I was quickly led to new informants and to all corners of the Ngorongoro. The high mobility and well-connectedness of these three initial research participants (all junior elders) also enabled both the geographic coverage and the wide range of participants in terms of social status and age.[17] As junior elders, all three key initial informants manage cattle. Solomon and Sululu are even involved in strategic and managerial decisions on a daily basis. However, being employees of the PC, these initial informants, also adopted somewhat exceptional and atypical Maasai roles. As employees of the Pastoralist Council, and in having access to the Pastoralist Council Land Cruiser, my

[17] In hindsight, I recognize a short-coming in terms of gender, given most research participants were male.

closest research participants were, to a certain extent, privileged; authority comes with working for what is essentially a body of the NCAA. I only truly realised this after a wedding function (see 3.1. and 3.3.) when these research participants opted to attend a wedding by staying inside the car, being serviced with cold beverages without ever having to leave the vehicle. It was at this stage that it became clear to me that I had to place more of an emphasis on conducting field research beyond the initial pool of informants (which I did all along, though it was at this point that I realized that relying too heavily on their voices alone would mean that I could skew the data, given their authoritative positions). A secondary key source was the people at Rhino Lodge, the venue at which I stayed, given that the majority of the employees were Maasai and so, in turn, were their social networks. The lodge is situated near the crater rim and is some 15 minutes' drive from Solomon's and Sululu's *bomas*. A receptionist (warrior) introduced me to his mother, who introduced me to the women behind the bead trade in Ngorongoro.

I concur with Mannheim and Tedlock (1995) that ethnography (except autoethnography) is an intercultural phenomenon (re-)produced in dialogue between the ethnographer and research participants. There should be no evident hierarchy between research derived from scholarly discourse and ethnography produced in dialogue with research participants. On a similar note, Lindquist (2009) urges anthropologists to take the concepts of their research participants as point-of-departures in anthropological inquiry. Anthropology is inherently comparative; it can never erase the background of the anthropologist, to which he or she relates, nor can it ignore the interaction and mobility of cultures prior to the arrival of the anthropologist to the field or site of research. Although the extent to which research can be accepted as anthropological, is the extent to which it depends upon 'the field'.

Gupta and Ferguson (1997) argue that 'the field' has been left obscure for far too long. Central to anthropologists' identities, 'the field' has been taken for granted, the 'what' is often given precedence over the 'where'. Furthermore, 'the field' is not just increasingly multi-sited, it is also increasingly 'virtual' with the global expansion of ICT technology. Boellstorff (2012) argues for a thorough ethnographic method that does not need to distinguish virtual from non-virtual sites in terms of quality of produced work. Here, Facebook was, and remains, an important 'site'. In line with the critique of Gupta and Ferguson (1997), I have attempted to explore both the possibilities and limits of the field, recognizing that my experience of the field is influenced and limited by my own identity, a topic explored further in the next section. My master's thesis research, exploratory with respect to the doctoral thesis, was carried out in Ngorongoro.

The NCA is unique in terms of its land use schemes and the interaction between Maasai, the government and tourism. It is not only heavily populated by Maasai, but is also a wildlife conservation area with the world's largest density of large game and tourist-crowded wildlife reserves. With different stakeholders pursuing interests in sustaining livelihoods, conservation and tourism, Ngorongoro is the backdrop for intense struggles over land use and political power. Karatu, bordering the NCA, is a town with a greatly diversified population and Arusha, the centre for pastoralist NGOs, is home to many Maasai indigenous rights activists as well as tour guides (see map in Appendix 3). Loliondo (Ngorongoro district) has, in recent years, experienced an internationally widely documented land rights dispute between the Maasai communities, on the one hand, and a Dubai-based corporation linked to the al Maktoum royal family, the Tanzanian government and conservationist organizations

seeking to evict the pastoralist community to enlarge the private hunting grounds of the Prince on the other.[18]

The high degree of media attention generated by the land rights dispute is the consequence of local Maasai documenting the process on their mobile phones and of (Maasai) indigenous rights activists spreading information on the internet primarily. My motivation to focus fieldwork mainly on Tanzania was based upon my expertise concerning the region and feasibility, but I believe that there is no argument for limiting the study to a particular setting within a political border that is actively contested and challenged by Maasai. Hence, online research was carried out too, and which included Kenyan Maasai, making the political dimensions clearer and highlighting the impacts that this political separation has had upon Maasai identity and the scope and ways in which Maasai work to contest borders and gain access to land, cross border cattle trade, politics and to society as a whole.

The ethnography I ultimately came to practice in Ngorongoro is close to what Geertz (2000) calls 'deep hanging out'. I walked, went to the markets, to offices, weddings and coming of age ceremonies, learnt how to craft jewellery, shared freshly slaughtered beef or goat over camp fires with warriors and elders, dozed in the sun, herded cattle, drank traditional brews and gradually immersed myself into what was, predominantly, male Maasai society.

[18] http://goo.gl/swsLgE

2.2.2. Language

Language was a barrier preventing me from engaging, on a long-term basis, with women. Few women speak English and many speak little or no Swahili. This is due to their lack of formal education. Swahili is the primary school education language and English was, until 2015, the educational language of secondary school (now English is being replaced with Swahili). My Maa is very limited; I had considered learning it in the field, but improving my intermediate level Swahili (learnt first 1997-2001) turned out to be more fruitful as it was easier and given that most of my research participants spoke Swahili well, having gone to primary school and many had an intermediate level of English.

Another factor regarding not engaging women as much as was hoped, was that people simply did not recognise me as a woman, but as a hybrid form of an anthropologist, tourist, white person, potential white Maasai, object of status, cultureless persona, potential investor, odd person, woman acting like a man and so forth. I was mostly invited to do male activities and to sit with the men. Due to educational differences, it is far more common for men to master Swahili and English than women. Nevertheless, I did get to do some fieldwork with women, both elites and 'mamas' (usually the wives of senior elders, a 'mama' is the mother of someone who is already a warrior or she is mother to a married woman). My research assistant Loserian served as my main translator between English (in which he is fluent) and Maa, as well as any advanced Swahili. Maa is a very complex language, with male, female and neutral nouns, and countless one-word expressions for what would require an entire sentence in English (and vice versa). Increasingly, Maa borrows from Swahili and many of my educated research participants would sometimes blend Maa, Swahili and English in various discussions.

Unfortunately, I did not learn Maa beyond greetings and very basic phrases although people were keen, surprised and honoured to try teach me, even though I would hopelessly forget things. Not speaking Maa meant that I had easier access to data collected from men, mainly educated (primary school or beyond) warriors and junior elders. This had the important repercussion that most of my research concerns men and that many research participants played vocal roles beyond Maasai society, with salaried positions or in activist work. Not speaking Maa also meant having to pay attention to the words used in English or Swahili, and the patterns or recurring phrases, along with paying attention to the different politics and histories that can be imbued upon an English word versus a Maa word; for example, Maasailand/*Oloosho* or Modern Maasai/*Ormeek*. While I equate Maasailand with *Oloshoo*, because this is what my English speaking Maasai research participants also do, Maasailand could also be interpreted as the Colonial reserve (Hodgson, 1999). The word *Oloshoo* captures much more than territory and is often used to characterise home (see Chapters 3 and 5).

Maa has only been a written language for a few decades, and so relying on Maasai accounts of Maasai history is a matter of taking down life histories and oral narratives. Archival research only reflects colonial views and impressions. No written data captures Maasai history prior to colonial times. Historical narratives by Maasai do date back some 400 years, when they are believed to have settled in their current locations. These form a myriad of tales and myths, differing slightly from story-teller to story-teller. Stories are replete with contradictions and imaginaries that reflect today's political realities. Although this makes it difficult to capture the ways in which social networks were created, and what constituted effective technologies in the past and how exactly these influence the contemporary, anthropology has taught me that

there can be no absolute truth. Truth is what your research participants consider it to be. Everyone has their own truth and an assemblage of all these truths form the body of knowledge necessary to human mobility practices in Maasailand.

2.2.3. Research 'on the move'

Methods employed often reflect broader anthropological theory itself; I have often employed mobile methods to answer questions concerning mobilities. I was influenced by Salazar and Smart (2011) who take a critical, reflective look at the mobilities lens in fieldwork, urging scholars to do likewise while harnessing the benefits of a mobilities approach, not to lose sight of other patterns in doing fieldwork. Sheller (2013) deems it to be one of the virtues of the methodological toolkit, being developed within mobility studies, that scholars experiment with various and mobile methods of fieldwork. Though I did follow Sheller's call, employing mobile methods to study mobilities is not a necessity. As well as reflecting epistemology, mobile methods also reflect a practical shift in methodology. Cyber research, coined as a mobile methodology by Sheller and Urry (2006), was particularly useful, both in researching online activism (Chapter 8) and in maintaining contact with research participants after fieldwork to follow up and to clarify on countless leads and questions I had as I was writing up the dissertation. Sheller writes that:

> 'The generative focus on mobilities has led to methodological innovation, as researchers have pushed to find empirical evidence pertinent to the study of mobilities and to invent instruments up to the task of measuring the changing nature of time, space and movement. Some have called for new analytical orientations and new methodologies in order to study especially the more

> ephemeral, embodied and affective dimensions of interlocking relational (im)mobilities that are not captured using traditional methods.' (2013:7)

My ethnographic fieldwork was very much mobile, rather than applying a programmatic methodology, my research assistant and principal research participants were constantly on the move (performing tasks throughout the NCA and at times Ngorongoro District for the Pastoralist Council). My fieldwork corresponded to the call, by Vergunst (2011), to follow the paths of my research participants while remaining aware that our destinations can differ. I did experience that by conducting ethnography 'on the move', by foot or car, the (moving) location informed what was being said and the relation to the landscape was given more context. However, this did not happen to the extent expected by reading the works of Evans and Jones (2011) or Carpiano (2009) concerning mobile methodologies. After all, more 'static' fieldwork, i.e. some thirty semi-structured interviews and participatory observation in informant's homes, also produces highly textured descriptions of landscape, mobility and relation to nature. This is much more similar to what was said while Maasai were herding cattle or walking. Büscher et al. (2010) further note the ground-breaking power of mobile methods given that:

> 'Through investigations of movement, blocked movement, potential movement and immobility, dwelling and place-making, social scientists are showing how various kinds of 'moves' make social and material realities […] open[s] up different ways of understanding the relationship between theory, observation and engagement. It engenders new kinds of researchable entities, a new or rediscovered realm of the empirical and new avenues for critique.' (Büscher et al., 2010:2)

Participatory observation of your research participants (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2011) is an indispensable method by which to transmit context and participants' narratives

were also employed to enable and facilitate am understanding of identity and mobility and how these are imagined and experienced. In selecting interviewees, not knowing and doubting my research objectives and questions increased the difficulty in both choosing and probing. The textured descriptions, which the interviewees provided me, were made available thanks to the Pastoralist Council employees' willingness to let me join them in their daily outreach activities across the NCA. Participants came from all corners of the NCA (and also Loliondo) and had diverse socio-economic backgrounds and age-sets. These included members of parliament, illiterate venerable elders, educated warriors, herders, traditional leaders, veterinarians and young Maasai feminists. The role of the Pastoralist Council must also be discussed in terms of research ethics. The Pastoralist Council is a political body, a part of the NCAA that functions as a counter-weight to the NCAA itself. The Pastoralist Council employees, however, do not have political mandates; instead, they fulfil community outreach duties, many of which are related to ensuring that children go to school, maize stocks are filled and accounting is done at markets (the three PC accountants are mobile bank service providers at markets or other venues with large transactions, since there is no bank in the NCA).

In 2013, I stayed at the Rhino Lodge in Ngorongoro for 7 months. As well as a research permit and a research visa, conducting research in the NCA also requires a document from the NCAA. Otherwise, non-Tanzanians are required to pay 50USD/day to visit the conservation area. I was stopped regularly by rangers and asked to provide documentation. Researchers stay at lodges, the Oldupai paleoanthropological site, the guest house of the Endulen hospital or at one of the two NCAA camps. Although I would have loved to stay at a *boma,* and I believe my social network would have easily permitted me to do so, foreigners are not 'allowed out'

after dark (except when accompanied by NCAA staff, which, technically, the PC staff are). Initially, the NCAA and its conservator showed interest in monitoring my work and I was invited to the Head Quarters to discuss my motives, 'in the interest of the NCAA and for the benefit of the Maasai people'. Being connected to the PC helped to keep the NCAA calm, but in light of tumult regarding NCAA leadership, the NCAA's interest in my work faded quickly.

Rhino Lodge is staffed largely by local Maasai.[19] This helped me to access all areas of the NCA for in-depth participatory observation and semi-structured interviews. Maasai lodge employees were helpful in providing insights or explanations to things that I had observed during the day. My stay in Ngorongoro fundamentally challenged my perceptions and prejudices of 'modernity' as well as particular kinds of spectacle, which instead of a conceptually dense examination of performativity was simply to be understood as entertainment (see Chapter 6). My research assistant worked as an accountant for the Pastoralist Council (PC), the pastoralist representative body at the NCA-Authority (NCAA). Being the smallest and least well-funded branch of the NCAA, its ideal role is as the watchdog of the indigenous population over the parastatal regime governing the land. Participatory-observational research took place among a very diverse group of people at the lodge, in various villages, at political institutions such as the NCAA Head Quarters, the Pastoralist Council, Party (CCM) gatherings, in schools and clinics, while walking, at the market, on the road and on the savannah. Instead of testing hypotheses, social and cultural phenomena were generally explored with respect to the research questions outlined above. Ultimately, the car and travelling therein, or conducting 'ride alongs'

[19] The lodge is co-owned by an Italian-American couple with the Pastoralist Council acting as a minority shareholder.

(Ferguson, 2011) was a big factor in fieldwork as I would come along with the outreach programmes of the Pastoralist Council (PC) on a near-daily basis.

The PC car became a central meeting point, both for chance encounters with hitch-hikers (women and (young) men), who typically cover many kilometres by foot every day and try waving down any car that is not a tourist vehicle; the car was equally the best-suited place to ask my closest research participants a few questions, as we often spent the entire day in its confines. At times, we would participate in events and not even leave the car; this included weddings, for instance, to which we would make out approach only to remain in the car, have people come up to us offering us soft drinks and engaging in conversation. We took pictures and videos of them; they took pictures and videos of us. Being recognizable to most inhabitants of the NCA, the PC car was a very 'non-threatening' vehicle (unlike other NCAA cars, the presence of which often evoke fear) and people placed great hopes in them, asking for rides, asking for money, asking for things and animals to be transported in it, asking for us to discard dead (human) bodies into the bush with the help of the car or to take people to the hospital.

On the move, it became a meeting point, a bank, a place of trade, a display of status and power, an ambulance and a vehicle of curiosity (there would often be someone riding along for no other reason than to just ride along). The car, being the most important conveyance by which to get around for my research and also a major 'site' of research, all at the same time, distanced us (the PC employees and myself) from them, the people around us, as having a car that was provided by government money is a huge privilege; however, it also brought us physically closer to the places we were going and to all the people who approached us while travelling. If you are

successful, and being in that car means that you are successful, you cannot easily turn down requests, particularly financial ones.

2.3. Reflexivity and autobiography

My academic background prior to anthropology was in economics and then in cultures and development studies. This has undeniably informed my work ethic and approach in the sense that I often think in terms of models, hypotheses and problem-solving. Prior to fieldwork in Tanzania, I had about 15 months to prepare for the undertaking of this research in Leuven, getting used to the inductive method, as opposed to the 'problem-solving' with which I had been acquainted in previous studies and preparing for qualitative research. Researching for my master thesis in cultures and development studies I was first introduced to qualitative research. I grew up partially in Arusha in Tanzania and it was a longing for this, to an extent imagined, 'home' that fuelled the decision to take on this PhD project. I moved to Arusha in 1997, at age 8 and back to Europe in 2001. My father, ever-believing that a world economic collapse was imminent, would always say things like: 'The Maasai have it all figured out. They were here before us and they will be here after us.' Although his only source of information regarding the Maasai were our *askaris* (guards), the men wandering the streets of Arusha and the women my mother would buy products from at the Maasai Market, and his own non-Maasai employees who largely looked down upon the Maasai; his positivist view on the Maasai made a lasting impression on me.[20]

[20] The Maasai Market is an open-air market in Arusha where Maasai people, mostly, sell all kinds of produce and artifacts; they sell to locals primarily and to tourists to a far lesser extent.

Being an individualist, I was also fascinated by the defiant dress code to which our *askaris* would adhere. I was also intrigued by the fear the bright red *shuka* would invoke in some (the *askaris* never wore blue). I found it tremendously cool that people would elect to stick out like that. Every morning, I would wait at the gate of the ABB camp, our company's gated community, for the school bus with two Maasai *askaris*, picking up a few odd words here and there, but mainly just admiring their attire (fashion being another great interest of mine). We would often go to Ngorongoro on weekends; the road leading off the Arusha Dodoma highway, in the direction of the NCA, was not paved at the time so it would take a good 4 hours. We would bring a picnic bag and spread everything out onto *shukas* at the first Ngorongoro Crater view point, just hanging out, lazily, and in a manner as though time stood still, ignoring tourists who would stop, take pictures and then move on, not unlike the many *nyama choma* picnics I would experience with my research participants. Back then, I wished I were Maasai so I could actually live there; it has been my favourite place on earth ever since. I have always found some views, which lie dormant in certain statements popular in tourism-related discourses or with Tanzanian government officials, such as 'The Maasai are dying out', to be toxic and paternalistic.

While some research participants found note-taking to be disruptive, others were offended if I did not have a pen and paper or a laptop out in front of me. Steering the conversation with senior elders (and certainly with venerable elders) was near impossible; any question asked would turn into a historical voyage into Maasailand and Maasai life as they experienced it, always with an emphasis on the mobile and the nomadic, culminating in a defence of the Maasai's capabilities to live in harmony with nature. It is hard to assess whether this emphasis on nature is a defence mechanism towards the conservationist doctrine that pastoralism is not sustainable, with other

white researchers in the region being conservationists, or whether this emphasis on the Maasai's special bond to nature is a sincere conviction. I am inclined to believe that it is actually both. Younger participants speak much less of nature and, again, it is hard to discern whether they did not realize the political importance of stressing harmony with nature to a Western researcher or if they are more distanced to nature as their lives are more sedentary with schooling and in the aftermath of the decrease of available land for semi-nomadic practices.

2.4. Netnographic research

Netnography refers to the branch of ethnography that analyses both Internet communities and observes human behaviour outside the virtual world, but via the Internet. Sheller and Urry (2006) present cyber research as one of their seven prominent mobile methods of doing research. In the context of online or cyber research, Kozinets (2009) coined the term netnography, studying its efficiency extensively. Netnography is 'Internet Ethnography', so it is part of cyber research (other forms of cyber research would include methods like metadata analysis, tracking of statistics, etc.) Like ethnography, it is immersive and involves a multi-method approach. This is the methodological anchoring point in which the examination of the usage and implication of social media is embedded. Doing netnography amongst Tanzanian (and Kenyan) Maasai was of particular use to this study, especially for Chapter 8 which deals with activism. Netnography was very helpful in terms of establishing contact with research participants, prior to ethnographic fieldwork as well as in maintaining follow-up research afterwards. In a meeting with Dorothy Hodgson at Rutgers in late 2012 (Hodgson having recently published a book on the indigenous

rights struggle of the Maasai), she maintained that indigenous rights activism was a halting enterprise and that not much new could spring out of further research into the movement. Seeing how indigenous rights activism was being reborn online, I was more than happy to take up the challenge and to uncover the local and international interactions of Maasai indigenous rights activists. Boellstorff (2012) argues that in anthropology, the digital has been met by a "profound theoretical silence" (pg. 39), this despite his prediction that few future ethnographic projects will have no digital element. He urges scholars to inform themselves better and takes the digital as a methodological approach rather than an object of study. As a technique, the digital in anthropology should be founded in participatory observation.

Throughout the project, I have maintained contact in the digital field, via social media such as Facebook.[21] Facebook is viewed as being synonymous with the Internet for many Maasai, who use it both to get political messages across as well as by uploading and sharing videos or sharing biblical quotes. I have met and discussed, with students of anthropology who carried out all of their research online and who argue that the virtual sphere is not inferior to the physical one. While I would not want to create a hierarchy between the two, people act very differently in the two arenas. Davis (2008) stresses the importance of validating and strengthening online ethnographic experiences by face-to-face meetings. The argument became clear to me while living in Ngorongoro, a place in which I could put all the mobile phone video clips and internet debates into a context of both cultural shift and the maintenance of traditions, driven by the usage of technologies of mobility. Daniel Miller, one of the most prolific anthropologists studying 'material culture' and more

[21] Most activist pages have a 'closed' status, in view of the growing awareness of government and other interest groups that monitor the pages; I will discuss public groups to a greater extent in Chapter 8.

recently social media and digital anthropology, stresses the existence of a schism between online and offline identity (2013, 2016). His arguments are not about the digital being inferior or less true; instead, his focus is on how people play out different identities in different contexts. Some people feel that they can only experience and realise their true selves on digital platforms.

In a discussion with Daniel Miller, at a University of Leuven workshop in 2016, Miller made some very valid comments as to how to put things in perspective when doing netnography, because the internet magnifies aggressions, relations and also the importance of people. Anyone can be a 'keyboard warrior' and being a vocal activist online does not automatically make your voice relevant on the ground. Miller's assessment puts me in mind of one of the most active (online) conservationist activists in Tanzania. Doing netnography, I was under the impression that he was a 'big name' speaking to 'on the ground' conservationists; I soon discovered his NGO to be dormant, following the catastrophic outcome of his policy recommendations in Southern Africa on culling elephants and his online activity to be a substitution for the loss of respect (and funding) within the world of conservation. My focus has altered dramatically throughout the course of the PhD project. I undertook my netnographic research believing that I would be answering what mobile concepts of indigeneity are and wound up fascinated by the selective, conservative and yet rigorously embracive approach to technology that my research participants displayed. Although the theme has shifted, the research question that gave this project its first impetus still fits in with answering the final research question, so netnographic work remains central to this dissertation.

Chapter 8 of this dissertation includes netnographic research that was carried out online, via participatory observation in Facebook groups and on Facebook pages.

Open-ended interviews, via Facebook private messaging, were carried out over a twelve-month period with fifty individuals; the majority of whom were Maasai who are regularly active on Facebook. Non-Maasai activists for indigenous/human rights were also interviewed, as were several opponents to Maasai 'interests'. Netnographic research was backed up with face-to-face meetings with five of the activists being interviewed by me. All participants were informed that I was doing research with the purposes of publishing a scholarly dissertation on the Maasai and Facebook and that their commentary would contribute to this work.

2.5. Research ethics

I have previously mentioned meeting Dorothy Hodgson at Rutgers University a few months into my doctoral studies. Hodgson is a feminist anthropologist who has written perhaps the most valuable ethnographic and historical accounts of Maasai culture in Tanzania. Somehow the topic of obtaining research permits came up. Not knowing what terrain I was stepping into, I said that I would try to get a permit from the Tanzanian state, but would not care too much if the authorities would not cooperate. Obtaining a research permit and a research visa, two separate entities, typically requires the hiring of a 'consultancy agency' and at the time (2013) it cost me ca. 1,200 USD and the consultants submit your documents with the proper authorities. The fees go into the work of 'submitting' your documentation to the authorities, although you do all the submitting yourself. Personally, I found the process to be unethical, just as I found the idea that a government has to approve of your research intentions in order for the research to be correct, to be unethical in the utmost, a dangerous thought even. Considering the politically motivated

marginalisation of the Maasai, especially in northern Ngorongoro, in which a slew of journalists and bloggers have been deported or prevented from doing research, the entire process of writing your research application to the Tanzanian state, in a way that seems as unthreatening as possible to the authorities, is a farce. Hodgson could not agree less. She considered 'unauthorized' research to be unethical.

I believe that it is very important to distinguish here between ethics and the law. Ethical and legal procedures can differ. This discussion marked the start of my engagement with ethics in anthropology and I believe questions like the ones above are rather important not to shy away from. A European anthropologist (whose name has escaped me) that I had discussed this with shortly after a trip to the United States suggested there was a different approach to research ethics in the United States. Looking up the ethical guidelines of the American Anthropological Association (and finding that the European Association of Social Anthropologists does not have ethical guidelines), I agree and I see ethical dilemmas in both the American and the European stances (or lack of stance).[22] I applaud an active discussion concerning research ethics (as in the case of North America) and wish for more debate in Europe. Yet, I also find it troubling that the AAA's ethical guidelines are concise statements, so as to be remembered easily. If one can only take an ethical stance based on easy-to-remember statements, rather than developing one's own ethical viewpoint, one should perhaps not be doing fieldwork. It is important for anthropologists to remember that these guidelines are indices that are open for discussion and that one's ethical stance should be informed by research participants and the field site.

[22] http://ethics.americananthro.org/category/statement/

Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) make the important remark that there is a multitude of values and cultures that inform an ethical stance. As a researcher, it is important to recognize that one's own value system is likely to differ from that of one's research participants and their approach to different ideologies and the stances that derive therefrom in this respect. This can of course be challenging. On one occasion, a (Maasai) research participant posted on Facebook that gay people should be punished with life imprisonment, or killed; I snapped. Engaging in a heated debate, in which he quoted the bible, and I quoted my own ideological beliefs I then defriended the research participant. In retrospect, I believe that my actions were unethical. I let my values get in the way and played the role of the cultural imperialist. Similarly, I interjected political thought about the NCA agricultural ban, as can be witnessed in a fieldnote in Chapter 4, section 7. I did not even see the politics in my interjection, before a reader commented on them. Fassin (2012) believes that anthropology should not be a moralizing subject. He problematises how, historically, anthropologists have acted as moral agents. In light of the argument I had with my research participant, I agree that problematizing the issue is important, but I equally believe that it can be difficult to erase moral judgement when in the field and often impossible to erase judgement totally when writing; we can often get political without realising.

I do wish I had dared to push Hodgson a little further on her stance on ethical research, instead I switched the topic and then spent time panicking over whether I would obtain all the correct permits. I also fretted about how I would have to represent, or rather misrepresent, my research to make it appealing towards a government that views pastoralism to be an outdated practice that must be ended.[23]

[23] http://site.uit.no/urfolksforum/tanzania-update-maasai-pastoralists-as-a-worst-practice-of-land-andlegitimacy/

This would not be the first time my disregard for political correctness got me clashing with other anthropologists. For those who value the seal of approval from a nation state that is ranked as being the 117th most corrupt of 168, by transparency international's anti-corruption list, and the means of obtaining it through a most obscure 'consulting firm', I obtained both the research permit and visa before conducting fieldwork. [24] My opinion remains that the approval of a nation-state is often unnecessary from an ethical perspective, even where not seeking approval may be illegal. If a nation were to deny a research permit, I believe the research would often be even more important to pursue, from an ethical stance. Cases in which I would see the ethical procedure convergent to legal procedure would be, for instance, medical trials or research extracting natural resources or a nation's cultural heritage. This is, I understand, a contested opinion, and one I invite readers to reflect upon and to criticise.

We must differentiate between research ethics and whether or not we ought to be moralists. Maintaining high research ethics is a given, I believe, for any anthropologist with a conscience, although the question of what constitutes ethical research, and what does not, is open for debate. In defence of 'science' and 'objectivity', d'Andrade (1995) laments the trend of a moral anthropology. He believes that moral and objective models should be kept distinct. Scheper-Hughes, he argues, had attacked the scientific value of anthropology by defending a moral position as an anthropologist. Scheper-Hughes (1995) on the other hand openly argues for a political and moral anthropology. She believes that one cannot suspend the ethical when engaging with a multiplicity of alternate truths. Her call to reconsider the

[24] https://www.transparency.org/country/#idx99

anthropologists' neutral role came in the wake of her field research in South Africa during the fall of Apartheid.

I believe the debate between D'Andrade and Scheper-Hughes is more about being moralistic and less about morals proper. I am torn between these stances. I do find it troubling, and an act of cultural imperialism, to judge the deeds of my research participants through the lens of my own world view, although I can empathize with Scheper-Hughes being moralistic about the practice of 'necklacing'.[25] I am faced with a discipline in which my world-view largely clashes with that of other scholars and I do not always shy away from arguing from my ideological (and moral) perspective. I have tried (and at times failed) to keep moralistic stances out of my engagement with research participants, but I have not kept moralism out of dialogue with anthropologists and with anthropological work.

In an essay published as a dialogue, Fassin and Stoczkowski (2008) also argue about the morals in anthropology. Fassin maintains that, as anthropologists, we have an obligation to maintain ethical standards, but not to be moralistic while Stoczkowski argues that as anthropologists we often mobilize certain value systems and are often not aware that we are doing so. Perhaps, because my value system is not aligned with that of most anthropologists, I have always been aware of Stoczkowski's observation. I see ideology in nearly every written text. It is, I believe, unavoidable not to write, at times, as an activist or as an ideologist and I have written as both. At times it may even be desirable to adopt an openly political stance. It is, I argue, morally just to acknowledge that one is not apolitical and one enters the field with a set value system; the system may shift, but it guides us, as a moral compass does. Reconciling the

[25] 'Necklacing' is the practice of placing tires around the necks of people, pouring gasoline over the tires and setting people on fire.

ideological paradigms that prevail in anthropology with my own world view has been a fascinating journey in itself, the highlights of which included wearing authentic leopard fur at the African Studies Association Conference 2012 in Philadelphia, to the shock of a well-known anthropologist present, a speech on 'Third Culture Kids' at EASA 2014 in Tallinn that divided the room into two tensely opposed camps and a book critique for Allegra in 2015, through which I 'came out' as an anarcho-capitalist.[26] Ethics are an important and under-discussed topic in cyber research and netnography. Unlike regular ethnographic fieldwork, in netnography one often 'lurks' as an unknown presence and even though one introduces oneself as a researcher, when observing and not participating, you are invisible to other users. As early as in 2001, Eysenbach and Till wrote an article recommending that scholars conducting qualitative research on the internet reflect on the blurred lines of private and public and on the harm sharing internet data could incur for those researched. In the light of the 'lurking' factor of cyber research, in netnography especially, a comprehensive discussion on research ethics is long overdue. However, Schrooten (2012) takes important steps in mapping out the ethical dilemmas of online fieldwork. She examines how researchers gain access to an online field site, commenting on the lack of physical presence in the research setting and how informed consent is acquired online. Some scholars maintain that the internet is a public domain (Magnet, 2007) and, hence, researchers have an implicit consent to publish data. I agree with Schrooten (2012) that the distinction between public and private is, at best, blurry and follow her call to scholars to announce themselves online as scholars and to ask for permission to use data.

[26] http://allegralaboratory.net/stitched-up-part-22-review/

Although many of my online research participants were part of a Maasai elite, their precarious situation became very clear when one activist disappeared in what other participants deemed to have been a government kidnapping in the wake of the 2013 Kenyan elections. This raises the concern that what I publish as a researcher may harm my participants and raises questions regarding how openly I should quote online and activist content. One Maasai activist, whom I had first met online and then met three times in Sweden subsequently, described it to me like as follows on a walk through the woods in suburban Stockholm: 'The embassy knows I am here, they probably even know I am here with you. They know what I do on the Internet. Yes, I am followed, but this will not stop me from saying what I have to say'. Chapter 8 certainly reflects my dilemma of protecting research participants and my indecisiveness as to what the public and private domains include. I could have included more fieldnotes taken from Facebook, letting my research participants speak more directly, but I chose to be cautious and limit the direct voice to a few choice excerpts.

What complicates the distinction between 'private' and 'public' on Facebook is that groups can have an 'open', 'closed' or even 'secret' status, and that admins often change the restrictions on who can see what is being posted. If a group has an 'open' status, anyone can read what has been written; if it is 'closed', anyone can see who is a member, but one has to be a member in order to read the contents. If a group is secret, neither the group nor its members or its content can be viewed by non-members. Members of groups get an automatic notification when admins switch the status of a group, but admins do not need their consent to switch.

I have changed the names of groups and only use direct quotes with permission from the participant due to the blurred and shifting lines when it comes to what

comprises the public and private domains online. It remains hard for readers here to trace these quotes, as the ones used in this dissertation were taken from private walls (you need to be a 'friend' of the participant to read it online unless it was posted as 'public'), from 'closed' groups or from private messages. Even so, ethical dilemmas remain; many of the research participants I encountered consider themselves to be activists, and what they write online to be activist statements. Therefore, by anonymizing them, I may not be acknowledging their roles as public speakers. In one case, a participant asked to be quoted publically, precisely because he sees his work as reaching out to the public, yet he subsequently disappeared from Facebook, resigned from online activism and became, as I heard from other participants, a 'family man'. I was not able to reach him to confirm if he still wanted to appear in my research, and if he wanted to be public or anonymous. As a compromise, I decided not to retract his statements, but to make sure he features anonymously.

In the field in Ngorongoro, I often came to question research participants' eagerness to partake in my research. Their interests were often intertwined with hopes of doing business with me. Mussa, a lodge receptionist, for instance, had high hopes that I would either invest or find investors for his bee-keeping project. I could not, but I did review and help him with his business proposal. This was a balancing act as I did not want to raise expectations of being a business investor of sorts, but simply that I had taken several courses in business and management as part of my training as an economist and that I wanted to help. It was mainly warriors, like Mussa, and junior elders who believed that I would have certain financial or political influence; senior elders on the other hand could be very dismissive towards 'Europeanness'.

My research assistant, whom I met during my fieldwork for my master's thesis, is also a highly entrepreneurial spirit, which is rather possibly why we 'clicked'. I

came into contact with my research assistant, Loserian, online, finding the page of the small NGO that he was running on the side at the time of research for my master's thesis. I was looking for someone who could drive and speak Maa; I was not expecting to encounter someone ready to give me access to one of the widest social networks in all of Ngorongoro. His help in facilitating the master's thesis research, by introducing me to a great many people in the NCA, was immense and so we stayed in contact. He runs various businesses when not accounting for the Pastoralist Council, including a chicken project with the mamas in his village, a bee keeping project and a safari vehicle rental/tour operating company. I agreed to lend my face to the company's website, to help swing prejudiced tourists. This was after concluding fieldwork and the success of this was rather limited, given that the company was transforming into an (expanding) vehicle rental company, as opposed to a tour company specifically.

The political nature of the Pastoralist Council must, I believe, be examined and recognized in this section, given that my fieldwork was largely facilitated by employees of this body. The PC is a branch of the NCAA and its members are voted in by the indigenous communities (there is a small Datoga minority in the NCA, there have been Hadzabe migrating in and out of the area, but there are no Hadzabe present or accounted for by the PC). The PC represents the pastoralists' interests in the NCA. They have several members of staff and it is with and through these people that my fieldwork was made possible. I would go out on 'outreach project' trips with the PC employees 4-5 times a week. These included providing banking and accountancy services to NCA residents, overseeing maize stocks, monitoring schools and schooling of children and sometimes and driving senior members of the PC around. The

employees are ‘apolitical’, although both residents and the NCAA behave respectfully towards employees as they interact with elected members of the PC closely.

The names of the research participants have been changed for reasons of anonymity, with the exception of my research assistant and prominent figures in Ngorongoro such as Francis, the founder of the Pastoralist Council. Names of the fieldwork sites, as well as the names of institutions, remain unchanged as a change in these would benefit no one. This is due to the fact that Ngorongoro Conservation Area is so well-known and because it is Tanzania’s largest tourist attraction.

2.6. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have presented an overview of the methodological approach taken in conducting research for this dissertation. I have discussed the project’s methodology, including field research practices, language issues, reflexivity and netnography as well as research ethics. The chapter has also examined my background, and why I came to study the Maasai in the Ngorongoro in the first place. I have explained the approach I adopted to sampling participants. Starting with three key informants (junior elders employed by the Pastoralist Council), I was invited to explore their social networks, which extended throughout the Ngorongoro. Joining these key informants, on a nearly daily basis, on their Pastoralist Council ‘outreach program’ allowed me to travel throughout the Ngorongoro and to establish a wide network of research participants. Although my research assistant was fluent in English, Swahili and Maa, language was a factor that prevented me from engaging some research participants to a certain extent, especially women, who rarely speak English. My academic training prior to anthropology was in economics and then cultures and

development studies, the discipline in which I first got to explore more qualitative research methods. Growing up partially in Tanzania and establishing key contacts such as my research assistant during my field research for my M.Sc. in cultures and development studies in Ngorongoro helped me prepare for the research stay.

Netnography was key for the chapter on indigenous rights, as well as in preparing for fieldwork and in following up with research participants upon my return to Europe. Netnography is an immersive approach to interpreting internet and social media data especially, where the netnographer observes interactive activity on the internet. Staying in touch with research participants via Facebook, especially in the final processes of writing up this dissertation, proved to be immensely valuable, given that I could easily reach many of my participants to fact-check data or to ask for their insights on new things I would read. An in-depth discussion on research ethics is long overdue, given that the netnographer often lurks as an unknown presence on social media sites, unlike the ethnographer, whose de facto mode is not in hiding.

The research ethics section presents my own ethical dilemmas and reflections and I hope to invite readers to engage critically with these stances. I presented how, rather unprepared, I first came to deal with ethics in anthropology. I have also analysed and entered into a dialogue with recent literature on ethics in anthropology. I have tried, and at times failed, to remain objective with research participants. I argue that, as anthropologists, we must be aware of and acknowledge our ideological stances and be aware that these do guide us. Some ethical dilemmas and puzzling questions presented here will be revisited at the end of this dissertation. I encourage readers to keep the intricate, overlapping and clashing networks of Ngorongoro stakeholders and complex issues in regards to land access in mind throughout this work.

Chapter 3: Imagining Maasailand

3.1. Introduction

> *'Rumours circulate amongst the passengers in the Pastoralist Council Land Cruiser about a party that is taking place elsewhere. Whilst Sululu, the driver, has stopped the car near Empakai crater and is very engaged and immersed in a newspaper announcing the headline that Hitler would have supported CHADEMA, Tanzania's main opposition party, the guys in the backseat, Solomon and other PC employees and their acquaintances are making calls to find out what is going on and where. A marriage is taking place and since somebody in the car knows someone who is somehow connected to the boma, we see this as being an invitation of sorts and head down towards the plains of the Bulbul Depression. We are headed to the marriage ceremony; Loserian refers to it as 'the taking of the girl'.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 4 July 2013

The cruise described in the vignette above is serendipitously leading us to a marriage ceremony. It is common to 'crash' ceremonies, as these are open to all Maasai (although not serving alcohol is an effective and frequently employed method of getting fewer people to come to a ceremony).

> *We're briefly blanketed in clouds as we make for the deep green valley, dots crystallizing on the plains: there are herds of zebra, followed by herds of cattle being tended to by young boys. A party signifies free alcohol, singing and dancing. Like curious spectators, we drive up to the village and park the car to watch the happenings unfold. Like tourists (everyone but me is Maasai) hijacking the event, none of us are ready to get out of the privileged space that is the vehicle. Loserian takes some 100 portraits and crowd shots of everyone at the ceremony, including some fabulous shots of drunk Babus (grandfathers) and girls, shy to the camera, who vacillate between shyness and the willingness to have their picture taken and seeing the result.*
>
> Fieldnotes, 4 July 2013

This chapter explores key technologies used by my research participants to occupy 'space', thereby making it 'place'. Maasai imaginaries of land and physical mobility are intimately entangled, carrying with them notions of motility (possibility to be mobile). Women are often responsible for the discursive construction of geographic

imaginaries (see Chapter 5) and female migration through marriage makes women, having travelled through Maasailand, even greater 'walking encyclopaedias' (see 1.3.). Pleasure-walks spur the imagination, re-enforcing the sharing of imaginaries on *Oloshoo*, 'home'. *Ulaya* (Swahili for Europe, often used for all things and concepts foreign,) is the 'out of place' in place-making and equally important in the construction of place.

What I find to be a key limitation of the 'mobilities paradigm' (Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006), analysed in Chapter 1 section 3.3., is its departure from meaning and place, treating fluctuation and placelessness as the 'new normal'. Treating meaning and place as 'normal' is not necessarily problematic, as Sheller and Urry (2006) suggest. Important work in the social sciences, particularly in the late 1980s to mid-1990s (Clifford, 1988, Malkki, 1992 or Cresswell, 1996) on meaning-making and place should, I believe, not be seen in stark contrast to later work on mobility. Both place and fluctuation can characterise the human condition and the four 'place-makers' have also been chosen with respect to their universal qualities. Marriage, walking, home and the 'out of place' or foreign have central implications for human mobility practices. Throughout this chapter, I hope to make clear a more 'holistic' approach to mobilities, capturing the importance of meaning and place-making in creating mobilities. The chapter, and the 'place-makers' analysed, serve the logical progression of the dissertation.

The chapter defines factors that give meaning to the movements in Maasailand, thereby constructing and reconstructing Maasai culture as a 'culture of mobility'. Mobility is here understood in its broadest sense, and as laid out in Chapter 1 section 3.2. It encompasses social, political, physical, historical, and imagined dimensions (Salazar, 2013). A culture of mobility is determined by complex and

variable factors (Salazar, 2016). Culture informs human mobility practices, while mobilities equally shape culture (see 1.3.3.). To analyse place-making and the construction of human mobility practices, I first analyse how space becomes place. The cruise to Empakai and the Bulbul depression highlights the ways in which the use or occupancy of space is communicated and explored through four themes: marriage, pleasure walks, home and *Ulaya*. I explore four 'place-makers', themes or concepts that are central to binding Maasailand together, infusing meaning to Maasailand in the process. Firstly, I study the interwoven lines created by marriage, a communication device that constructs place. Secondly, I analyse how pleasure-walks have and are shaping Maasailand and how they function as a technology of mobility. Next, contested concepts of home are explored. Lastly, by exploring the Maasai interpretation of *Ulaya*, I explore how the 'out of place' constructs and defines the 'in place' and how the borders between the two are porous in nature.

3.2. Moving from space to place

In order to understand human mobility practices, we first need to examine place-making and meaning-making in relation to mobility. I aim to grasp the ways in which the Maasai understand and imagine Maasailand not just as space, but as place and the technologies that allow for this. Space and place bear separate meanings (Hubbard and Kitchin, 2011) and relate to each other in a manner similar to how movement relates to mobility. The most detailed study of space-place relations comes from the field of human geography (Tuan, 1977; Cresswell, 1996). Following Agnew (2011), both space and place are about the 'where' of things, with place also being about the 'how'. How did a space come to matter? How does one identify and relate to it? How

is its use and access organised or restricted? Moving on from Agnew's work, I believe that 'who', 'why' and 'what' equally relate to place. Who restricts access? Who shapes its history? Why is it regulated? What makes it matter? These questions boil down to the meaning that is attached to space. I define place as space imbued with meaning and mobility as movement imbued with meaning. Mobility is, I argue, moored in meaning and place.

Space is a dimension in which physical matter is located. We move through space; meaning is what makes a space a place and also what makes movement mobility. One can move through space, but in order to be mobile, one needs place. Place has multiple qualities apart from its geographic ones (Agnew, 2011). It cannot be substituted or exchanged; it has a social dimension and rank and temporal ordering. Place is created through peoples' attachment thereto (Tuan, 1977). Lefebvre (1974) proposed a study of the interstices between cultural practice, representations and imagination in order to construct space. This understanding of space is closer to my understanding of place, or of the making of place. I argue that place rather than space emerges out of cultural practices and imagining. Place is made through the attachment of meaning to space. 'We exist in and are surrounded by places – centers of meaning' (Cresswell, 1996:13). If there is no meaning, then one moves through space; if there is meaning, then one is mobile through place.

Anthropologists add to definitions of space-place by conceptualizing place as an embodied space (Setha, 2003). Peoples' experiences are imbued with material and spatial dimensions. Mobility 'means different things, to different people, in differing social circumstances' (Adey 2006:83). The same logic of a meaning that is imbued is explored in terms of space being a neutral grid, while place (both physical place and imagined dimensions) is inscribed with different relations, imaginaries and social

circumstances. Understanding this relationship between space and place, and between movement and mobility more generally, is seminal to understanding the following chapters of this work and in answering the research question posed; that is, how are human mobility practices continuously constructed and (re-)produced, through communication technology, in dialogue with members of a cultural group and in reaction to its non-members? What I aim to achieve in this chapter is the exploration of the dialectical place-making process and the process by which meaning becomes attached to both space and movement and the technologies mediating this process.

Meaning is a key theme in the anthropology of landscape. Carrier (2003) explores how the sea-scape of Montego Bay and Negril carry conflicting sets of meaning for different people. Meaning is also a resource that can be managed and exploited (Gardner, 2016); I explore this topic further in Chapter 5, sections 5, 6 and 7 regarding tourism imaginaries, and in Chapter 8 in sections 4 and 7 in reference to how the 'meaning' of place is skewed by indigenous rights activists to appeal to donors. Place is constructed through personal attachment and a distinct rhetoric is used to communicate the meaning of place to different people. Meaning is attached to sociopolitical realities which both exclude and include individuals, as is further demonstrated in Chapter 8 in which I explore indigenous and land rights debates. Rather than mapping out sovereignty, with clearly marked boundaries, Maasailand is a moving landscape from which one borrows. The Maasai understanding of land use and ownership is in conflict with the one dictated and defined by the Tanzanian state (which owns all land and leases some of it out to private entities).[27] Having introduced readers to the literature concerning space and place, and to my understanding of the meanings involved in the concepts of space and place, the following sections are

[27] A guide to Tanzanian land rights: http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/tanzania

devoted to the exploration of four themes central to meaning and place-making, starting with marriage.

3.3. Marriage: It makes good warriors

For Maasai, marriage is the act of 'sending off the girls', by the villagers of the girl's native village, or of the 'taking of the bride' from the village the girl is moving to, respectively. For most women, marrying results in a spatial displacement or movement in space, sometimes to sectors so far away that the 'sending' would take weeks on foot.[28] Marriage itself is an act of migration, of connectivity and, ultimately, of peace, given that it deters interior conflict. Marriage is an institution or mooring that binds remote areas together, historically strengthening kinship ties (Talk, 1987), the defence system of Maasailand. It is a practice of territoriality, place making, linking villages to the broader network of Maasailand.

As with many ceremonies, marriage is a lengthy process. Like the traditional leader initiation ceremony, which stretches on for days (see 6.5.), ceremonies are fluid in both space and time and are based upon an idea of the complete transformation of the person or people at the centre of the ceremony. As elaborated upon in Chapter 6, ceremonies mark the start of a new 'culture'. After a ceremony, one has new responsibilities and tasks and access to new information. Though fluid, Maasai

[28] A comprehensive network of busses and mini busses connects Maasailand: *Dala Dala* known as *Matatu* in Kenya as a mini bus. Some operate on fixed schedules, others when depart when they are full (ca. 20 people). Many drive within towns or cities, some cross-country. Busses (up to 50 passengers) have fixed schedules, typically drive long-distance and *Noahs* (taking 10 pax) drive whenever they are fully loaded with passengers and/or luggage. *Noahs* drive between Karatu and Arusha and were formerly known as *Peugeots*. *Noah* is an 8-seat Toyota vehicle only sold in Asia, primarily Indonesia.

ceremonies are structured by protocol and are bound by strict rules. They are understood as individual cultural entities and journeys (explained further in Chapter 6). Coast (2006) describes Maasai marriage as a process, rather than as an event. If an 'event' can be categorised as being static, then 'process' is mobile, once more showing how marriage is embodied mobility when analysed in symbolic terms.

> *'The junior elder getting married is clad in blue and fine jewellery and ornaments, for hours, he is congregating and discussing with members of his own age set, receiving advice, giving advice. Their mood rather serious. We are at the village of the girl and she never leaves her hut and does not see the ceremony outside, instead she receives advice and blessings inside the hut. Tomorrow, in the early morning, she will depart tomorrow morning together with her new husband to her new village.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 4 July 2013

To quote an elder, moving brides across long distances 'makes strong warriors.' Navaya, a wildlife guide explains that genetic diversity created through movement (here involving humans) is a side effect of marriage over which a certain awareness exists among elders (who are herd managers), and this is due to breeding experiments with cattle. At markets in Ngorongoro, you will often find Kenyans buying or selling bulls from their home country, given that cattle differs significantly in genetic terms to the cattle found in Tanzania and can go for much higher prices than they would in Kenya. Similarly, a Tanzanian cow can have more value in Kenya.

Within anthropology, Maasai mobility is often only analysed from a male perspective: i.e. the *manyatta*, the forest camps, cattle herding (Hodgson, 1999) and physical or geographical mobility is in focus. Yet, the migration of women also creates a certain binding material of Maasailand, one which defines its boundaries, and justifies or enables the continuation of a somewhat unified society. This aids in

preventing sections or clans from departing from mainstream Maasai culture. One could argue that with today's communication technologies, and their quick embracement by Maasai across East Africa, the necessity to physically embody space, that is, to move across distance, becomes obsolete; however, cell phones, cars and the internet cannot replace the willingness to bond and to connect with others that the process of arranging and negotiating marriage offers. All of the 'modern' elements listed here do facilitate communication, but do not necessarily motivate connectivity and place-making. Place is culturally produced, through activities such as marriage. Culture both takes place and makes place (Hubbard and Kitchin, 2011). Maasai marriage, as an institution, has been studied extensively by anthropologists (Coast, 2006; Hodgson, 2000). Most studies look either at the household itself, how (polygamous) marriages contribute to the livelihood of the household-structure, or discuss demographic factors such as changes in the age of marriage, polygamy, divorce or church wedding or traditional wedding.

Van de Walle (1985) argues that 'the nature and rationale of the mechanisms linking society and marriage are poorly understood' (Van de Walle, 1985:110). I have not yet found a study that has analysed this link. Studies often do not grasp the rationalities of marriages that go beyond the household itself, with ethnographic studies instead focusing on interactions within the household and demographic studies looking at the structural differences, described above. What I contend is that the mechanism linking marriage to the structure beyond the household, i.e. the community, or Maasai culture, is the socio-cultural rationale of connectivity, communication and the setting of boundaries that go with marriage. Marriage is a communication device, employed amongst many other things, to give meaning to or between spaces; it is a place-maker. Marriage defies the imaginary of the mobile

Maasai man versus the woman as a caretaker (explored further in Chapter 5). After all, it is a radically disruptive act for the woman who migrates and marriage is one of several connectors. Marriage enables patterns of mobility and practices of place-making. Marriage is a communications device aimed at peacebuilding and re-enforcing connections, it keeps Maasai culture connected' women, having migrated, often make great story-tellers, sharing and passing on geographic imaginaries, or imaginaries of *Oloshoo*. I will focus on the connector and place-maker in the following sections and how the *arere nkejek* can be compared to the concept-metaphor of 'Flânerie'.

3.4. Pleasure walks: 'How far can you walk?'

Loserian, my research assistant, tells me that there is a very wise elder that I have to meet and we decide to try our luck with a surprise meeting, instead of phoning ahead in advance. Francis lives in a concrete house powered by a generator, a short walk from the main crater rim road up the mountain range. We are lucky that day as Francis, the 'real nomad'[29], is 'home' and is happy to meet us.

> *'I ask Francis about his life story and like many other senior elders, rather than telling his own story, he embarks on his own account of the history of the Maasai as a people. His youngest wife provides my research assistant, two of his friends, Solomon and Sululu, and myself with refrigerated sodas. She has most of the Coca Cola Company's sodas stored in the fridge.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 10 April 2013

[29] Several research participants have nicknames or descriptions attached to their names, which attest to their mobility. One participant was nicknamed 'Mobile'.

Inviting visitors for soda (a bottle retailing for over 700 Shilling) is a display of status in Maasailand, and which trumps the chai (tea) women will otherwise brew over the fire indoors. Offering a chilled soda is an elevated form of displaying wealth through hospitality.

> *'Francis has eight wives, most of whom live in traditional houses around the plot. He's over 60 years of age, but only the clear blue layering around his eyes discloses this fact. He attributes his youthful looks mainly to having eaten nothing but the meat of healthy cows and having drunk cow milk with blood growing up, accompanied by his avoidance of western medicine. 'When I'm ill I go into the forest and get the right plant.' He explains. And further: 'Western medicine expires. So it expires in your body and then you expire and when you expire you die. Before, we didn't have all these diseases like TB or Brucella.' Phone calls interrupt his narrative numerous times. Francis was born in Ngorongoro before it was a conservation area and long before the NCA Authority was created. He's a retired traditional leader, ward councillor and the founder of the Pastoralist Council. Both his father and grandfather were born in Ngorongoro. Francis recounts when the Ngorongoro was established as a conservation area in 1959. He was in standard 3 in primary school when an agreement between 12 traditional leaders and the Colonial rule led to the eviction of all the Serengeti Maasai, establishing the Ngorongoro as the recognised homestead of the indigenous community.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 10 April 2013

The agreement Francis is referring to is a compromise, bearing the promise that the Maasai would be left to manage the Ngorongoro land while giving up the Serengeti in the spirit of Bernhard Grzimek's conservational doctrine. The document was signed in print by the traditional leaders and was later reversed by the Tanzanian government.[30]

> *'I ask what Ngorongoro was like before the Serengeti eviction, an event few Maasai alive today witnessed. Francis recalls the days before the evictions fondly. 'There was wildlife everywhere. We Maasai were not just livestock*

[30] Grzimek was a long serving president of the Frankfurt Zoological Society and the most influential conservationist in securing the Serengeti as a national park. His documentary on the Serengeti won an academy award in 1959. He believed that national parks must be void of human life and preserved for nature lovers to rest and biologists to study, hence, the eviction of all Maasai from the Serengeti. See Dowie (2009).

keepers, we were wildlife keepers. Now, there are 30 year old men who have never seen a rhino! We had over 200 up here on the rim!' He continues: 'And the livestock was so plentiful and healthy. We were rich! If we needed fat, we slaughtered a sheep and we had 10 litres of the stuff. The cows gave so much milk! And sometimes we would go camp out in the forest and we would bring a bull and slaughter him there and stay for 15 nights, maybe. The climate was different too. We would just move with the climate. We would come up here, go into the crater, into the forest, and then move down to the Serengeti slopes. We could go anywhere, everything was ours. And the lions respected us. The lions and the Maasai were friends. They knew we were Maasai, so they would not attack our cattle. They didn't have to either because there was so much wildlife. So much more than now, with the authorities and conservation and everything. And when the lions got old they got desperate, so that is when we killed a lion with one spear. We were the wildlife managers. We regulated everything and everyone was healthy and strong. Then the conservation area was created and we could not go into the Serengeti anymore. Then in the 70's poachers started coming and they killed off the wildlife. Then they [the government] created the NCAA. To 'manage' the conservation area. But the poaching just increased! And we had so much more wildlife when we were the managers! So they established the NCAA and they told us what to do. They evicted us from the Crater. They had to go and manage the wildlife and us. And we were no longer nomads. The climate changed, the Serengeti was blocked off, the educational system prevented movement and there were too many people around so we had to become sedentary. We had nothing to say any more about our own land.' [Phone rings, Francis speaks with the caller effusively before returning to our conversation]'.

Fieldnotes, 10 April 2013

As examined in greater detail in Chapter 8, almost every longer conversation, no matter the topic, that I had with any Maasai included an unsolicited defence of Maasai as the real conservationists. It appeared that this rhetoric was aimed at convincing me, the outsider, that the Maasai are the true caretakers of Maasailand.

'In 1994, I started looking into this and I began reading legal texts and I discovered one thing: The NCA was created as a multiple land use area. One of the three objectives was to develop the Maasai. Develop the Maasai! Who can develop the Maasai? [Rhetorical pause] Only we can develop ourselves! The three objectives were: promoting tourism, protecting wildlife and developing the Maasai, so I realised we have rights and I went to the minister to claim them. Many were against us, at first, but the law was on our side, so we started the Pastoralist Council. I don't know how much we have changed,

but we are trying. At least we had a voice. Education was always our number one goal. Yes, culture changes with education, but it is necessary for us to have a voice. My sons and daughters, I kept one at home for the goats and one for the cattle and the rest went to school. Everything here was much better before authorities, before the government, had to get involved but at least we have representation now. Why do outsiders always have to get involved? Because we have a culture! They don't have culture anymore. Do you have culture in Europe? No! Only the Maasai have culture. And maybe the Red Indians [he gets up from his sofa and goes to search for a book about Indians]. And then this organization, UNESCO, also rule us. Education Culture something… We don't know who they are! Or what they want. They tell us we cannot cultivate. We don't understand what they are here for. Culture… but whose culture? Whose culture? European culture? I went to London once and then to Cambridge. They have a huge library with all the tribes of the Commonwealth.

One man there, he knew my father and all of the elders! He spoke fluent KiMaasai, he asked about everyone from that time. People are always interested in our culture and we have to educate ourselves to protect it or one day we will die and the Ngorongoro will die too. Our culture is changing but that is ok. It's dangerous when we change because of tourism, though. Maybe I will dress like a warrior so the tourists can take pictures! I can pretend I'm a warrior! That is harmful. Or in the cultural bomas we sell Ladies jewellery to men and men's jewellery to women, to make a profit. Or men dance to women's songs. Tourism can be both good and bad for us, but these things they harm our culture. Also, we don't benefit from the lodges. It would be much better if we had direct tourism! If the tourists came and stayed at Solomon's house! Then he can show them the Maasai way of life. That would be good!' Solomon nods at the idea. Our conversation ends with Francis explaining to me that I should inquire in advance in future when I come to visit because he is always travelling.

Loserian explains that Francis is still a nomad, always walking, always moving from one village to another. 'How far can you walk?' Francis asks me, catching me off guard as I try to give a kilometre estimate[31]*, not paying much attention to the numbers I try to come up with, Francis continues that he can walk much further and that I have never truly walked*.'

Fieldnotes, 10 April 2013

Although rhetorical, the last question he asked me before I left his home really caught me off guard. Walking, not necessarily with any direct purpose other than to experience the sensation of walking, is an essential experience, especially to the men I

[31] Maasai usually explain distances in the amount of days it takes to walk.

asked after speaking to Francis. It is an experience of freedom, of connecting to the land and is both perceptual and knowledge-producing. Walking is essential to our existence, capacity to think and to imagination (Gros, 2014). For Francis specifically, walking is done to feel free, youthful and alive. Research participants like Francis leave me with the impression that, through walking, one is connected to something larger. Ingold (2011) describes this larger-than-life connection when he writes of walking as a ritual of communion between the human and more-than-human. I chose to study walking as it provided a multisensory experience of place. When you walk you see, feel and smell, but you also think. I try to distinguish here between the physical and the cognitive experience of place through walking. In terms of scholarship on the Maasai, walking is an understudied practice. I found this to be rather surprising, given that the Maasai are widely regarded as semi nomadic and that many of my research participants place an existential importance on walking; I hope to fill some scholarly gaps through the analysis provided here.

Elders urge warriors to rediscover the qualities of walking as an act of education. Walking teaches knowledge and skill-sets not transmitted through formal education. Skills taught through walking include a profound understanding of seasonal changes and regional topography but also skills such as patience. Additionally, it aids the imagination and fosters great story-tellers and senior elders are often referred to as 'walking encyclopaedia' in the context of story-telling.

Walking is an act of personal enlightenment and idea development and I concur with Oppezzo and Schwartz (2014) in that walking increases creative output. Nietzsche once wrote that 'All truly great thoughts are conceived by walking' (Nietzsche, 1889:34). Walking serendipitously determines both future walks and future herding patterns. It offers appreciation for landscape and knowledge thereof. Tsing (2012)

writes that by walking one makes a familiar place in the landscape. Place-making is also the 'beginning of appreciation for multi-species interaction' (Tsing, 2012:142), a topic further explored in Chapter 4.

Walking is a social experience and Ingold and Vergunst make this case in their analysis that social relations are 'paced out along the ground' (2008:1). Transhumance is imperative to the stability of the rift valley ecosystem and Marcel describes the notion of being a wayfarer in the following way 'Perhaps a stable earthly order can only be established on earth if man remains acutely conscious that his condition is that of a traveller' (1962:7). Francis frames *ilotot*, walking, as a blessing and as an experience of freedom. Maasai pleasure walks, *arere nkejek*, 'to go take a walk' can be likened to the concept metaphor of flânerie and a wide body of literature refers to the flâneur and how this literary device served to reinvent the ways in which people saw, imagined and experienced the city (pre-dominantly Paris) in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Concept metaphors are descriptions of ideal types that relate to broader societal visions; they are framing devices that facilitate comparison (Salazar, 2014).

Moore (2004) describes them as a kind of conceptual shorthand (5.5. further analyses concept metaphors). Laurent (2010) notes that 19th century literature, often through prose, defined and shaped the flâneur as a poetic stroller and time-rich idler.

Flânerie is almost exclusively defined within the urban landscape. Flânerie is a luxury and leisure activity, often reserved to the young (male) bohemian and the cityscape. After World War I, the flâneur became a scholarly subject, with Benjamin reviving the works of Baudelaire in his 'Arcades project' (1927-1940). The practice of pleasure-walks by Maasai (such as Francis) in many ways compares to the metaphorical flânerie. The wayfaring, freedom-seeking Maasai also figures centrally in Maasai story-telling.[31] He (or in some stories she) is a brave hero and both

movement and the relation to the landscape are central themes. In stories, the ultimate punishment imaginable is often eternal immobility. Stories are told orally by 'walking encyclopaedias' (or senior elders) with the ultimate purpose of education.

It is also compelling to compare Thoreau's work on wandering (1862) to Maasai wayfaring, in how both concern relating to nature through walking. Thoreau conveys great intimacy with the landscape in his texts, but also practical knowledge. He illuminates that the act of movement across land puts man in his proper place. Wandering is vital to assessing both threats and opportunities. Shields (1994) describes how the flâneur 'visually consumes the urban space to repossess it'. Pleasure walks, albeit usually not urban, are enjoyed by Maasai men of all age-sets and one could say that young *ilmurran*, as they leave home and wander around, are also flâneurs, though I found that senior elders primarily had the luxury and volition to do so. Filipo, a warrior working as a waiter at the lodge, saving up to buy his first cattle, would go on holiday breaks just so he could walk, explore and think, journeying from one village to the next, covering much of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area on these walks. Through *arere nkejek*, the Maasai visually consume, repossess and define the landscape. Maasailand is contextualised through a network of movement and (sometimes temporary) moorings (such as homesteads built and maintained by women). The name Ngorongoro actually describes a mooring, as it translates to the gift or spring of life.

[31]Examples of traditional stories involving walking can be found on the following pages:
http://bluegecko.org/kenya/tribes/maasai/stories-godsland.htm
http://www.johntyman.com/africa/folk/
http://www.masaikenya.org/MAASAI_FOLK_TALES.pdf

Siringet, the Maasai word for Serengeti, refers to both 'endless plains' and 'the place where the land moves on forever'. The Serengeti is still very much at the heart of Maasailand, the dreamscape or imaginary at the core of many of their stories. I wish to evaluate the extent to which it is useful to draw parallels between the discursive construct of the flâneur and I believe that one ought to be cautious not to fall into the trap of the 'noble savage'. The 'noble savage' is a similarly mythical and discursive figure, also laden with judgements and ideas. Rousseau (1755) has contributed to the production of the term; although he did not directly use the literary character of the noble savage, he did draw many vast parallels between the civilised flâneur and hunter or herdsman. Rousseau's flâneur is an intellectual part-time nomad en lieu to Benjamin's flâneur. He is enlightened, unlike the herder, who is free only in the spiritual sense.

While the 'noble savage' is granted freedom, coolness and even wealth, he is denied intellectual enlightenment and, thus, is looked up and down upon at the same time, both scorned and idealized. If one acknowledges the wandering Maasai as a flâneur in the Parisian sense, one can appreciate the intellectual wealth gathered on these walks, the knowledge that feeds into stories that shape the imaginaries of today's Maasai and the bond to *Oloosho.* For Filipo, *arere nkejek* is about getting to know home, but also about appreciation and gratitude. *'I am welcome everywhere there is Maasai. To rest, to eat.'*

Arere nkejek is the meaning-making of movement by giving it the purpose of pleasure and for Maasai this type of mobility also offers fascinating by-products. Whilst the Parisian flâneur enjoys 'inspiration' as the main by-product of his walking, the real benefit for the Maasai on a pleasure walk is in the chance encounters he comes across on these excursions that will often take days, if not weeks. Allegretti

(2015) describes a 'new' category of wandering Maasai, similar to the wanderer I have studied; the Maasai man walking through the city, and through the serendipitous experience of strolling through the cityscape he also looks for economic opportunity. The opportunities the city-wanderer looks for include trade or taking up small jobs or learning new information from people he meets.

> *'This is why news spreads so fast in Maasailand,' explains one elder. 'Long before the phone […] we are welcomed home in every village we visit, regardless of section, and if not we set up camps in the forest. Sometimes we are in groups, but I prefer to walk alone. News spreads much better this way than over the phone. It is more accurate; people lie on the phone.'*
>
> Senior elder, fieldnotes, 7 August 2013

In these acts of wayfaring, these interactions, the Maasai becomes a participant observer who, through exploration and wandering, discovers societal realities in much the same way as Shields (1994) describes the behaviour of the flâneur. By wayfaring, the Maasai-as-flâneur assesses transformative realities: changes in climate or political obstacles (such as the rather popular secretive moving of demarcation lines between protected areas and grazing lands by authorities). It is work and leisure at the same time. For example, as one *murrani* told me, 'This is how we find new grounds to graze cattle, too. Someone will call and say that they have a great place to herd cattle, but maybe they are lying. To be sure, I still need to walk there.' What helps is that wayfarers will almost certainly be welcomed into a home to stay the night. Maasailand as an organic, moving landscape is kept alive through these walks. It is customary that warriors walk in pairs or more, or that women depart in groups separate from men, asserting an added social element to the practice of walking. *'We must walk so we know what is happening to the land. Sometimes they want to pick me up with the land cruiser, but I prefer walking'* said one senior board member of the

Pastoralist Council who walks but, more often than not, catches a ride between his two *bomas* on opposite sides of the Crater. This highlights the discrepancy between the things that the Maasai do and the things they say they do. The walking, the nomadism, is often imagined. This functions to protect the Maasai understanding and identification of their culture (See Chapter 6). Nomadism and wayfaring are, to an extent, abstract concepts; it is as much a perception and a view on life as it is a physical reality. Malinowski (1916) vividly described discrepancies between what people do, say they do, and think, deducting that one cannot capture the life-worlds of research participants by formally observing rituals (1916:189), here a farewell to dead spirits:

> *'They spoke with the same characteristic mixture of arrogance and shyness, with which they used to approach me, begging for tobacco, or making some facetious remark, in fact, with the typical demeanour of boys in the street, who perform some nuisance sanctioned by custom, like the proceedings on Guy Fawkes' day or similar occasions.'*

The Maasai pleasure-wanderer re-orients himself based on the ecological constraints he encounters (the search for better grazing grounds) and the political realities he comes across. As a wanderer, he assesses the 'real-time' ecological situation and passes on the information about where is best to herd to herders or decision-makers in his family or social sphere. In times of climate change and extreme droughts (such as 2009), 'real-time' data becomes increasingly important in complementing 'time-tested' knowledge of rainfall patterns and its impact on specific areas. Pairing incoming reports on ecological constraints and opportunities with customary knowledge produces more dynamic knowledge. Research participants like Saitoti (see 1.3.4.) understand technology as 'knowledge production' and the dynamics outlined

above are an example of the merging of the time-tested with the new, enabling agency over decision-making in ecologically as well as politically challenging times.

Political realities take on many forms, be they Maasai re-settling, others setting up villages or government forces confining Maasailand boundaries. The Tanzanian government confines boundaries by demarcating lines with red paint, wooden poles and concrete blocks, setting these up to mark the borders of new conservation areas or hunting grounds. Shields (1994) notes that the flâneur closes the gap between citizen and state by re-imagining and mapping his newly expanded world. Similarly, the Maasai flâneur acts as a link between his *boma* or village and the larger, organic Maasailand.

The formal Maa word for walking is *ilotot*. The word highlights the complexities of wandering. It is a plural word, indicating that walking constitutes multiple acts on different levels. Being plural, walking is and does different things at the same time. Walking gets a number of things done. Walking is done alone or in groups where it is often customary for the women to depart and to arrive earlier than men so that they can set up and prepare things. Walking is a physical act, a displacement between two points, and it is also a spiritual, intellectual engagement, both with oneself and dreamscapes of the mind, and with the land one crosses or with whom the people one walks with or encounters while walking. The experiencing and interpreting of the imaginary as a reality comes close to the Maasai understanding of being nomadic. For many research participants, it is a natural, unquestioned truth that the Maasai are nomadic.

The serendipity at the heart of pleasure walking is central to how information is shaped and most vital decisions are based on the chance encounters with others

'taking a walk', with people from other villages or through ecological discoveries. This pleasure-walking is a technology of communication and mobility if one defines it as a manifestation of human desire, a system that enables, supports and gives meaning to movements, aimed at advancing society or culture. It is a sociological tool manifesting human desires as the pleasure-wanderer visually consumes the landscape and makes decisions based upon findings. These wanderers are themselves mobile connectors spreading knowledge through Maasailand. Understanding oneself as nomadic, even though a stark loss of land access, population increase and a schooling system tying families to rather sedentary existences, is not contradictory if the imaginary of Maasai society is that of a mobile, nomadic people. The colonial category of the nomad has become a real category and an integral part of Maasai culture. Whilst other distinctions, such as 'the people of the cattle' are significant, the nomad is a contemporary Maasai construct as much as it is a colonial classification that served to disenfranchise Maasai from land. The Maasai-as-nomad is embodied through walking, but also through geographical imaginaries of *home*, creating the Maasai-as-imaginary-nomad. The Maasai as mobile is embodied most specifically through the herder, explored in Chapter 4.

3.5. Home is with cattle

If home is where your livestock is, then home is as mobile a concept as the land that cattle graze upon. Saitoti writes: 'They [the Maasai] live as they always have, nomads but not without a home.' (1980:32) Home is also as vast an area as the grazing of cattle, which is determined by economic rationality. Most Maasai research participants gave very practical answers when defining 'home', a definition always related to cattle. 'Home is where we live and we have other areas for wet season and

dry season grazing' (Loserian) while women will speak more of the houses they have built, given that the construction of *bomas* is a specifically female task. As small enclosures, *bomas* are units that hold together the moored necessities for survival. There is the outer *kraal*, which protects the huts and the overall micro-ecosystem and the inner *kraal* that encloses the cattle at night. There are the huts and, where permitted by the authorities, perhaps a vegetable garden.

Some tie home to *Oloshoo*, with old memories or the memories shared to them by elders, often of the Serengeti. I saw much of my research participants' relation to *Oloshoo* confirmed by Mallki's (1992) analysis that (mobile or displaced) people often invent home(land) not in situ, but rather through memories and claims of places not inhabited physically. These idealised accounts made by research participants affirm Tucker's (1994) definition of home; he recognises a vast gap between the 'natural home' and the 'ideal home' that people often search for their entire lives. The 'natural home' is the setting that is conducive to human life, whilst the ideal home is the place where one would feel fulfilment. Tucker describes confused and sentimental journeys in which the natural home is our residence and the ideal home is a multi-level abstract structure reached or something sought after through an inner journey. For many NCA Maasai, this mental journey is to the Serengeti, it is infused with shared and passed-down memories. Remembered places function as symbolic moorings to mobile or displaced people (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992). Only the most senior elders have actual memories of the Serengeti, idealized as endless plains. These memories, made before 1959, become powerful imaginaries of Maasai identity as a culture that is mobile. Francis describes it vividly, the endless possibilities tied to moving freely on the plains of the Serengeti. I argue that it is the imaginary that shapes Maasai mobile identity much more than it is actual physical movement.

The Maa language has two distinct definitions of home; the physical home (*Aang*) and a home close to Tucker's ideal home. Mallett (2004) illustrates that there is a tension between the ideal and the physical home. Research participants speak of either their *aang* or *boma*, encompassing their cattle, *kraal*, husband/wife and children or *Oloshoo* to describe the place they call home. *Oloshoo* is also described as a dream, an ideal and wish for the future of Maasailand. *Oloshoo* is a geographic imaginary. Said (1994) describes geographic imaginaries as physical spaces that are imagined and have meanings ascribed thereto. Cattle is the entity that blurs the two definitions of home and features prominently in both. Cattle is at the centre of practicalities of organising home-making in Tucker's sense of 'natural home', but also in the dreamscapes of *Oloosho*. Headlines regarding the possible Loliondo evictions (2013 and 2014) state that 50,000 Maasai will be evicted from their homes (see Chapter 8). This is true in the Maa, *Oloshoo* sense of the word, but not in the *boma* or *Aang* senses of the word. Few *bomas* would be destroyed; the homes referred to are the grazing grounds. Fifty thousand Maasai would lose access to essential grazing grounds, not to their living space as such.

The natural influences shaping Maasai culture are, and have been, of a circulatory character; the central role of cattle in Maasai life, the economic rationale of circulatory grazing patterns combined with climate and the ecological imperatives of constant movement, form the very core around which culture revolves. The 'Great Migration' and its crucial impact on cattle grazing is, in itself, of a circulatory nature: Wildebeest and zebra and the migrant lion prides form an ecological constraint to which the Maasai have adapted, as senior elders claim, to which the wildlife has adapted in what Maasai believe to have been a union, a co-existence of mutual

benefit. A circle of life completed by all its elements and disrupted by outside imbalances and constraints.

The same natural conditions that motivate animal migration are a vehicle of Maasai mobility. The seasonal rains and dry periods, the dramatically changing topography of Maasailand, forests, rainforest, bush savannah, savannah and mineral-rich soda lakes are a motor for Maasai mobility. Grazing cattle means a constant search for the most optimal land at the most optimal time. Movements are also often vertical, up to the highlands in the dry season and down to savannahs in the wet season. This vertical mobility is, however, increasingly stagnating. The NCAA does not want humans and cattle on the plains of the famous 'Great Migration' of wildebeest and zebra down in Ndutu and Kakesio, near the Serengeti border. Tourists and tour operators complain of cattle disrupting the scenic landscape. The 'Great Migration' is a unique selling point for Tanzanian tourism providers, given that Southern African destinations do not have large-scale migration.

The Great Migration takes place only for a few weeks every year in Kenya, as the animals migrate from the Serengeti into the Maasai-Mara. The spectacle of thousands of Zebra and Wildebeest trying to make it across crocodile infested rivers (usually Grumeti River) has been filmed countless times in nature documentaries. Tourists often expect to see just this and not the slow, but steady, circular movement of hundreds and thousands of animals across thousands of kilometres of plains. They rarely arrive on time and at the right point to see spectacles, such as river crossing attempts, but this is often what the 'Great Migration', as an imaginary, is reduced to. Although Maasai herders may let their cattle graze near the migration, they generally try to avoid it. Saitoti (1980) writes that any good herder knows that cattle dislike wildebeest and that it is hard to find good grazing spots if wild animals have trampled

upon the grass. The tourist complaints about Maasai herders are exceptionally high in the Ndutu and Kakesio regions, as they border the Serengeti, which receive the 'Great Migration' bi-annually and many tour operators purposefully promote the area to their clients as the Serengeti National Park, thereby avoiding park fees.[32]

Mobile phone reception is not good in Ndutu. Lodge operators maintain that this is why it is hard to find motivated Maasai staff. Maasai might take on jobs, but might then disappear after a few weeks not being able to track what is happening with their cattle. Further pressing a lodge operator on the matter, she suggested the primary reason may be that many Sukuma from Lake Victoria work in Ndutu, causing ethnic tension. *'They are fish eaters!'* explains Daniel, a Maasai tour guide. Sukuma-Maasai tensions have a longstanding tradition and, for Maasai, 'fish eater' is a derogatory term as fish are thought to be the snakes of the water.

3.6. *Ulaya*: Ambivalent modernity

In this final section, I will explore how 'foreign' elements define place. I argue that place, like human mobility practices, is defined in dialogue with, and in contrast to, 'outside' elements. Place is relational towards what is 'out of place' (Cresswell, 1988), it exists within and dissects borders and, as Massey (1994) argues, it is constructed in a matrix of power relations, from the body to the global. This section analyses the Maasai understanding of *Ulaya*, Swahili for Europe, which is a term that has a much broader interpretation by the Maasai, including anything foreign, global

[32] Interviewing tourists, many believed that they had been to the Serengeti, when they stayed in Ndutu or Kakesio or they found out it was not within the technical perimeters of the park and felt cheated by their safari operators. Tripadvisor reviews on tented camps and lodges in the area also attest to this.

and ‘modern’. I analyse it as an abstract interpretation of ‘modernity’. Place-making often makes room and incorporates the outside, or it creates and recreates boundaries in relation to the out-of-place. The out-of-place here is *Ulaya.* Many Maasai take a complicated stance towards *Ulaya* that incorporates defiance, adaptation but, also and simultaneously, inferiority and superiority. The Maasai use the term purely as a context towards which one acts in both defiance and partial adaptation. Imaginaries of *Ulaya* help people to understand and to contrast their own identity. ‘Here’ and ‘there’ or what I call ‘in place’ and ‘out of place’ are discursive, not empirical constructs (Frello, 2008). This makes boundaries porous, leading to the swift embracing, but also strong rejection of certain ‘out of place’ elements.

Colonial and nation-state policies and attitudes towards the Maasai strongly dichotomize the modern and the Maasai (Hodgson, 1999; Spear and Waller, 1993). Within this marginalization, the Maasai have found a niche, that is their ‘having culture’ while others do not (further discussed in Chapter 6). The Maa word that was used, in the past, to point something or someone out as ‘modern’ was *Ormeek,* as in *‘he is an Ormeek.’* An *Ormeek* was first anyone non-Maasai and, by the 1930s, any Maasai engaging in processes and opportunities provided by the colonial administration and later the independent rule. ‘Modern Maasai’ is the English (and Swahili) translation. ‘*Ormeek* was therefore an implicit critique of all that modernity represented to Maasai: education, institutionalized religion, even the political structure and language of the nation-state’ (Hodgson, 1999:136). *Ulaya* is the favoured terminology for what modernity represents to the Maasai, including the origins of technologies, objects, policies and ideas brought in from the global sphere, with ‘modern Maasai’ or *Ormeek* having an increasingly ambivalent meaning, as ‘modern Maasai’ reclaim their identity by playing important roles both within and outside

Maasailand, e.g. making large investments in Maasailand by purchasing cattle and then outsourcing herding tasks. Hodgson's (1999) interviews with senior elders signified that *Ormeek* are those Maasai who know nothing about cattle. The 'modern Maasai' who participated in my research all had extensive connections to Maasailand through herding.

Ulaya does not signify improvement or development, and neither do Western concepts of development synchronize with Maasai understandings. Development or improvement can be gained by incorporating certain elements from *Ulaya*, or repurposing them to fit their own cause. The following section is a demonstration of this phenomenon:

> *'I'm invited home to Loserian's boma, in Endulen, where his father lives with his eight wives (in separate houses) and in which Loserian keeps some of his livestock. We've brought a solar panel system from Arusha, a simple 200 USD device that will light up a few lights as well as charge cell phones. All cell phone cables imaginable are built in, and dangle from, the apparatus. His mother's home is modest. She lives with one of Loserian's sisters in a more or less rectangularly-shaped mud house, its two dark rooms divided by a paste wall of cow dung, mud and newspapers. There are no windows; the makeshift door lets in sunlight. Behind the home stands a much larger concrete building with a panelled roof and two large square windows. The larger building is 'perfect' in construction and looks like it could be standing anywhere in the world. I ask Loserian who lives in the large building. 'The chickens,' he answers. 'I started a community project for my mother and some other ladies and we had the house built for the chickens.' 'How many chicken?' I ask. '200,' he replies. 'They lay eggs and the ladies sell them at the market. It generates 30 USD per day.' (Loserian is an accountant, and has numbers figured out in a very precise manner.)*
>
> Reflections penned later that evening in the fieldnotes diary, 5 July 2013

I was dumbfounded as to why this building that, to my then-held standards and biased ideas, I would describe as being nice, liveable, well-built and so forth, was built for

chickens. Mama Loserian, on the other hand, lived right in front of it in a structure that I would not like to live in.

> *'A building without sanitation and without, even until, electricity. We swung a wire with a lightbulb around a beam and we were trying to tie it up so that it wouldn't swing into someone's head. Loserian's mother didn't find the lighting solution to be much of an improvement in terms of living conditions. The solar panel was there so that she'd have her phones charged at all times to make communication easier.*
>
> *To me, this experience highlights how differently we understand what an improvement is, and how biased and pre-conceived ideas of modernity are. There is no linear path of development that people follow, no rule of law that societies evolve from agrarian to industrial to the post-industrial information and service industry.*
>
> *People such as the Maasai make clear choices as in what constitutes an improvement in livelihood and what not and which what parts of the evolution of civilisation if seen in modernist terms should be skipped and which should be embraced. The economic foundation of Maasai culture remains pastoralist, branching out into the service industry by producing services for the tourism sector. Characteristic to Maasai life are also elements of the 'post-modern' information society. Intellectual Property (IP) being a trend travelling from village to village with groups organizing to efforts to brand the name 'Maasai' as an intangible good and claim money from companies using it to sell their products.'*
>
> Reflections penned later that evening in the fieldnotes diary, 5 July 2013

Whilst distinguishing between the modern and the traditional is difficult, and perhaps unnecessary from a scholarly perspective, the Maasai make this distinction through critical observations on *Ulaya*. Processes described in this section are, one might say, an 'indigenization of modernity', given that technologies are sourced to reflect a seminomadic lifestyle. The selective approach taken by the Maasai reflects an understanding that efforts of 'forced modernity' often have a radical impact upon systems of land use. This does not mean that Maasai are not connected to international developments or are rejecting these developments. Instead, elements imported from *Ulaya* that improve the mobile use of land are implemented vigorously.

Ever since colonial times, outsiders have sought to categorize the Maasai in terms of wealth and development, and the outcomes are contradictory. Hodgson's (1999) archival research (archives from 1927-1940) proves that the Maasai were the group paying the highest taxes in all of Tanganyika as the British, always uncertain of whether the Maasai were rich or poor, savage or noble, decided that cattle was a valuable and very taxable commodity. Hodgson views this commodification of goods, by an outside force, as being a deterioration of the welfare of Maasai, whereas Galaty (2013) frames the annexing of Maasailand to the nation-state context of Tanganyika and national-international markets both as an opportunity and as a constraint. The Maasai participated in international trade (Kipury, 1983) even in the early years of the slave trade. Kantai (2007) mentions a colonial saying that the Maasai were 'probably the richest uncivilised race in the world.'

Mobile practices today largely manifest themselves in culture, lifestyle, values and contemporary customs. *Bomas* are built so that one could easily pick up sticks and leave; electricity is of little importance even to wealthy Maasai. In Maasai culture, all large assets are mobile. These include livestock, phones and power stations (usually solar powered and portable). Explained further in Chapter 4, anchored investments are made only as moorings that in turn enable mobile ones (Sheller, 2011). The scarcity of non-mobile capital leads to a combination of employing costly innovations with time-tested customary institutions, rituals and traditions. For instance, it is common for each large family to have at least one veterinarian who complements their expertise with local remedies. Another example is in the upgrading of indigenous stock with breeds from other countries.

While what comes from *Ulaya* is interpreted as 'modern' and advanced, it is often understood as lacking culture (distinctive traditions, norms, dress code, ethnic

identity, shared ideals and goals), and a pragmatic distrust is brought to bear against it. I stress the word pragmatic because what is out-of-place can be turned, and be adapted and transformed, to be 'in place' very quickly. Sahlins (1999) and Galaty (2013) study the 'indigenization' of modernity. Their approach defines modernity as a framework of globally shared institutions and ideas. This working definition does not discriminate among cultures, but rather explores multilevel institutional relations between local, state and international powers that frame pastoral existence in the contemporary world. In this approach, the pastoralist interacts, not with a rigid top-down framework of state interference and neoliberalism, but as a pragmatic agent with a conscious choice in what cultural strategies to adopt and adapt in securing their livelihood. Clifford (1988) asserts that many cultures adapt to global frameworks in distinct ways, thereby reasserting difference, rather than simply 'merging with the modern world' (see Chapter 6).

Maasai culture is not eroded, but is re-negotiated within a global framework, to which people are both sceptical and welcoming. Many research participants are particularly sceptical when 'development efforts' are put into practice by outsiders to 'modernize' the Maasai, every so often backfiring with the added negative effect of having destroyed traditional practices. Sahlins (1999) notes how international homogeneity and local diversification are two sides of the same coin. Hannerz (1983) adds that globalization is often an organization of diversity. For instance, the introduction of 'better' livestock, not fit for nomadic herding on semi-arid drylands for instance, has damaged existing gene pools which is indicative of a poor organisation of diversity. Whilst the Westphalian state is meeting its demise, local differentiation and land use is increasingly based less on rootedness and sovereignty, and more upon a concept of mobility that fits well into the globalised era. New

practices of territoriality, drawing upon pre-colonial models, can emerge within a context that is both highly globalised and idiosyncratically local. Space can be interstitial and intersected by multiple interest groups, according to ecological and political climates.

Political structures that are considered 'out of place' are often actively ignored or resisted (see Chapter 8). Maasai culture is organised and divided through clanship and age-sets; the first ensuring cultural and economic exchange (and competition, see Galaty, 1993) and the latter political organization. Whilst traditional structures of high physical mobility make up culture, the land has been defined, narrowed down and regulated to such an extent that it largely impedes semi-nomadic life. Customary land use patterns often threaten contemporary governance schemes. For instance, 'privatized' or 'protected' land is often transgressed upon. Another practice is spearing a lion. The killing of lions by warriors is seeing something of a comeback. Human-wildlife conflict related killings aside, the ritual is a reactionary measure towards the government and private organizations controlling parts of Maasailand.

> *'We Maasai of Ngorongoro are victims of a totalitarian regime.' I'm sitting inside a modestly decorated home of a retired politician. Cats run in and out of the building and flies mate on the table as we drink chai with fresh milk. The elder has settled in Loliondo, Ngorongoro District, but keeps his livestock in the NCA. 'What was the revenue of the NCAA last year?' He asks the younger Maasai sitting on the sofas. '60 million USD' one answers. 'And how much did we get?' The elder asks, referring to the Pastoralist Council as representative of all Maasai. '1.2 million.' One answers. 'That is nothing!' The elder exclaims. 'We have nothing! No power over our own land. Nothing to say! We are being persecuted!' I ask why and he continues: 'Because our land is beautiful. It's our curse that we, unlike other Tanzanians, preserved our own land, lived with the nature. We cannot live as Maasai anymore because we were the ones who preserved the land, they took it from us. The OBC [Ortello Business Corporation of the United Arab Emirates] is evicting us here in Loliondo. They are taking away all our land over there.' He points towards the land behind the hills. 'We must learn to organize as Maasai.' As he talks, he shifts from English to Maa to Swahili, the more political the*

phrase the more likely he is to say it in English; I believe he would do this even if I were absent. 'We must learn to organize like the Kenyans [Maasai] do. It is our only chance to survive, by organizing so we can gain power over our very own land again and defend our rights as indigenous peoples, also internationally.' That is our only future. But we are sitting on a time bomb.

Me, I was evicted from Ngorongoro [Conservation Area] because of agriculture. So I had to come here for agriculture and stay in Ngorongoro for my livestock. I am a migrant now. But, for how long? Soon they will also take this land right here! Our enemies, our enemies are the President of the Republic of Tanzania, his secretary and the Arabs. Because we preserve our beautiful land they come to make profit from us, the President too, he makes so much money here. And in return they evict us, take away our rights. Tourism is bad for us. It's destroying our culture. Because our land is beautiful, the tourists came and now we are being evicted so the government and the Arabs can have the land for tourism. He turns to the Maasai seated around me and addresses them in English. 'You people in Ngorongoro, you are not fighting your own cause!' To me he says 'They are so submissive!' The Maasai around me are all quiet. 'They need to Organize, Educate and Cooperate. They are not cooperating! They are not cooperating between the sections and everyone follows their own interests. Look at Kenya, they are so much better at organizing now they are claiming back their land successfully. Also, these Cultural Boma's are only a tool of submission by the NCAA! The Maasai don't fight! They just let the NCAA control everything and here it's the Arabs.' When I am asked whether education is important, I answer. 'Yes! Very important. Maasai resistance to change is what preserved this land but now we have to go with time, to educate to defend our cause.'

Fieldnotes, 22 March 2013

This retired politician (CCM) was the most outspoken of the research participants that I interviewed. Apart from politicians and indigenous rights activists in Arusha, very few spoke in activist terms explicitly. The retired politician referred to the Maasai of the Ngorongoro as being submissive. Other activists spoke of ignorance towards ones' own fate. Some suggested that other Maasai were afraid and wanted to keep the harmony with the NCAA and government bodies and were more willing to mobilize on the internet, finding this to be safer than direct confrontations and uprisings. He particularly stressed the importance of institutionalised (essentially Western) education, viewed also by my research participants from the Pastoralist Council as being a premise for the cultural survival of the Maasai. For Loserian, Sululu and

Solomon, the idea of sending all Maasai children to school is so important that whenever we travelled together and encountered a child not in school during school hours, they would stop their daily business to figure out who the child's parents were and how to get the child in question to go to school.

3.7. Concluding remarks

To understand the meaning of both place and mobility, it is necessary to lay down some 'ground work' first. This chapter has done so by exploring geographical imaginaries and themes central to the topic of place-making. Theoretical shifts in the social sciences in the late 1980s and early to mid-1990s (Clifford, 1988, Malkki, 1992, Tucker, 1994, Cresswell, 1996) paved the way for a better scholarly understanding of the meaning-making involved in place. This chapter revisited their analysis on place and meaning and framed Maasai place-making drawing on their conceptual frameworks. In so doing, this chapter is also a criticism of some of the facets of the 'new mobilities paradigm' (see 1.3.3.), particularly, elements of the paradigm that question previous scholarly analysis about meaning and place (Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006). Treating meaning and place as 'normal' is not necessarily problematic, as Sheller and Urry (2006) suggest. To re-assess mobility, I hope to have demonstrated that we, as anthropologists and social scientists, need to re-examine the work developed prior to the alleged 'mobilities turn' in social sciences.

What has been analysed in this chapter is a mapping out of the various facets of mobility and place-making in Maasai life, while the chapters that follow examine their contextual importance and the manner in which they are put to use. Mobilities are rooted in meaning and place. Four concepts were explored in this chapter that

argue that a mobile relation to land is formed when space becomes place. The themes tie in together as central place-makers in Maasai culture: Marriage, pleasure walks, home and *Ulaya*.

Firstly, I explored the interwoven lines created by marriages, how female migration creates a network of connectivity through Maasailand. Secondly, I analysed how pleasure-walks have shaped and are shaping Maasailand. Early on in fieldwork, I was left driven to reflection and impressed by a meeting with a venerable elder who had a profound influence on the NCA, Francis. His rhetorical question as to how far I had walked is perhaps the reason I have examined place-making and how the multisensory experience of walking infuses meaning to space. Next, narratives on home and cattle were introduced, the intertwined relationship of being at home and 'in place' with cattle has also been analysed. The research participants I interviewed presented two very different notions of home, the ideal home, *Oloshoo* often a geographic imaginary, and the physical home. Lastly, I turned to *Ulaya* and the sense-making of

'modernity' in Maasailand. I analysed Maasai perceptions of 'modernity' and how this 'modernity' is infused or rejected. I explored how the 'out-of-place' informs and becomes infused with the 'in place'.

Intricate and variable factors inform not only a culture of mobility, but its necessary foundation in place. Migration is one such factor, female migration through marriage is a case in point for processes of connectivity and interaction across Maasailand. The Maasai-as-flâneur also paces out ties along the ground. Maasailand, or *Oloshoo,* is however often more of an ideal home than a physical reality or a geographic imaginary reinvented and re-inscribed as stories intertwine memories and myths.

Through this process, lost land such as the Serengeti is re-enforced as ‘in-place’. Whilst the out-of-place is defined in dialogue and in reaction to the ‘in place’, rather than there being a barrier between the two; instead, there are boundaries, which intersect and dissect. What is foreign can be adapted into place. The interview with the politician highlights how this is the case with Western education, which he deems to be paramount for the continuation of Maasailand and Maasai culture.

What I hope to have accomplished by examining these four themes is to show that to be mobile, one needs place. The four themes functioned as place-makers, infusing meaning to space. If there is no meaning, then one simply moves through space, but if there is meaning, one does not simply move, one is mobile. Place is a requirement for mobility. By focusing on ‘place’, the chapter has set the ‘ground-work’ for the chapters that follow. The research question is: how are human mobility practices continuously constructed and (re-)produced, through communication technology, in dialogue with members of a cultural group, and in its reaction to non-members? To answer this question, I have demonstrated that what first needs to be explored are the dialectical place-making processes that attach meaning to both space and movement and the technologies that mediate these processes. By having examined place-making I can turn next to human mobility practices and to the tools that construct and (re-)produce them.

Chapter 4: Herding by Phone

4.1. Introduction

> *'Loserian and I are driving around the Crater rim, near the Crater descend road, when something hits the car. We stop it and a 5-year old runs out of the bush towards an injured goat kid, its right foreleg is dangling as though by a thread. The child is terrified and keeps apologizing for not taking better care of the goat. Lose asks for the child's father's name. The child doesn't want to say at first, but Loserian insists so that he can refund him the price of the goat. The child obeys and Loserian takes down the father's name, tells the child not to be afraid, but to never stray from his livestock. We climb back into the car and Loserian calls Sululu to find out who the father is and what his phone number is.*
> *A few days later, Loserian wires 25,000 Tsh to the father through M-pesa. We learn that the child has been scolded for letting the goat run across the road. Loserian declines the offer to exchange the money for little goat's meat.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 2 September 2013

This incident illustrates how responsibility and human-animal communication is taught, from a very young age, through herding and how conflicts surrounding livestock are resolved. The question here is whether a negligent herder or the third party is liable for the damage. The social organization of Maasailand foresees the teaching of responsibility, independence and inter-dependence from the earliest possible age. This chapter analyses how human mobility practices are imbued with meaning through herding. Even toddlers, much younger than the child in the example above, are sent out onto the grasslands to control small livestock where they have to ensure no animal strays and stay vigilant towards predators or other wild animals. A toddler can be sent out for hours alone without siblings. A strong bond to the social network of Maasailand is created at an early age through the responsibility of herding, the non-human-to-human component in social networking and a human-animal

communication.[33] Children are taught to sing to the cattle and quickly learn to distinguish each individual in the herd.

Interspecies interdependencies dictate and narrate Maasai life. In prayers, children and cattle are prayed for at the same time: 'May God give you children and may God give you cattle'. The interpretation of, and communication with animals and nature is taught to children from a pre-verbal age. A bond between human and animal worlds is created, in line with Freud's (1899) argument that when humans and animals communicate to each other they speak in the 'other' language, the shared cryptography of dreams. The foundation for the Maasai social network and sociability has a non-human component; herding, as a technology of mobility, it implies the human and his (or her) communication with the non-human, with cattle and with nature.

A recent article by Tsing (2012), is a case in point for the (re-)examination of human-nature communication. Tsing calls human nature an interspecies relationship. As Ingold (1991) notably points out, social and cultural anthropologist have long ignored the relations between nature and culture, the organism and the person. Similarly, Latour (1994) invites readers to explore and to suspend their knowledge of what a human subject is and what a non-human object is and to break free from the paradigm that there exists a dichotomy between the human and the non-human. He believes that we need myths to understand and to connect humanity and non-humanity. Kirksey and Helmreich (2010) even call for a 'multispecies ethnography' as a mode of research to bring nature and the interdependence between culture and nature away from the margins of anthropology. It is not my aim with this chapter to

[33] Social networks are understood (2000:3) as 'a set of institutions, knowledge practices, and artefacts thereof that internally generate the effects of their own reality reflecting on themselves' (Riles, 2003:3). See Chapter 8 for an in-depth discussion.

answer this call, but rather to highlight the process of interspecies communication and the role of herding as a technology in the meaning making of human mobility practices.[34]

4.2. Herding as a technology

Herding is the most physical practice of the Maasai's mobile identity. It is as much a cultural expression of mobility as it is a survival and livelihood strategy. Most of life is spent outside the home and, as discussed in the previous chapter, only wealthy families will make basic investments in shelter; even if most bomas are not transient elements, but are instead permanent residences, they are constructed based on customary techniques using cow dung, mud and sticks.[35] Herding is a mental exercise as much as it is a physical one. For instance, in Zen Buddhism, (ox)-herding is recognized as a spiritual act of meditation and discipline.[36] Maasai believe that cattle were given to them by *Engai* and that cattle have divine elements; therefore, herding has, aside from an economic reasoning, a spiritual and disciplined nature. Although challenged by the conservation doctrine that Maasai land use constitutes 'overgrazing', My Maasai research participants strongly believe that herding respects nature's bylaws. Robin Reid (2012), a rangeland ecologist, supports this view in her in-depth report on how the engineering of protected areas, such as the NCA, have failed by excluding the original engineers of these areas (pastoralists) from designing their own conservation schemes. Her work emphasizes how pastoralism is not just

[34] Tsing's (2012) essay, however, in which she interweaves the history of mankind with the life of fungi, is an eloquent answer to the call by Kirksey and Helmreich (2010).
[35] See Loserian's mothers' hut versus the large chicken house described in the last paragraphs of Chapter 2.
[36] http://terebess.hu/english/oxherd12a.html

compatible with wildlife, but also how pastoralists have co-created ecologies together with wildlife, and how pastoralism and biodiversity go hand-in-hand.

Pastoral land use still takes up some 25% of the world's land mass (Blench, 2001), yet a certain area of land is only utilised for a limited time, allowing for other modes of production or other forms of life or wildlife activity to take place when herds are elsewhere. Herding allows for overlapping geographies as it does not require territorial exclusivity. However, herding practices are today strongly influenced by political constraints. Mobile people are a lot harder to track, to 'herd' and to control than people who are bound to cities or Ujamaa villages. On this note, Foucault (1978) writes that one cannot govern over a territory, state or political structure; one can only govern over people. The Tanzanian state, and before it the colonial powers, have, as discussed in the introduction, sought to immobilize mobile people through various methods of the deprivation of land rights and the damaging of their reputations by representing their physical mobility as representative of a 'backward' outlook on life and herding as an outdated way of securing livelihood.

Ngorongoro presents an exceptional variety of flora and fauna, from dense highland forests to arid drylands, short grass savannahs, bushlands, steeply ascending mountains, craters, ravines and alkaline lakes. The topography can alter dramatically, even over a walking distance of just a few minutes. Herders need a vast knowledge of the landscape to make adequate herding decisions. In Chapter 3, the use of pleasure walks as a way to gain this knowledge was explored, a process that blurs leisure and work through consuming the landscape whilst on foot. Herding is the strongest manifestation of the Maasai's desire to be mobile. The deep and instinctive knowledge of land and territory, taught from a very young age, combined with the human

component of herding as a technology, is the foundation for its holistic implementation.

If herding is defined and understood as the technology of mobile animal husbandry (Moran, 2006), does understanding the herder, as Dyson-Hudson (1972) urges, then become easier? Herding is the coordination of a set of techniques aimed at bringing animals together in a group, of looking after and of controlling livestock such as cattle, goats, sheep or reindeer. The technology of herding is an inherently mobile act. Herding is aided by an expanding number of technologies, aimed at coordinating, simplifying, diversifying and increasing the economic productivity of the activity. In Maasailand, the technologies that permeate herding include the age-set system, the homestead as a mooring, the herder, the mobile phone and M-pesa. While herding has become infused with newer technologies, such as the mobile phone and M-pesa, it also borrows from a history of technologies (the age set system and the mooring) and the user (the herder).

Herding is a body of knowledge, a technology derived from sets of practices that are both time-tested and innovative. Its two main resources are manual labour and land. What is necessary for successful herding is, thus, the human component, the ability to exercise control over the animal and the ability to read nature and communicate with livestock. As such, herding may be the most integral technology in Maasai society: the skills, the time, the monetary investments and strategic decisions in defending or expanding territory all revolve around ensuring the herds' welfare . The age-set system is integral to how herding is organised, as described in the introduction, children tend to small livestock and even cattle, whilst warriors are in charge of daily herding practices. Elders take on managerial decisions and women tend to young or sick livestock. As this chapter shows, the age-set system is one out of

many elements supplemented by outsourced herding, veterinarians and increased fragmentation of herds (splitting herds up into different areas to reduce risk in terms of disease or drought).

Land access for herding has been largely reduced by the government and disenfranchisements are common on behalf of wildlife conservation efforts or international stakeholders, such as members of the Dubai royal family.[37] In effect, a cattle-less class of Maasai is beginning to emerge and the wedge between those who have large herds and those who own smaller herds is increasing. Many cattle-less and poor young Maasai venture into cities or to the coast to work either as *askaris* (guards) or in tourism. With the emergence of a Maasai elite (elite also to mainstream Tanzanian society), herding is also becoming a salaried profession in which Maasai opt for careers in cities to maintain their bonds to Maasailand by keeping livestock. The increased Maasai commitment to formal education, combined with government and NGO efforts to support young Maasai through to university, has aided in creating these elites. For my key research participants, the employees of the Pastoralist Council, education was so important that spotting a child by the roadside at school time would lead to suspending of their activities and a 'hunt' for the parents to talk these into sending their children to school.

Interviews with elders like Francis and the retired politician (see 3.3.), show how education is regarded by many as a cultural survival strategy, the educated Maasai no longer shunned Hodgson (1999), interviewed elders in the 1990s, most of which approve 'the power of the pen'. With the emergence of 'modern Maasai' or

[37] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22155538. Dubai-owned OBC controls parts of Loliondo and seek to incorporate more into their 'wildlife corridor', hunting grounds to which the Maasai would have no grazing rights. The company was registered by the U.A.E deputy defense minister, Brigadier Mohamed Abdul Rahim Al Ali. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/13/opinion/the-brigadier-sshooting-party.html

ormeek who keep cattle, the opportunity for young impoverished Maasai (and non-Maasai who are increasingly trusted to herd) to work as professional herders is an increasingly lucrative alternative to venturing East to Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar for tourism, also ensuring that they will not be branded *ormeek* by other Maasai and may manage to save enough to herd their own livestock. For these young men, as for other many other Maasai, Mobile technologies are integral to the organization of herds during times of political, societal and ecologic transformation, both exogenous and

internal, in Maasailand. In addition, they facilitate or reinforce the system of cattle-lessness by enabling 'herding-by-phone' with professional herders who own little or no cattle and herd on behalf of wealthier, often salaried cattle owners. Herd owners need to exercise a great deal of social control and coordination of this labour to ensure that their cattle are well taken care of and are herded well.

Despite government campaigns against pastoralism, herding is so prevalent that the majority of the Tanzanian population relies on pastoralists for milk and meat produce (Kipury, 2005). Studies have shown that nomadic pastoralism is superior to ranching and other exogenous production systems in tropical and semi-arid rangeland management (Homewood, 1999; Galaty et al., 1994). Regardless of these findings, Tanzanian regulations favour sedentary systems. Development organizations have long supported the belief that pastoralism is not compatible with the eco-system and must be replaced by other production modes because it places too much stress on grasslands and encourages human-wildlife conflict. In my fieldwork, I have found that well-funded conservation organizations, often backed by aid agencies such as the Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS) continue advising the Tanzanian government to diminish nomadic herding opportunities.

I did most of my fieldwork on herding walking with Sululu, a car and truck mechanic who owns a herd of over 100 cattle. My impressions of herding and understanding of the Maasai's intimate relation to land and cattle formed as I wandered with Sululu, his family and their livestock. Although a lot of our interaction was characterised by silence, as he is not one to speak much, the wandering conveyed much of the existential experience of herding. Eventually, I was given a calf by Sululu (partly as a joke, partly as a sign of appreciation), she grew into a healthy milk cow.

> *He looked angry, strong and dangerous. His position in the driver's seat giving him power over the group. Like a true bully, he'd slow down to pick up hitchhikers only to speed up whenever their faces lit up when they thought they'd gotten lucky. Behind the angry face and the language barrier, a humanitarian, a devout Catholic, a father and a generous person was hidden. So I was told, and so I would discover in the months that followed.*
>
> Fieldnotes, 12 May 2013

My first impression of Sululu, as an angry dangerous person with whom one better not mess, was not shared by the members of the Maasai community. Friends and acquaintances of mine who came to visit did appear to share this view, but to the Maasai of Ngorongoro, Sululu was a very important and integral individual. Sululu's cattle, Sululu's boma, Sululu's church (as he is the chief coordinator of the Catholic Church), Sululu's Land Cruiser. Sululu had many stories, such as the helicopter crash, to which he was the first respondent, or the nuns in the plane crash, or the drunk *babu* who was trodden upon by an elephant, or the dead bodies he had to dispose of in the bush.[38]

[38] Traditionally, only the most important community members are buried and most deceased people are simply disposed of. Government regulations and the Church have strongly weakened this practice, though many people still choose to get rid of their dead family members by dumping them in the bush.

Sululu went to primary school and then trained as mechanic/truck driver. For the first 6 weeks, I encountered Sululu on nearly a daily basis he didn't speak a word of English; however, he starts speaking when the others are not around. Has many cows, he keeps some cows with his brothers in 'Sululu village' but also outside the cultural boma before Oldupai– another near-by resident working at the lodge (Filipo) tells me only the poor Maasai work at the cultural boma, he has his goats at the boma. Lives in Oilorobi. It seems like many keep their livestock scattered all throughout the area. The reminiscence of nomadism. A half-brother works there, his English is good, the same kind as Joseph, the Americanised accent one can mistake for Nigerian English. Sululu brings his son along and we check on the young cattle, 47 cattle, between 4 and 6 months. Sululu points to 6 speckled cows, of 6 month of age, and tells me that one is 'Baby Jesska'. Later I fail at milking a goat in the boma, an outpost, with two houses. We drive a few kilometers back towards the crater and stop to walk a ravine and up a hill to his grown up cattle. Mama and Father Jesska are pointed out. Some 200 cattle are herded by a warrior, the Sululu cattle marked with two stripes on their right hips, three smaller ones on their front legs. It feels as though cattle is the most important thing on earth. Later at catholic mass, women wearing their finest jewellery and bright clean shukas singing Maasai versions of Christian songs, some I recognise from the traditional soundtrack playing from the Docomo Mp3 in the land cruiser.

Fieldnotes, 12 May 2013

Sululu is the driver and mechanic of a government-sponsored Maasai organisation. Like many Maasai with a salaried job or a career outside of taking care of cattleherding, he has a multi-tier herd management technique involving several stakeholders both within and outside of the family. In addition, different areas within the NCA will host cattle at different seasons of the year. Cattle is transferred upwards towards grazing lands near the Crater rim in the dry season and down towards the plains near Oldupai Gorge[39] when the wet season sets in. There is also a separation of cattle and smaller livestock into a cattle pen for the youngest cattle who are taken inside at night. Sululu and his three brothers, one of whom is a veterinarian, owns a

[39] It is also known as Olduvai Gorge. Pressure from Maasai indigenous rights groups has resulted in renaming the area into correct Maa spelling.

herd of about 200 cattle (Sululu owning around 100 of them). This makes the herd one of the more sizeable ones in the NCA. All of the brothers are elders; this means that none of them participate in herding routines on a daily basis. Their cattle are herded together with those owned by other Maasai, but the cows from Sululu's family are distinguished through unique brandings; these brandings consist of two stripes burnt into each cow's hips. He says that he could recognize them from afar without even having to look at the branding. Brandings are useful when disputes over ownership arise that need resolution, for instance when cattle gets taken, rather than for an individual to distinguish his own cattle.

The elders' role lies in making strategic decisions regarding the herd and these tasks are split into practical management, veterinary services and executive decision-making regarding grazing and transactions. Herding is managed by warrior half-brothers, hired herders and, occasionally, Sululu's 12-year-old-son or other children in the family. A female cousin manages the small livestock at a *boma* near Oldupai. Grazing lands near this *boma* are utilised during the medium and dry seasons. On the weekends, the brothers will supervise the cattle, give injections where necessary or take other decisions regarding sick cattle. An important purpose of the age-set system is to structure and allocate the tasks of herding. Young boys, such as Sululu's son, sometimes toddlers even, are sent out to watch over sheep and goats. Warriors take on the most enduring tasks of herding, spotting new grazing grounds, moving cattle over vast distances. Elders make strategic decisions and have the final say in managing the herds. Women (they are not formally part of age sets) take care of small livestock, including young cattle. Sululu rarely intervenes physically, leaving most of the actual work to the others. Driving the land cruiser seems to give him more status than the brother who studied veterinary science at university. In dealing with the political

realities and the opportunities arising from participating in the 'salaried economy', roles are far more complex and diverse.

4.3. Cows, wife and children

> *'Maasai have no home if he don't have cows, wife and children. Especially cows. Maasai without cows is a Maasai with no home. Home is with your cattle'*
>
> Mussa, fieldnotes, 29 March 2013

Mussa, 25, a warrior, lodge receptionist and aspiring beekeeper, sees the relationship that Maasai have to cattle as the core of his culture and, as such, also to be a key indicator to the changes in Maasai culture. He argues that Maasai can no longer graze their cattle as real nomads, the land is too confined and the population is too great.[40] Income has to be gained through other activities. Mussa is able to take up a salaried career and slowly builds up a stock of animals including goats, sheep and cattle without his physical presence, and can stay in touch with his herder via his mobile telephone, one of the most sophisticated models, a nearly-new iPhone 4. If the herder needs supplies or has to top up his cell phone credit, he transfers via the mobile payment system, Mpesa. Most of my male research participants have a similarly intertwined relationship with cattle, even though the taking care of cattle is not their primary occupation. Mussa ranks cows, wife and children as integral to Maasai and to his perception of home, with no reflection on the positionality of women, nor on the physical home-making and house-building that are entirely female tasks. Tsing (2012) argues that 'home' is where the entanglement of domination, domestication and love

[40] Mussa did not reflect on the imaginary of the Maasai nomad or who constructed it. He envisioned a nomadic past that is no longer possible.

is the strongest. Women have always claimed ownership of cows, but have rarely participated in herding or in the managerial decisions and practices that go beyond caring for small livestock and young cows.[41]

My research participants separate female and male love (see the kidney myth in 5.2) and from this draw conclusions about male and female tasks in taking care of livestock. Women, so the popular kidney myth goes, display short-sighted love, the kind of love that does not take larger structures into account. Their love is the love that favors their son over all other sons, whereas male love is the kind that asks what is best for everyone. Both types of love are of great importance to society, and so the female role is the one of the nurturer, her interspecies relationship is more intimate, more immediate and present, she will stay 'at home' and take care of weak or sick cattle as well as calves and smaller livestock. Livestock need attention, care and presence. Men are believed to make the best decisions for the herd; for this they too have a strong connection to animals and learn to study and understand the needs of their livestock, their bond is more with the herd than to individual animals. Gender closely informs the type of relationship a human builds to animals, and this relationship informs the roles men and women take on in society.

Women act as the 'moorings' to an intricate herding system; their active participation in mobile aspects of herding were difficult for a very long time. The accessibility to mobile telephones is making it easier for women to take managerial control over herds; they can relay their instructions and apply their decisions wherever necessary without changing their physical location. Women can keep livestock in

[41] Ownership is a complex term and Maa-English translations do not fully grasp its meaning. Llewelyn-Davies (1978) proposed that the male head of household 'owns' all livestock (as the *olopeny*, overseer) yet women control livestock too; they nurture livestock, receive livestock as gifts in the example provided in this work on page 121, inherit livestock and so forth and children can also be given absolute control over small livestock. 'Ownership' is multi-layered and has different rights and duties.

multiple places in Maasailand and stay informed via their mobile telephones. This is now possible without their managerial oversight taking too much time away from activities such as raising children, cooking, collecting firewood, beadwork, going to the market, building houses and taking care of small livestock; thus, taking on their traditional roles of acting as moorings to a mobile landscape whilst themselves becoming herders-by-phone. Geser (2004) argues that once the novelty aspects of a technology fade out, the technology itself is no longer visible to the relationships of its users. Applied to mobile phones, the part of the argument concerning 'relationship' does not entirely hold up. Whilst the technology integrated well into the socio-cultural setting and its role and purpose is not questioned as much by users, relationships have changed; put simply, these women would not be herding if it were not for the phone.

Children, as Mussa points out, are integral to this and many other Maasai's understanding of what it is to be Maasai and, as the next section discusses, 'sons and land cannot be given away' (popular saying). It is with great devotion and zeal that children are taught the interdependent responsibility of herding and it takes sons and land to herd, because cattle are already God-given. Sons and land, however, are the 'crucial ingredients' to making cattle herding possible.

> *We picked up medicine at the NCAA HQ; I was in the car with Loserian and Solomon. Solomon took the package explaining he had 'cough fever'. I inquired about this cough fever to find out he didn't really have cough fever but the cows did. To him this was basically the same. Later, Loserian told me that it was not even his cows but the cows of the traditional leader in his village that had this 'cough fever'. It wasn't communication issues leading to the misunderstanding about who had cough fever, because for Solomon there was no difference between him being sick and a cow being sick. Cows come first. It is normal for a family to have a veterinarian in the (extended) family. In contrast, there is only one physician at the NCA headquarters and he rarely treats locals, while at the Endulen hospital there are sporadic visits by physicians. In the past years there has been an annual starvation (in October/November) with up to 200 deaths (usually children) each year*

> *attributed to the lack of nutrition. This appears as something contradictory if one looks at cattle herding. There is substantial wealth in the NCA and there is also great solidarity between people but children starve.*
>
> Fieldnotes, 1 August 2013

Solomon sees himself integrated not only with his cows but also with the cows of a close friend of his. Like other research participants, including Loserian and Sululu, he ascribes subjectivity to each and every cow, differentiating between them in great detail regarding health, productivity, mood and hide patterns. As a herder, Solomon exercises a pastoral power fittingly described by Foucault (1978:128) as 'zeal, devotion and endless application'. He follows particular sets of techniques, rationalities and practices. Sululu is not on Facebook, but if I write to Loserian regarding Baby Jesska ('my' cow in the Sululu herd) I would get an instant and substantial report on her. At the same time that people give these individual attributes to their animals, they also equate their cows, or all cows, to Maasai life in general. One would not be whole without the other.

Competition is tough and herding is a volatile business. Many herders choose to maximize their herds rather than maximize productivity. A large herd is seen as a kind of bank, stocks may decline rapidly, due to drought or disease (as during the rinderpest epidemic in the 1890's, see Spinage, 2003), so a large herd, spread across different places, is highly sought after. Loserian, for instance, once had well over 100 cattle which was reduced to about 20 in the drought of 2009; after having sworn off cattle, he is now rebuilding his herd(s) in multiple places across Maasailand – a strategy aimed at reducing risks in the event of drought (periods of drought have increased sharply) or disease strikes, facilitated greatly by easy access to communication with the herders to whom the cattle have been outsourced.

Wealthy Maasai like Loserian are expected to contribute to the well-being and education of family members, even up to the point where their own fortune could be jeopardised. Solidarity is valued highly, and yet cannot prevent the annual starvation that hits children of Ngorongoro in October and November (after the dry season and before the short rain season in November has shown effect on grasslands). Incessantly, the staff of the PC stop to hand out shillings, but never to strangers. Recipients of this charity qualify by descending from the same village or holding even a remote ancestry. Women are aided before men, and either women who have abandoned their pride to approach richer family members or men fuelled by alcohol approach the car. Widows or wives of cattle-less men are sometimes given cows by village leaders or by rich family members; these transactions are organised and overseen by accountants from the Pastoralist Council.

On one such occasion, about 10 women gathered as the vice president of the Pastoralist Council bought some 30 cows from wayfaring Maasai from a village near Lengai. It was two days after the market in Endulen, the cows in question were some 15 kilometers from Endulen, about 100 km still remaining on their journey; the group was breaking up to return home with some 100, now reduced to 70, cattle. The vice president never needed the physical market place to buy cattle. On the contrary, by managing to make the purchase, two days after hired warriors had wandered all the way from Lengai and back in vain, he has a competitive advantage and manages to save transaction costs. The whereabouts of the wandering warriors, made known by informants by phone, and negotiations about price were done in much the same way. Only the monetary transaction cannot be done in any other way but cash; this is because M-pesa has security limits on how large a transfer can be. The security limits exist as it is a very easy and extremely common mistake to send money to the wrong

number. Yet, there is a certain ethic in Tanzania in sending wrongly received money back. I witnessed these mishaps being put back to right on dozens of occasions, with different research participants either sending or receiving money erroneously and quickly correcting things with the stranger on the other end of the line. At the final stages of research, I inquired into gift-giving *osotua*, and the research participants I questioned online responded that yes, the example above with the gifting of the cows was likely such a case. As for erroneously received payments, people felt an obligation to return the money quickly, which can indeed be connected to what Cronk (2007) refers to as the central metaphor of the Maa economy, *osotua* directly translating to umbilical cord.[42]

The post-market transaction is an example of mobile technologies opening up a market beyond the traditional market. The vice president was able to purchase cattle at a lesser rate and the contracted warriors were able to strike a deal. Contracted sellers usually work on percentage rates and selling a large herd enables these warriors to buy their own cattle. For many young Maasai, who wish to pursue a life of herding and herd management, contract selling is a fast track to cattle ownership. On their safaris, often covering hundreds of kilometres, they sleep in the bush or in peoples' homes to which they are invited, regardless of clan membership. Having a herd of cattle is the goal of most cattle-less Maasai, both Maasai pursuing careers and those who do not own cattle due to marginalization. Moses, a contract seller from Longido, describes his vocation as follows:

> *It is a good job, I am saving money for my own cattle … I only have goats and sheep now but soon I will have a herd of cows. I don't mind walking, I go to*

[42] However, unlike as with actual *osotua* practices, which create an eternal bond between those setting up such a relationship, sending money back is a quick, one-time process. It would be compelling to further explore the extent to which the phone changes *osotua* practices.

markets with friends. I enjoy it. It's so expensive to buy cattle. I want my own cattle.

Fieldnotes, 12 May 2013

4.4. Sons and land cannot be given out

Ilmeishooroyu emurua oolayioni (Sons and land cannot be given out)
Popular Maasai wisdom

Each evening, at sunset, tourists on a luxury safari gather on the deck at the Ngorongoro Serena hotel. The sound of cowbells interrupts the tourist chatter. The hotel is perched right on the Crater's rim; the entire Crater floor opens up underneath. One of the two performing groups, either 'African Acrobatics' or the Maasai dance choir, gather in the staff quarters. The acrobats have been at the hotel for well over a decade and a half (escorted in and out of Karatu, about an hour's drive away). The choir has just been replaced because the old group did not 'jump high enough', to quote Loserian, who mingles at the hotel frequently, partly because nobody turns down a respected elder with ties to the NCAA and partly because he owns a tour company. Just before the performers come on stage, a herd of about 100 cows ascends right past the hotel and back up to one of the *bomas* near Sululu's. Only a few families lead their herds down into the crater and back up again, and there are rarely more than 200 cows on the crater floor. Down on the crater floor, the cattle find nourishment, salts and minerals on the banks of the alkaline lake, which the elders have deemed necessary for their cows.

Bomas are no longer permitted inside the crater but the Maasai have (so far) retained the right to guide cattle into the crater daily. There is only one route by which they ascend and descend and it goes straight through the Serena Hotel property. Often

to the complaints of tourists, who have been told by their (non-Maasai) guides how this disrupts the eco-system. As the Maasai wisdom introducing this section says, sons and land cannot be given out, and the daily march through the Serena property in the morning down into the crater and up again just as the sun sets is a manifestation of this, perhaps even an act of protest, as it is physically challenging do ascend and descend 600 meters on a steep path with over 100 cows. Maasai families lived and herded down in the crater until the Tanzanian government breached its agreement of Maasai control, installed the NCAA, and had all Maasai removed from the crater in 1974. The daily 'commuting' of these herds into the crater is about much more than salts and minerals; it is, since the eviction, a daily protest against NCAA control. It may even be a waste of resources, but a compromise following the eviction decreed that cattle could be led down and back up, along that path.

A popular Maasai idiom says that sons and land cannot be given away. In order to herd, as opposed to keeping cattle in ranches, one needs to make use of vast areas of land, a lot of which is only used temporarily and one needs skilled labour; namely, herders equipped with the skills necessary to defending livestock from both wildlife and from other humans, and spot the best land for grazing. Herding ensures high mobility and the effective use of land. Complex negotiating strategies dictate the systematic use of land. Following Galaty (1993), a land-tenure system is traditionally made up of two elements: the first being a legal framework, the second being customary techniques or practices. The first is dictated by governing institutions and, in the best case scenario, is carved out together with community leaders, NGOs and development agencies and the second portrays the shared understandings and cultural codes (or informal law) regulating access to land in a traditional setting.

What must be added to this definition of a land-tenure system are the sets of practices that arise through the development of new novel, non-customary technologies. The legal framework is almost exclusively a top-down process prescribed by the government; the customary techniques and practices element is based on centuries-old wisdom and negotiations between families and clans (Knight, 2010) as well as other ethnic groups co-using or competing for resources. The advancement of technologies of mobility is exogenously made available by private telecom companies whose operations, one must note, could be shut down by the state (if communication is seen as a threat by the government) and endogenously created through popular demand. So-called 'Modern Maasai' (a nickname used by both Maasai and other Tanzanians) rarely turn their backs on Maasailand. Often they hold the most substantial herds, which they tend to by phone. They are motivated to 'stay Maasai' (custodians of God-given cattle, to continue the legacy, to preserve culture and to ensure the welfare of family members in Maasailand). Families and societies pressure individuals to continue building a specific legacy, and many individuals feel it is their duty to carry on a legacy, the most primal legacy among them being children.

The next step, according to some pastoralists, may be herding using drone technology. With commercial drones becoming more affordable and easier to maintain, conservancies across Africa are testing them to monitor the herd movement of wild animals or to look for poachers. Equally, drones are believed to be used by poachers. Kenyan authorities have already gone so far as to fine tourists for using drones to take pictures of wild animals.[43] In Ireland, farmers are testing drones to keep

[43] http://www.eturbonews.com/54588/tourists-kenya-warned-not-fly-their-drones
[42] http://goo.gl/1kg4Ex

track of, and even herd, sheep (as replacements of the shepherd's dog).[42] Drones can help in both evaluating landscapes for fresh pasture, for long-term decision-making, in deciding what direction to take cattle on an immediate basis, in surveilling one's own herd and to ensure that contracted herders are doing their job. For drones to be viable options to herders, however, they need to be able to fly for longer periods and must be easily chargeable using solar energy; their prices will also have to come down significantly.

In Chapter 3, I reported that the estimations for livestock numbers per person are unreliable and politically tainted, often under-reported for fear of government action or in the hopes of more aid money. The alternative is that they are over-reported in government or conservationist data. Additionally, many Maasai will have cattle outside of the NCA, and these numbers are not reported. Similarly, political doctrine permeates some of the academic literature on pastoralism. Pastoralism is either benevolent to conservation (Homewood 2009) or it is destructive (Ogutu et al., 2005). Whilst some scholars maintain that the erosion of the socialist state framework has had a fundamentally negative impact on pastoralist economies (Sneath, 1999; Hodgson, 2011), others uphold the increased economic opportunities arising through neoliberalism (Fratkin, 1994).

Bollig and Schulte (1999) argue that African pastoralists adopt sustainable herding practices based on their intricate pastoral knowledge, which is partly time-tested observations of herd-vegetation interaction and partly ideological. Herding practices, I argue, are embedded in both ideology (as a set of cultural rites and practices and political stances, particularly rituals of taking cattle down into the crater) and in technology. Responses to environmental constraints are both emotional and economic in nature. One research participant reported how during the last great

drought, he lost 80% of his livestock. He said that he then decided to 'stop being Maasai', yet restocked when income from other sources (mainly tourism) gave him the opportunity to do so.

4.5. Markets and microcapitalists

Trading in cattle is, as cattle value currently goes up whilst cattle numbers go down, a major business. On a typical market day in Endulen, 50,000USD can easily pass between accounts. Cattle traders can benefit either from asymmetric market information or bypass said information by means of a well-placed phone call. A business venture enjoyed by many Maasai is to buy up a large stock of cattle at Endulen (50-100 cattle) and then have 4-5 warriors take the cattle, on foot, down to Arusha, paying them each 35,000Tsh (20USD) for the 4-day trip and a small percentage cut of the sale. Cattle are then resold for much higher prices at the Arusha meat market. As much as pastoralism, as a subsistence pattern, seems to be transforming into a trading of commodities nationally and internationally, Maasai have partaken in international trade through routes to the Swahili coast for centuries and Richerson (1991:76) assesses that: 'Trade and war are both favoured by the efficient transportation technology that is in the hands of pastoralists' (Richerson, 1991:76).

Taking cattle (the Maasai predominantly herd a breed known as the Zebu East African Cow) to market is a desirable job. Traders profit from deals and the cattle taken to Arusha or Kenya sometimes even end up in the Middle East. Apart from being good herders, these men are also prompted to learn the game of trading, as this is how they can make the most money. These men then bring goods back to the NCA (thereby establishing side businesses). They are often commissioned by Maasai

women who trade with agricultural products or everyday goods at the markets in Ngorongoro. Women most definitely play decisive roles in both livestock caretaking and trade. Apart from tending to their young and small livestock, they also provide the 'mooring' to the otherwise mobile concept of herding, their roles in markets are seminal to the household, selling and trading in skins, milk, eggs, jewellery and agricultural produce. These daily, weekly or bi-weekly micro-capitalist activities represent the mooring to mobilities and are just as integral to keeping the day-to-day operations going as herding is. They are also vital to solving food-security issues on a daily basis.

Although beadwork and jewellery-making may seem like enterprises undertaken in vain, over a dozen stands at Endulen market are tended to by female bead sellers, more than the vegetable stands. Men and women wear elaborate jewellery on a daily basis, no matter what exercise they are undertaking (herding, cooking, carrying firewood etc.). Beads of all colours, qualities and sizes hang on strings. Most are glass, some plastic and some made of natural material such as seeds. Women walk from stand to stand comparing and discussing. 'This is culture.' Mama Jackson explains, hinting at the importance of visually marking cultural distinctiveness. The prices hardly budge and most stands sell the exact same variety of beads. Only a few stands sell necklaces directly. 'Most women rather make their own beadwork' according to Mama Jackson.

The Maasai beads are mostly imported from the Czech Republic.[44] The beads traded at Endulen are used both internally and, to a lesser extent, for tourism. Beans made out of seeds, the traditional material, are scarcely manufactured and when they are,

[44] Beads have been traded between the Czech Republic and Africa since the 19th century, when traders would exchange Czech beads for metals and stones. See Bigham and Coles (1990)

they are mainly for tourists. *'We want white beads! If we buy colourful beads or seed beads, that's for tourists. White is beautiful. The colour is for wazungus! The colourful beads go back to Ulaya again with the tourists!' Mama Jackson.*

In a video from Loliondo, produced for an international audience by Maasai men and women from several villages, we find women proudly defending their construction techniques and the ways it relates to the land and to the cattle, weaving into the culture of mobile lands and cattle.[45] The women interviewed show how a house is constructed and how this construction reflects the mobile lifestyle, the idea of borrowing from the land (*their* land, as they stress continuously). Rather than cutting down trees, sticks and branches are used to form the house, rather than nails, these are tied together with ropes and, finally, cow dung and mud is mixed together to form the paste that covers the construction. The structure is a mooring with borrowed elements from land and mobility. Whilst Maasai society is structured around men, and men perform most tasks around herding, women play decisive roles in facilitating the infrastructure as well as in trade and, where permitted by the Tanzanian government, agriculture.

A common misunderstanding is that pastoral agriculture is foreign to Maasai. In a 1992 report, McCabe et al. write about the dangers of designing conservation and human livelihood policies based on stereotypes. Many Maasai sections are involved in agriculture. 'Maasai are not agriculturalists,' the Tanzanian UNESCO Director explained to me, when I met her at Rhino Lodge 4 years after a UNESCO recommendation had led to the overnight ban of all agricultural activities within the NCA. Her trip to the NCA was met with heavy scepticism within the Maasai

[45] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRvRRxoDggQ

community, even though she brought Marco, a well-respected indigenous rights activist along as her new personal assistant.

The implementation of the UNESCO recommendation (to help protect wildlife and Maasai culture) had led to starvation; the Pastoralist Council claim that 200 people have died as a direct consequence of the ban. The 2009 UNESCO recommendations present the Maasai as a threat to the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, urging the NCAA to develop a 'pastoralist strategy' and to control and manage the Maasai population. UNESCO points out that agriculture is illegal and not part of Maasai tradition; furthermore, the 'experts' assert that Maasai traditions are fading. Maasai bomas are called informal settlements or shanty towns and the NCAA must regulate Maasai population numbers. The document completely lacks recommendations regarding any sort of integrated management plan between the Maasai and the NCAA. It also identifies the NCAA, and not the Maasai, as the owner of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. This document caused an overnight ban of agriculture amidst one of the worst droughts in recent history. The McCabe et al report (1992), a document on policy-making in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, warns that policies based on stereotypes (such as Maasai not being supposed to farm) can have detrimental effects on human livelihood.

We met at the lodge together with Marco and the lodge managers, Serge and Nur. They stopped by for coffee after Marco had told me about his trip via Facebook. Below is an excerpt of the meeting transcript:

> *Director: The ban to happen like this was never our intention. They took our recommendation out of context. Now we need to find a strategy for Maasai livelihood.*
>
> *Serge: And this will not include small scale agriculturalism?*
>
> *No. Agriculture is incompatible with conservation.*

Serge shakes his head and Nur nods.

Serge: The situation is not sustainable now.

UNESCO Director: I know, that is why we made this trip; we are working on a solution.

Me: What solution? Importing maize is not sustainable; it creates dependency and the maize never arrives on time or disappears.

Director: We don't know yet, we are trying to talk to the Maasai, that is why I brought Marco, but they won't talk to me, they see me as the enemy, but I didn't make the recommendation.

Marco: I'm trying to talk to the Maasai. We must come together to find a solution for this, the Maasai, UNESCO and the NCAA.

Serge: So there is no solution; why no agriculture until there is a solution?

Director: Agriculture was deemed incompatible and we cannot reverse that decision.

Serge: It can't be that bad.

Nur disagrees.

Marco looks nervous. I'm speaking with my people. We must join efforts in this. The NCAA can no longer discriminate against Maasai. I applied for a job once as a warden with another Maasai and three who were not Maasai. I and the other Maasai were the only one who could answer the questions regarding wildlife. The others had never seen wildlife. I didn't get the job. The discrimination is systematic. They don't want you just because you are Maasai.

Fieldnotes, 8 August 2013

With the agriculture ban being strictly enforced in the NCAA and transgressors evicted, fruit and vegetables are imported from Karatu and sold by (mainly female) traders at markets as well as *dukas* (little shops). Maize, the staple food to most meals, is both traded regularly from Karatu and also distributed by the NCAA and PC at a subvention price. While Hodgson (1999) does not see the exchange of goods as innate

to human interaction, but rather as a system brought into Maasailand by force and coercion, Schneider (1979) defines cattle as the world's oldest currency. As such, in Maasailand it is an equity traded as both social and economic currency, socially in terms of paying a bride's family or settling a social issue (fining) and economically as live cattle and meat products have been traded between Maasai and with other ethnic groups. Early ethnographers, as well as Maasai oral tradition which reaches back to the 17th century (Kipury, 1983), confirm extensive trade relations.

Yet, despite often having substantial capital assets in terms of cattle, Maasai have been, and are still, vulnerable to external shocks such as climate change, disease or land disenfranchisement. The welfare of cattle, as a mobile, organic asset is highly dependable upon the land available for grazing. The mobile and fragile nature of keeping cattle as your main investment leads, and has led, to heavy fluctuations in wealth. Outsiders, dating back to colonial times, have tried to 'develop' the Maasai into the modern world, yet they easily forget that since early colonial times they were a part of it, their lifestyles and culture set up to thrive on high mobility.

4.6. Herding and politics

Herding practices are strongly constrained by political realities. However, the Maasai have incorporated, and have made their own, the grassroots politics model that has characterised Tanzanian society since independence; they have done so in order to maintain or negotiate authority on these practices. The majority of Maasai are vigorous supporters of the very same party that, since independence, has attempted to grab their land and end pastoral herding. This may seem counterproductive, or 'passive', as both Maasai supporters of the opposition, Chadema, and outside

stakeholders, such as NGO's or conservation organizations contend. This misinterpretation is highly Eurocentric, given that it stems from a world-view in which multi-party and democratic politics is the tradition. Understanding the Maasai support for the ruling party, the CCM, implies understanding customary practices about political decisions. Political decisions, for the welfare of the herd, are made through one channel. This channel was replaced by the one party model that was in effect in Tanzanian politics until 1992.

It is through attempts to align both the legal, nation-state driven and the customary frameworks that many Maasai find themselves marginalised and landless. This is where novel mobile technologies serve as tools in evading oppressive regimes as well as in making a more efficient use of land. Whilst the Maasai make elaborate use of phones to evade rangers, this is particularly the case in the NCA and on the border to the Serengeti, it must be noted that phones have made it easier for private organizations, such as the Frankfurt Zoological Society or the Tanzanian state, to combat herders too. The following may seem startling considering just how participatory Tanzanian politics actually are. Nyerere pioneered the concept of grass-roots politics in Africa (Friedland and Rosberg, 1964), albeit under a one-party model that prevailed until 1992 (Zanzibar being the exception). Grass root politics only trickle down slowly and opposition to the state of Tanzania, and to its authorities, does not equal opposition towards the CCM, the party that has ruled Tanzania since independence. This may seem counter-intuitive, however, as CCM was the only known forum to offer a way to engage in politics for a long time. CCM operates on a village level, giving every Tanzanian in every recognised village the possibility to make political contributions. This disrupts traditional decision-making in Maasai society and leads to new, non-traditional Maasai leaders, but it is also the only channel

that, until recently, was known to communicate directly with higher levels of political bodies.

Rather than challenging Maasai traditional hierarchies and community organization, CCM in Maasailand is driven by Maasai on a grass root level, is a supplementary channel and is a way in which to raise issues and to be heard as a Maasai community. This is why one can be heavily engaged with CCM party politics, but can also see authorities, such as the NCAA, organizations such as the OBC and the government as such, as being a parasite and an enemy. Few pastoral societies base their subsistence purely on herding; but, this is what the NCAA, based on misguided ideas about pastoralism presented by UNESCO, have forced most NCA Maasai to do. CCM grass root politics was the only way to engage in (non-customary rights) politics for a long time. A CCM presence in every Maasai village does not equal obedience to the Tanzanian state; it is a means of communicating with the nation state and with other villages on issues of politics. As such, CCM coming into every village in Tanzania during a period that only had a one-party state system was a very interesting concept and was an introduction to politics for many Tanzanians. It was the only political channel for engaging in politics and now this channel is under attack with the emergence of the Chadema party.

While there is strong support for Chadema within the Maasai community, CCM is the largest party. Chadema supporters are often seen, by Maasai supporters of CCM, as traitors. Traitors to politics are thought of as being corrupted people. This is, for instance, Sululu's view. He is active in CCM on a village level, and to him Chadema is a new political channel driven by even more corrupt people than CCM; namely, by traitors and outcasts. If you operate within politics, which is very different from deciding on customary policies governing Maasailand as a society within a

society, then you operate politics via CCM because that is how it has always been done and Nyerere is a man nobody wants to challenge. Nyerere is the founding father of Tanzania, despite all his policies aimed at marginalizing the Maasai, and Tanzanians' rights to act politically, this has earned him eternal and unquestionable respect from nearly all Tanzanians.

At best, someone who switches to Chadema would do so because he or she thought CCM was too corrupt (something nobody challenges, CCM is certainly corrupt, but it is the Tanzanian way of doing politics). It may seem odd how people can call for autonomy, call out governmental (CCM-powered) institutions as violent forces threatening their livelihoods and yet still engage in CCM activities every week in their villages. CCM still equals engaging in politics; it does not equal accepting the government or the government-sponsored authorities who try to crush Maasailand. This is because for so long all Tanzanians knew about politics was that there was one party through which to exercise politics; rural people in particular remain loyal to this concept of politics (while Arusha remains a Chadema stronghold).

Slowly, some Maasai are realizing that there are other channels of politics, such as Chadema or even organised autonomy movements in Kenya (a crackdown on one of these in 2007 led to dozens of deaths and to leaders going into exile (Kantai, 2007)). So, supporting CCM is by no means the equivalent of not supporting a higher degree of autonomy in Maasailand, even though CCM led policies have marginalised all of Maasailand, installing hostile regimes such as the NCAA to govern the NCA or have allowed private operators such as the OBC to take control of parts of Loliondo. Like the retired politician, whose interview is reproduced in Chapter 3, many CCM supporters and in this case politicians even, would support a Maasai uprising against the authorities controlling Maasailand. The politician in question was evicted from the

NCA, by authorities put in place by the CCM, yet he continues to support CCM as a party in elections.[46]

As an effect of Tanzanian politics, and the reluctance of Maasai and other pastoralists to challenge CCM, ownership of cattle and other goods is already becoming an increasingly individual affair. The sharing of communal land is becoming less of a 'Maasai thing' and is becoming more territorialised to family units. Families will participate in both home-based and extensive grazing (herds are often split across the land into groups according to specific needs). Butt (2011) concludes that the pool of warriors available for herding is being depleted by tourism opportunities and his studies of communities bordering the Maasai Mara found that up to 30% of household income is drawn from tourism there. In the NCA, tourism is far less lucrative, as Maasai are actively discriminated against by the NCAA (Kipury, 2005, my field research) and lodges employ few Maasai (Nilsson, 2011).

Nevertheless, a growing number of warriors and young women have opted for salaried careers or studies in wildlife management or tour guiding and then need to herd by phone if they wish to continue this legacy, which so many of these so-called 'modern' Maasai do. Ideally, communities will agree upon which herds can graze, when and where. Herds are often split and tended to alongside cows with similar needs; hence, one owner may have cattle spread out across various locations. Following Kipury (2005) a 1997 study suggested there are 2.7 cattle per person, or 12.5 cattle per household. These numbers are unreliable today and are subject to political interests. 42% of households hold 10 or more cows. Getting an accurate

[46] Tanzania does not keep or present statistics on how members of ethnic groups vote;however, judging by the majority support of CHADEMA in many north-western districts, CHADEMA may actually have received majority support by Maasai in the elections (2015). This is a surprising upset to the village participation system that the CCM so carefully established. However, the success of CHADEMA may be attributed to its Presidential candidate, Lowassa, being from Monduli and speaking Maa.

census of how many cows graze in Maasailand or in the NCA is neither possible nor advisable. Reporting too many cows will set the community at odds with the government and conservation agencies. Marriage is also strategic alliance to secure grazing rights and water resources. Marriage is a social capital that builds ties and grants access. Yet, well-established customary rights between families and clans have diminished both in the NCA and beyond, both socialist policies and neoliberal state intervention play into this evaporation of customary rites, both in Kenya and Tanzania in which elements of both systems exist and have, or are being, tested.

Much of the anti-pastoral government and NGO policies can be traced back to Herkovitz's (1926) *Cattle Complex*. Never having been to East Africa, his writing presented a picture of the irrational herder who over-utilizes grasslands so as to maximize personal profit in the short term, ruining the land over time. Herkovitz's herder is an individual; he is egoistic and not bound by cultural rules or beliefs. Garret Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons' (1968) would later cement the view that pastoral livelihoods are ecologically insensitive (Fratkin et al., 1994). Cattle Complex argumentation ignores the complex structures and rules set around herding, rules carved out and perfected over the centuries. For instance, land is not owned, but is kept in custody for future generations (Lane, 1998). Lamprey, writing on behalf of the UNESCO Integrated Project in Arid Lands argues that, in the long-term, pastoralism is self-destructive (1983, quoted in McCabe, 1994) and, perhaps unwittingly so. UNESCO has since become increasingly invested in the degradation of Maasai livelihoods. What Herkovitz (1926) and Hardin (1968) miss in their analysis of the sustainability of pastoral production is what Tsing (2012) has coined a crucial ingredient, love. When you are born into herding, and taught that cattle have a divine quality, the zeal and devotion for land and livestock cannot be properly measured in

rational game theoretical models. Herders think in terms of what is best for the herd, not short term profit maximization. In more 'modern' land use systems, such as ranches and plantations, it is not love but coercion that is used to tend to land.

Galaty (1994) observes that by adopting policies based on 'the tragedy of the commons' (Hardin, 1968) two paradoxical trends have emerged and transformed East African rangelands: Western style privatization and Socialist collectivization. Nomadic notions of the ownership and borrowing of land were deemed defunct by both the State and development organizations and only these two options were presented to policy makers. Kenya has largely followed the Western route, privatizing not only state-owned but also common property. Tanzania followed the Socialist route. One must note that both countries have adopted mixed privatization/state control strategies. To Galaty (1994), both stand in stark contrast to Maasai land-sharing policies. The outcome is similar for communities' control over land that is also diminishing. The claiming of land, on a more non-exclusive basis, allows for great flexibility but it increases the potential for conflict with other groups such as agriculturalists and it decreases the state's potential for control over pastoralists. Arguments concerning the 'tragedy of the commons' has long been under debate within both the field of economics and in social science.

Pastoralists do not act according to the 'rational' moves. McCabe (2004) notes that since pastoralists in East Africa live in communities in the long term, resources are used in a more resourceful way than if these same resources would not have been shared. Collaborative commons are examples of strong, often-implicit contracts within societies that prevent one actor from abusing what is shared communally; should he default and free-ride, the punishment is severe. Freeriding remains a

problem no matter what the socio-economic construct is, and overriding pre-existing concepts of collaborative commons with an imperative idea that communal use of resources leads to their depletion is the real tragedy. Throughout, Eastern Africa scholars have noted that it is not land utilised under customary rights that faces degradation and overgrazing, but land that has been placed under novel tenure systems such as 'communal property', 'individual property' or 'villlagisation'.

4.7. Concluding remarks

This chapter has analysed a physical practice of mobility (herding), its contribution to the meaning-making of a culture of mobility and the technologies that assist in herding, which is a corporeal manifestation of human mobility practices, allowing the human to interact with nature. This chapter has highlighted the integral role that interspecies relationships play in Maasai culture. Human mobility practices are constructed and (re)produced continuously through interspecies interdependencies or communication between people and animals. This chapter has shown how customary herding practices have given way to experimental managerial techniques and a more diversified approach to herding. At the same time, a small group of herders draw on the past by insisting on guiding their cattle down and up the crater wall, every day, ever since *bomas* were forbidden inside the crater. The climb is physically challenging, yet it is a daily exercise of a pastoral right the NCAA has not yet managed to take away from the Maasai.

The technology of mobility that is herding has changed both due to political constraints and due to new technologies that make the outsourcing of tasks and the diversifying of income opportunities easier. Yet, a class of cattle-less Maasai actively

participating in herding has also emerged, and it remains to be seen whether these, often young, herders will be able to afford cattle of their own. Through salaried herding, love as a 'missing ingredient' as Tsing (2012) puts it, is left out. Butt (2015) reports on salaried herders as being less knowledgeable. I am interested to see the long term effect this has, both on land use and for the welfare of the herds.

The mobile phone helps in navigating politics and new land tenure systems, evading new legal frameworks, but also enforcing them (see Chapter 7). Geser (2004) argues that once the novelty aspects of a technology fade out, the technology itself becomes invisible to the relationships of its users. Applied to mobile phones, which are no longer novelty items in Maasailand but well-integrated technological devices, his analysis upholds only partially; technology is seamlessly integrated into the sociocultural setting and its role and purpose is not questioned as much by users, but relationships have changed. The strategies concerning where cattle are placed have changed; the cattle-less herding class emerging would not be carrying out its duties without the control mechanism that phones provide. Women and salaried Maasai men, who would not have had the time to control cattle physically, can do so with much greater ease.

The social organisation of Maasailand foresees the teaching of responsibility, independence and also inter-dependence at the earliest age possible. This interdependence is manifested in the relation of the herder to the herds and also to the constraints and opportunities presented by nature itself. Among the human mobility practices explored in this dissertation, herding is perhaps the most physically active, but also the most salient; as a daily ritual it re-enforces a mobile bond to place. Herding allows for place to dissect and overlap, it allows for the falling in and out of place, for others to make use of the same space. As herding takes up vast areas of

land, land is used only for a limited amount of time and made available for other people-groups, animals and to other stakeholders when not in use. This does not counter the popular wisdom that sons and land cannot be given out. Land belongs to God, not to the Maasai, all cattle belong to the Maasai. Another pearl of wisdom is that land and other resources are something from which one borrows, whenever needed. This ensures a largely peaceful co-existence and dissecting of space by multiple stake-holders.

The chapter has demonstrated how the Maasai's mobile relation to land is experienced through the technology of herding cattle. Herding is aided by an expanding number of technologies aimed at coordinating, simplifying, diversifying and increasing the economic productivity of the activity. Herding can be described as the core practice of a pastoral people group. Time, monetary investments, strategic decisions made in defending or expanding territory all revolve around ensuring the welfare of the herds. Herding as a daily ritual is a constant re-enforcement of mobility and the physical core of the nomadic experience of Maasai. The following chapter will explore not only the physical core but also the 'imaginaries core' of Maasai mobilities, given that imaginaries are powerful technologies in asserting belonging to a place and function in society. This will then be linked to the imaginaries of 'Others' regarding Maasai.

Chapter 5: Imaginaries: On gender and the noble savage

5.1. Introduction

> *'The market in Endulen is full of women, some men rest in the shade eating nyama choma or drinking. The police officer who secures the livestock cash transactions is also sleeping and has forgotten his rifle in the car. Another group has gathered further up, negotiating cattle. Few men buy and sell any products apart from livestock. 'Trade is an important role for women' Naserian, a trader in eggs, explains. 'My chickens make money for my family.''*
>
> Fieldnotes, 16 April 2013

In this chapter I ask: How is a culture of mobility (see 1.3.3.) formed through means of imaginaries as meaning-making devices? Imaginaries are transmitted representational assemblages, interacting with peoples' imaginings, they are meaning-making and world-shaping when operationalised (Salazar, 2012). Imaginaries lie at the very interstices between communication, technology and mobility. They are communicative devices, mediating and moulding world-views and they control and help people to adapt to socio-cultural environments (see 1.3.6). Following Ricoeur (1994), they are both meaning-making devices and the products of meaning-making. They function as tools of knowledge, shared dreams and, ultimately, power. They carry with them the possibility of mobility (motility), and they equally contribute to temporal and special othering (Fabian, 2002) which can restrict peoples' mobility. Geographical imaginaries (Chapter 3), central to knowledge production (*engariyano*), complement mythscapes of endless plains and of memories of endless freedom. Imaginaries are re-entextualized and reproduced in altered forms (Salazar, 2013) and are replicated and disseminated through images and discourses. Human interaction is often mediated through the patterned representational assemblages that are imaginaries.

Imaginaries enable transcendence between the present, the past and the future. Positioned at the intersection between mobility, communication and technology, imaginaries are explored as place-making, mobility-enabling and restricting, communicative tools that control and adapt to the socio-cultural environment in which they are produced and/or used. Given the diffuseness of imaginaries, it is often difficult to trace where they are located at any given time; however, Salazar (2006) compellingly explores how global discourses become locally reproduced.

This chapter hones in on two specific imaginaries, imaginaries of gender and tourism imaginaries of the mobile, primitive and pristine, of the noble savage. These are both gendered imaginaries, grounded in uneven power relations and although they interact and take cues from early colonial writing and policy-making, as Salazar (2011) notes, imaginaries are also produced by individuals. This chapter separates these different kinds of imaginaries and analyses how and to what extent they are grounded in historical power dynamics. Tourists represent the 'out of place', analysed in Chapter 3, with regards to the making of place. Their imaginaries, and the imaginaries that many Maasai share on tourists, are part of a global discourse which I aim to explore further here. The practical reasoning behind choosing tourists was my daily exposure to tourism and to Maasai-tourist interactions. This is not meant as a disregard of non-Maasai Tanzanians. The construction of Maasai mobilities in reaction to the Tanzanian nation-state (and its citizens) and how the nation state deals with the Maasai, is explored throughout the dissertation.

Imaginaries are produced and reproduced, blurring the lines between what is constructed 'internally' and by outsiders. First, I focus on gender roles and imaginaries thereof; namely, the Maasai man as mobile versus the woman as the house-builder, caretaker or as mooring. Gender roles are understood as social norms

ordering behaviours that are expected, are conventional or are desirable for someone, based on their gender.[47]. Secondly, I focus on imaginaries and concept metaphors that are either imposed or projected upon the Maasai by euro-centric forces primarily, particularly that of the fetishized 'noble savage'. The noble savage is equally a gendered imaginary, fiercely masculine, athletic, on the move (by foot), 'roaming' the savannah. Its (re-)application to the Maasai, as Hodgson (1999) has argued, may have served to disenfranchise women from being viewed as Maasai proper. However, the Maasai have crafted and redefined their culture in response to external forces that try to alternately marginalize, destroy, 'develop', 'preserve' or to 'modernize' them. The imaginary and concept metaphor of the noble savage dates back to writings of the enlightenment period (18th century) and has been projected onto the Maasai ever since explorers and administrators penned their perceptions of the 'warrior race' in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Thomson, 1885; Merker, 1910).

I use the noble savage as a concept metaphor that is representative of imaginaries related to the primitive indigene, the underdeveloped, the savage, the intrepid warrior, the magnificently brave and fierce individual and so forth. A concept metaphor is the use of one idea or concept to make sense of another, it is used symbolically, often as a likeness or analogy (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). The noble savage is equally an imaginary, a representational assemblage used in difference-projection (Hollinshead, 1998). I explore how imaginaries of gender and the imaginary and concept metaphor of the noble savage shape a culture of mobility. Due to my having conducted fieldwork among tourists, the chapter hones in on those motifs of the intrepid warrior and the noble savage as a tourism imaginary specifically. The noble savage staple is of particular interest to this research project

[47] http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/gender-role

because through it, I explore how culture is shaped in reaction to and interaction with the 'out of place'.

Furthermore, the imaginaries explored here unravel the dialectical construction of the mobile vs the immobile, addressing the research objective of deconstructing the discourse shaping a culture that is mobile (or immobile). As Frello (2008) compellingly explores, the 'mobile' and 'immobile' are discursively labelled. Her observations are particularly poignant in relation to the uneven power relations that have dictated colonial and post-colonial discourse on the Maasai, with fluctuating labelling of the Maasai as 'nomads' or as 'backward' and sedentary influencing the, often contradictory, policy-making regarding the Maasai. As argued in Chapter 3, mobility is moored in meaning and place and this chapter further extends the understanding of what mobility is by analysing how discourses define what is mobile in relation to what is defined as immobile. The mobile relates to a mooring that enables mobility. The mobile versus the immobile is constructed through discourses. Binaries are inevitable in this analysis, but I hope to show that these are often discursive constructions with porous boundaries. The mobile quickly becomes the immobile, what is 'out-of-place' becomes 'in-place'.

5.2. Gendered roles, gendered imaginaries

The female role in the pastoral production economy as traders is another case-in-point for the contention that women are moorings to a mobile system. Yet, this opens up a fascinating observation into how the mobile can be immobile, depending on the perspective adopted: From a financial point of view, female economic activities offer far more fluidity, while herds are rather solid assets. The market place is fixed in time

and place, as a bi-weekly gathering on an open spot in the savannah outside Endulen. Women tending to their stalls bring home much of the cash (or M-pesa) money on which families live. This ensures stability in terms of cash flow as herds may be worth a fortune, but economically are 'frozen assets' that cannot be converted into cash very quickly.

Women guarantee a family's liquidity through their role as moorings at the market place while men manage the investments. Herding is a mobile production system or technology and yet, when translated into economic terms, cattle are the opposite of a mobile asset; turning them into cash takes time and is not usually desired since they are long term investments. What this highlights is how what is mobile or immobile is always in relation to something, and how this relation is discursively produced (Frello, 2008). In financial discourse, female economic activity can be characterised as mobile. Male activity can be framed as less mobile in regards to their management of long term investments and less liquid assets.

Maasai roles in society are essentially structured along two lines: age-set (temporal ordering) and gender (Spencer, 1988). Gender roles are of great importance to ensuring pastoral mobility with the system of herding being dependent upon the female role of taking care of the household (Bailey, 2012). Various imaginaries exist around the shaping of gender identities; the most prominent imaginary shaped through the various versions of 'The kidney' is a myth explored in the following paragraph. While the ideal man is a good pastoralist, mobile and freedom-loving, the woman takes care of the household, even being responsible for building the house. While men dominate the exterior world, in terms of politics and herd management, women represent stability. A popular myth is often invoked to explain male political dominance. According to the story, when the women were in control (no specific time

is given as to when the world was dominated by women), they started arguing about which sons should stay home to eat a kidney, resulting in the herd not being tended to and not coming home at night. Women cared more for the well-being of their sons than for cattle. They lacked the capacity to make responsible political and economic decisions and political power was given over to the men. From that time on, and in various stories, a binary relationship between men and women is drawn up in which men have been associated with disciplined and responsible animals, such as domesticated animals, while women have been associated with wild animals. Women are, thus, not capable of controlling the external world and are better suited to tending to the household. The association of women with wild animals and men with domesticated animals, in relation to women's alleged incapability in herding, is fascinating regarding mobility and that the woman, even though she is confined to the mooring (to the home), is imagined as sharing the same spirit as the wild animal. For that reason she cannot, for example, drink alcohol 'because then she will run away and not come home because she cannot take the responsibility' (verbatim Solomon). Men, associated with domesticated animals in human-animal metaphors however, exercise self-control and do not cry during circumcision. If they do, they are ridiculed as being 'girls', their families shamed and the scorn may have implications for the rest of the person's life.

Binaries are conceptual tools that inform abstract notions and these opposites, are the basis of social structure and culture. They have a symbolic ritualized order, one kind of distinction relates to another kind; for instance, the wild animal represents the woman and the herded animal the man, this translates into social order and the functioning of Maa society, men making principal economic and political decisions and women, thinking with their heart as opposed to their head as presented in the

kidney myth, take care of the home, nurture the young, the sick or weak (both animals and people). Cultural relationships have the structure of a thesis, an anti-thesis and a synthesis; through transformation, the 'raw' becomes 'the cooked'. Opposing ideas are mediated and resolved, in turn establishing cultural practices and the basic axes around which society is structured; Maa society is structured along the lines of gender and age.

Women are, to an extent, disassociated from Maasai culture both by the external world, which views the noble savage male as a symbol of Maasai culture, as well as by those Maasai who place pastoral nomadism, a male task, at the core of Maasai cultural identity. Male control over herds is further explained and rationalized by women being occupied with the welfare of their children and men being more concerned with the welfare of the herds. Hodgson (2000) notes the shifting production of Maasai masculinities through dichotomies imposed throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods. She argues that anthropologists (and policy makers) have made the mistake of labelling Maasai society as being patriarchal, due to the division of gender roles, and suggests not super-imposing a hierarchy in which domestic work is inferior to herd management; this is due to the fact that political decision-making and other relationships are far more complex than this kind of imposition of hierarchy would allow for. For instance, women are respected and feared as organisers of protest (a topic explored further in Chapter 8). Women protest collectively, organising marches, 'sit-ins' and 'walk-aways'. What often happens at gatherings is that, where there is a disagreement with a 'dignified' speaker, women will often stand up and leave silently and collectively, thereby humiliating the speaker.

5.3. She who gave birth to the land

Cieraad (2006) argues that home is a visual model of a culture's social structure. By looking at the home, one can derive the social structure of a culture by the way it is constructed and partitioned and the items in a home. This is a partial understanding of home, one in which home represents the domestic space. As demonstrated in 3.4. though, the Maasai know and use two concepts of home. Home as *Aang* or as the *boma*, the space of settlement where the family comes together to live, sleep and eat and home as in the homeland, *Oloshoo*, encompassing not only the grasslands for herding, but also other geographical imaginaries. Women play a crucial role in the social construction of place as well as in the spatial construction of the social. In my fieldwork, I found that it was mainly women who spoke of home, in both senses of the word. Women would also make the most passionate and poetic arguments defending home. Film clips devoted to and developed by the women of Loliondo about the land rights struggle convey these two notions of home, as well as women's centrality in shaping both concepts of home.[48] *Oloshoo*, much like Schama's (1995) 'landscape', is both a physical substance and an ideal form; it is a social imaginary.

Taylor (2004) describes social imaginaries as being the glue of a society. They are communication devices that engineered towards the construction and (re)production of culture. Women in particular partake in the sharing of imaginaries. They prepare their sons for warriorhood by sharing collective dreamscapes of *ilmurran* and of their bravery (Hodgson, 1999). Senior elders share stories of Maasai culture and Maasai land and, in so doing, fulfil the task of 'walking encyclopaedias', as they are often referred to, given that they transmit the dreamscapes of *Oloshoo*. My research participants would mainly refer to senior women as being 'walking

[48] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRvRRxoDggQ and https://vimeo.com/144006642#at=1

encyclopaedias.' The task of sharing knowledge is the task of a 'technologist'. *'The Ilkununo were the technologists of the Maa people. But senior elders are also technologists.' (Saitoti).* Senior elders (female) are considered *aariya,* closer to God, on a higher level of intelligence, transmitting knowledge that is equated with technological production (see quotes by Ibrah, Ben and Saitoti in Chapters 1 and 8). *'She, the lady sitting in the shade, she is a real walking encyclopaedia.' 'My mother is a walking encyclopaedia; she taught me so much about being Maasai.'*

One of the many Maasai origin myths (which varies depending upon the narrator) refers to Naiterekop, the first wife of Maa, as 'she who gave birth to the land'. The myth also explains the complex relations Maasai have in sharing land, as Naiterekop gave birth to one with only one tooth, Nagol, who was an outsider who went on to form his own tribe. Maa's other wives gave birth to the founders of a series of ethnic groups and Maa speaking sections, as well as a daughter named Simal, who was 'taken to Somalia'. Additionally, God, *Engai,* is singular and has a feminine prefix (-en), indicating that God was once interpreted as being a female figure, although no research participant could tell me a story in which God was a female. Rather, God encompasses all features of everything. Ngorongoro too has a feminine prefix (n), although this is disputed as Ngorongoro can also be *El-Nkoronkoro* (masculine). Ngorongoro itself is a mooring (unlike the Siringet, in which the land moves on forever) as it means the gift or spring of life.

5.4. Disputed gender identities

What the Maasai have done, since early colonial times, is that they have crafted a culture that is rather aware that euro-centric forces are trying to redefine, control and

to label them. Hodgson (1999) argues that Maasai men identify so defiantly as pastoralists and warriors because this identity is forged in opposition to a 'modernity' imposed upon them, first by colonial and now by nation-state powers. In this dialectical process, women have been disenfranchised from being the quintessential element of being Maasai, which is related to being a pastoral nomad. I would like to depart partially from Hodgson's (1999) argumentation, because I believe she places too much faith in the ability of colonial powers to change Maasai culture. The Maasai did maintain a lot of autonomy from colonial authorities, administrators' scorning and idealizing the Maasai at the same time because they often kept their distance. Maasai gender roles and imagery are well-rooted within Maasai culture and oral tradition. However, it is men who have been given land to control or govern over (both in colonial and post-colonial times) and this disenfranchises women whose customary rights were clearer prior to the processes of the state sectioning and partitioning of land. I argue that many Maasai actively resist and defy the *Ulayan* influences. They honour their own view on culture, actively dismissing interpretations by others by, for instance, grazing cattle in the Serengeti or on Thompson or OBC land, pretending that these borders do not exist. Culture is crafted in dialogue and in reaction towards outside influences (see Chapter 6).

An interesting merger of defiance towards outside interests (such as the nation state or, historically, colonial rule), and evidence of having been deeply influenced by these interests, can be found in the continuously perpetuated image and understanding by Maasai that they are nomadic. Senior or venerable elders (old enough to have experienced colonialism) particularly stressed their identity as nomadic people, even while the Maasai-as-nomad, as opposed to semi-nomadic, is a colonial staple created to disenfranchise Maasai from land (Hodgson, 2001; Hughes, 2006). They, as a

people, are nomadic, not so much because they act nomadically, but because they say they are; even research participants with only one *boma*, in which they have lived all their life, insisted on their being nomadic. Spear and Waller (1993) see these strategies of ethnic differentiation ('becoming' rather than being nomadic) as a response to political realities.

Based on Merker's writings (1910), Hodgson (2001) concludes that, in the 19th century, neither domestic nor public spaces were particularly gendered as female versus male. The identification of the domestic as female and pastoralist and political tasks as male was influenced by colonialism:

> 'The physical appearance of the unregenerate robber Masai is splendid. It is a treat to the anthropological student to gaze on such magnificent examples of the fighting man. It is an example of one side of our multiform nature pushed to an exclusive and supreme development. The Masai warrior is the result of the development of Man to a beautiful Animal . . . the physical perfection of these East African beefeating, bloodthirsty warriors is of the prize-fighters or the rowing man's ideal, rather than the aesthete's.' (Johnston 1886:408-09)

Accounts like this one have shaped the colonial approach and ultimately nation-state and tourist views of the Maasai, but Hodgson contends that they have also cornered Maasai men into forging an identity that is dominant and mobile. As Hodgson (1999) argues, Maasai contemporary masculinity was also influenced by colonisers labelling them as being fierce, nomadic warriors. Furthermore, colonial administrators consulted only male elders in order to codify customary laws. While I am in no doubt that gender roles and gender imaginaries shift over time, and have been influenced by 'external' factors such as colonialism and the nation state, to conclude that patriarch identity roles in Maasailand were shaped so strongly by outside forces, disenfranchising women, credits colonial influence over the Maasai to a somewhat

excessive degree. Maasai age-set practices and the pre-occupation with beauty amongst warriors and young women shape the aesthetics surrounding the 'intrepid' warrior. Maasai imaginaries on gender, and the tourist imaginaries thereof, thus have commonalities but are to a large extent rooted in different things.

Myths and stories of women being the best, or most responsible, for the home and men taking care of herds and making political decisions were hardly invented by opportunistic Maasai men in the colonial era and none of my research participants, either male or female, would support this contention. Maasai culture has an oral tradition and any historic literature was written by explorers, administrators (such as by Merker) and colonial policy makers, such as the British provincial commissioner in this commentary dated 1927: 'Masai District has been constituted as an ethnological and economic sanctuary; rigidly closed to outside influence and to trade, it has remained for 11 years a stagnant island set in the midst of the most progressive areas of the Territory.'[49] The policy followed at the time was clear, isolate and sedentarize the Maasai so as to preserve and encapsulate the 'special' nature of their culture (the fierce warrior, defiant to progress). Colonial policies would vacillate, time and time again, between 'protectionist' and 'progressive' policies of assimilation, often geared towards empowering men politically (Hodgson, 1999).

The often binary approaches by colonial policy makers must be studied through an analysis of how mobility is framed and produced by discourse (Frello, 2008). Texts, such as the one from 1927 presented above, allude to a protectionist interpretation of who the Maasai are, a framing of the Maasai as backward, sedentary, caught in the

[49] Retrieved in Hodgson, 1999, first in Mitchell, PC, NP to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam, 16 Mar 1927, TNA 17/4–.

past and in need of protection and rooted to a specific territory. An alternating dialectic between this stance and the one of the intrepid nomad warrior frames the Maasai as one of two binaries, antimonies which are hard to reconcile. In the process of attempting to 'make sense' of the Maasai, I have found that many non-Maasai Tanzanians, conservationists and aid workers are left frustrated and confused, angry at the 'stubborn' Maasai. I have highlighted some of this frustration in the introduction of Chapter 2.

5.5. 'Before they pass away'

I want to briefly examine why concept metaphors are useful to academic inquiry (see 3.3.), and to this chapter more generally. Concept metaphors are descriptions of ideal types that relate to broader societal visions; they are framing devices that enable comparison (Salazar, 2014). Moore (2004) describes them as being a kind of conceptual shorthand. Often, they are literary devices (the flâneur, the noble savage). To be useful to academic theory, however, Moore argues that ontological, epistemological and empirical claims, as opposed to mere description, must be attached to the concept metaphor. The noble savage is a sense-making and comparative tool here not for the anthropologist to understand the Maasai, but for the anthropologist to better grasp the frame of reference many people, including tourists, writers, development workers and policy makers have when relating, comparing or meeting the Maasai. The primitive, indigene or native is a societal staple that creates an us/them dichotomy, derived from a western hegemony on knowledge production and the writing of history.

The noble savage is reflective of unresolved challenges of framing and understanding modernity in a manner that encompasses a plethora of cultures 'in motion' as agents of their own future. As Clifford (1988) writes, history and much of 20th century tradition of ethnographic writing has denied many cultures, constructed as being 'backward', the capacity to invent local futures. Their cultural distinctiveness is tied to a 'traditional' past and they either resist or succumb to modernity, but they themselves cannot produce it. The noble savage, as both concept metaphor and imaginary, ties the Maasai to an imagined and immobile past, presenting a time capsule to the world, a snap shot in the history of mankind. Popular discourse concerning Maasai (magazine articles, coffee table books, fiction writing, photography and movies) is very much dictated by the realm of Western (and to an increasing extent Eastern) imagination. The Maasai-as-noble-savage becomes a site of both attraction and repulsion, a fetish for the ways in which 'modernity' ruins essence and purity. Protagonists or famous figures in this popular discourse, such as contemporary photographer Jimmie Nelson, showcase work on how the Maasai (and other indigenous cultures) are dying out. Nelson displays his work 'Before they Pass Away' at some of the world's leading galleries and museums. The jargon used is one that makes the Maasai blend in with the landscape, they are threatened with extinction, just like the animals in their surroundings. The success of Nelson's work echoes the imaginary that 'modernity' ruins 'authenticity', an indigenous culture that is transforming must be in disorder, this disorder caused by the chaos 'modernity' has thrown them into.

Appadurai (1988) compellingly explores how Western anthropology has tied the native not only to a place of physical immobility, but has idealized him or her as being ideally adapted to their environment. The ecologically noble savage is confined

to a place based on moralist assumptions or, as Malkki (1992:29) writes, 'the dictates of ecological immobility weigh heavily.' Essentially, I see two meta-narratives influencing imaginaries when interviewing tourists, rooted in a complex web of colonial policy making, ethnographic writing, documentaries, novels and film and tourist interviewees often presented one of the two, or a conflicting mix: The first meta-narrative is of the native that is rooted and confined in place and the second of the nomad that has no place.

I understand imaginaries to be vehicles of socio-cultural change (Salazar, 2011). Imaginaries are a shared cultural ethos through which individuals make sense of the world (Gaonkar, 2002). They propel people to engage with 'otherness', with far away people and places. I agree with Salazar (2011) that the human capacity to imagine, and to imagine others, is paramount to the formation of human identity. Salazar (2012:34) defines imaginaries precisely as 'socially transmitted representational assemblages that interact with peoples' personal imaginings and are used as meaning-making and world-shaping devices', a working definition I adopt throughout this chapter. Both concept-metaphors and imaginaries function to explain binaries ('us versus them') and I often use the terms in an overlapping fashion. The differences here (in my working definitions) is that concept-metaphors are analytical tools or short-hands that aid in comparing one thing to another, explaining the abstract in relatable figures and creating a frame of reference. The purpose of imaginaries, on the other hand, is to make sense of the human imagination through a shared and reproduced ethos. Through tourism encounters, but also through policies derived from a world-view that frames the Maasai as being backward, the Maasai are forced to interact with a reality in which they are framed and positioned by others as primitive, place-less nomads on the verge of distinction, ecological noble savages, backward and

so forth. Policies that marginalise the Maasai are often products of imaginaries and conceptual short-hands of the indigene. In the following sections, I wish to analyse the paths navigated and the reactions by research participants thereto.

5.6. 'They are so magnificent and brave!'

'Loserian is bored of seeing the 'Maasai Dance' but Solomon hasn't been to the Serena [A 5-star hotel perched on the Ngorongoro Crater] in years, so Loserian takes him on the Maasai dance day (the sun downer performance altering each day between a dancing and a musical group). Solomon really wants to see it; he's heard that it's great entertainment and he knows some singer/dancers from church. He takes a bunch of pictures and tunes in once the complementary chips and macadamia nuts served by the waiters are finished. Tourists whisper about sitting next to a real Maasai. After the group sings everything from Maasai pop songs to wedding songs he goes to greet some of the choir members and congratulate them on their performance. He says it's a really good show. Loserian agrees that they jump much higher than the group that was hired before.'

Fieldnotes, 30 March 2013

'Was that really a Maasai village? Something wasn't right. Something wasn't right. We could tell it was fake. I think they've been corrupted. We introduced them to things like money.'

Nancy, American tourist, 2 April 2013

'They are so primitive. You've seen how they live, of course. It's so fascinating. But they're changing. It's so sad. You think there will still be Maasai in the future?'

Deborah, American tourist, 2 April 2013

'Our guide told us they have to change. They can't live like this any longer, it's not good for the wildlife. We went down the Crater to see wildlife and they were leading cattle down there!'

François, French tourist, 4 May 2013

'They're so magnificent and brave.'

Jamie, American tourist, 8 June 2013

My primary engagement with a societal discourse that labels certain cultures (such as the Maasai) as being backwards and primitive came about through engaging with tourists. In the evenings, upon returning to the lodge from fieldwork, I met with tourists around the fireplace in the lodge's common area, which is where the above quotes were collected. Through these daily interactions with tourists, where I would find myself practically 'cross-examined', I began to see patterns and to trace the wishes and ideals that romanticize and simplify Maasai life. I came to interview nearly 100 tourists on their expectations and observations on the Maasai and to disseminate what I call the imaginaries of the noble savage.

Imaginaries of the noble savage are technologies that mediate powerful, collectively shared and transmitted images, wishes and ideals of the 'unspoilt', the 'indigene' or of 'the primitive'. They are shared by many tourists descending upon Ngorongoro, but are also produced and reproduced by tourism service providers (these can also be Maasai). Imaginaries have a political force, are seductive and restrictive (Salazar, 2012). On the receiving, Maasai end, imaginaries of the noble savage form technologies of persuasion, cultural representation and communication. Staging tourist expectations of a culture encapsulated and frozen in a distant past has become an increasingly important livelihood strategy, primarily for impoverished inhabitants of *Cultural Boma*s. These are hamlets created to generate income for tourism and for some upwardly mobile Maasai seeking to benefit from tourism income on a larger scale.[50] Like Hodgson's 'Maasai Masculinities' imaginaries that

[50] *Cultural Bomas*, although 'staged' for tourists, are also lived in. They are tourism villages in which tourists are sold 'authentic Maasai life' and can interact with Maasai. Usually inhabitants of *Cultural*

are popular with tourists, such as the noble savage, are also relational, historically produced and the site of local mediations on both gender and identity. I take note of the historical processes generating these imaginaries, and how they have been and are being used within colonial and post-colonial Tanzania, by policy makers and by Tanzanians in general.

Oftentimes binaries of 'here and there' become stretched out and intensified. Given that they are implicit understandings (Gaonkar, 2002), imaginaries must be studied through images and discourses (Salazar and Graburn, 2014) and the practices through which they are operationalised. Institutionalised, they can lead to the exclusion or inclusion of people. These binaries are driven by individual agents and are at the core to how individuals relate to each other, to their past and to their future.

The noble savage imaginary is a colonial and post-colonial imaginary of the primitive, athletic and on the move male, gracefully majestic, like a lion with a big mane and ignorant towards the enlightened world and the corrupted pitfalls of the rational, enlightened man. The term 'noble savage' is here used as a blanket term for any sharing and transmitting of patronizing stereotypes and attitudes. These have shaped the history of outsiders' engagement with the Maasai, which incurred consequences such as marginalization. Hodgson (1999) shows how power, given by the colonial administration to Maasai men, based on colonial observations of the 'fierce warrior' re-enforced men and weakened women's positionality within Maasai society. This shaping involved a dominant masculinity that rejected the trappings of 'modernity'.

Bomas (at least in the Ngorongoro) are impoverished; these are families, often with widows as family heads, sent to the *Cultural Boma* by their 'real' village.

The ‘noble savage’ is a literary figure popularised Rousseau’s work on primitivism (1755). Although Rousseau never directly used the term noble savage, his writings on the ‘unspoilt indigene’, vis-à-vis the enlightened man, profoundly influenced the creation of the concept (Diamond, 1974). The ‘noble savage’s’ understanding of the world lacks enlightenment and, thus, he (women are rarely presented as being noble savages) represents either childlike innocence or fierce brutalism. Imaginaries of the ‘noble savage’ influenced both colonial policy (Franklin, 1784) and its critiques (Diderot, 1772) infiltrate today’s tourism imaginaries of the veritable ‘Shangri-Las’ (Murakami, 2008) of the world. Although few tourists used the term ‘noble savage’ when talking to me (primitive people or undeveloped/underdeveloped people were expressions that were used more frequently), many voiced the desire to meet people fulfilling the criteria of the classical, commonly-used, ‘noble savage’ figure.

Tourism imaginaries travel back and forth with tourists in a continuous cycle of exchange (Salazar, 2011). Tourism sets relationships between consumers and producers in the context of culture, between consumers of cultural products and the producers of these goods. (Salazar, 2011). Tourism imaginaries are the ever-evolving projections and desires that tourists bring with them to their destinations. These imaginaries have been based upon stories and imagery they have consumed at home and they evolve and take new shapes as tourists reach their destinations and then travel back home with them. In the context of travelling to developing countries, colonial prejudice permeates these imaginaries. Since the days of ethnographic literature produced during the colonial age (Hinde, *The Last Maasai*, 1901), the idea that the Maasai and their scenic surroundings have become frozen in time, but are in

acute peril, persists. The tourists' search for 'authenticity' and untouched culture is staged to meet these expectations. As Salazar (2009) writes, the film *Out of Africa* (1985) exemplifies the stereotype of the culture doomed because of modernization. Films like these evoke a sense of urgency in the need to go see people like the Maasai before they perish. The imaginary of a savage culture, one at odds with 'modernity', one losing the battle as 'modernity' encroaches further in upon them is an imaginary blind to its over a century-old history as it has hardly changed. The narrative remains the same one penned down by Hinde in 1901.

Serge (lodge manager) comments that many guides use 'the locals' as outlets under whose wings both they and the tourists take can condescend to, something he believes helps the guide to affirm his social status as being 'above' the locals, being someone the tourist can trust to navigate unknown terrain. Living at a tourist lodge, I spoke to both guides and tourists on a daily basis and the majority of non-Maasai guides took it upon themselves to criticize Maasai for their traditional way of life, and convince their tourists that this lifestyle was not sustainable, neither in wildlife conservation nor with respect to the demands of modern life. The Maasai are not living up to the expectation of the ecologically 'noble savage' and for this they can be criticised heavily on Facebook and TripAdvisor. Guides had to tread lightly though, as many tourists try to take a particular interest in the Maasai and every so often, rather than projecting clearly racially discriminative thoughts, guides would emphasize the supposed primitiveness and untamed nature of the Maasai. Guides learn the 'language of tourism' and the cultural and structural ideologies through which tourism imaginaries are mediated is reflected in this language use (Salazar, 2006).

Tour guides (usually Tanzanians having studied wildlife tour guiding) and their companies (language and culture aside) do present a great barrier to the Maasai

sharing their culture on their own terms. In the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, tour guides will outbid the different *Cultural Bomas*, pitting them against one another, only then to take the tourists to the *boma* that offers them the highest commission. This can be well over 80% of the earnings of the Maasai for hosting tourists in their villages and the sale of jewellery and other artefacts. In turn, the tourists' negative view of the Maasai is exaggerated as they feel that they have been cheated out of their money. They will buy a necklace for 30 USD only to find a similar necklace in the lodge gift shop for 15 USD, not knowing that their guide easily made a 20 USD profit on that necklace, for instance. [51]

Cultural Bomas are often the primary meeting place between Maasai and tourists; to that end, tourist guides steeply limit and exploit the Maasai's agency in re-designing tourist interactions by taking extortionate cuts of what is sold. Among the research participants with whom I spoke regarding tourism, Francis, Marco and the retired politician were the most vocal proponents of changing and determining how tourists interact with the Maasai. Francis proposed that rather than visiting *cultural bomas* and sleeping in luxury lodges they should, for instance, live with Solomon. Marco was trying to finance a 'Maasai museum' and the politician wanted to close down the *cultural bomas* and urge Maasai to stop engaging with tourists altogether. Loserian, who moonlights as a tour guide, takes his guests on long cultural outings (to the Hadzabe, Iraqw and Datoga), but tries to avoid introducing guests to Maa culture. He is not comfortable with how his culture is represented to tourists.

Tourists come to Maasailand to view wildlife primarily. A secondary, powerful motive to travel to Maasailand, and all of 'Africa' even, is the search for

[51] When it comes to tourism, USD, unlike Euro, is an accepted and frequently used currency in Ngorongoro.

'authentic culture', which no people group seem to embody as effectively and powerfully as the Maasai do. Some guides will joke that tourists come to view the Big Six (Lions, Elephants, Leopards, Buffalo, Rhinos, Maasai).[52] The Maasai have become the human, cultural ambassadors to a continent otherwise depicted primarily through brutal images of starvation, disease or war, or of untouched nature. The expectations of tourists are high. They seek wild, untamed nature but also wild, untamed people, in harmony with nature. Tourists are often motivated by an ambivalent nostalgia (Salazar and Graburn, 2014) or an imperialist nostalgia that mourns the passing of something that was transformed by colonialism. (Rosaldo, 1989). Many Maasai have become accomplices in the tourists' quest to fetishize Otherness or to find 'authentic culture'. In Chapter 8 of this dissertation, I discuss how historicizing landscapes through imaginaries enhances emotional bonds and helps in collecting support from outsiders in land claims.

Tourists are sold an outdoor culture, despite home-building being an intricate (female) craft in which women take pride. Homes are not exactly luxurious, but they are highly functional. The *Cultural Boma* version of the Maasai home is tiny (perfectly round, and *bomas* are built in a perfect-circle shape) and stripped to the bare minimum, as shacks designed to make the tourists that come through in hordes feel claustrophobic. Given that there is no space for any ritualised practices, staged rituals instead takes place outside, to manifest a bond with nature. The semi-permanent residents[53] of these neat circular *bomas* deal with what Theodossopoulos (2014) maps out as the dominant orientations that shape imaginaries: Scorn and idealization.

[52] Colonial hunters would race to hunt down the so-called big five; the term carried on into regular safari jargon where tourists come to hunt the big five with their eyes. A popular joke among tour guides is that tourists want to see the big six. The Maasai is made to be part of the wild.

[53] There are currently seven official or recognized *Cultural Bomas* in the NCA; these serve both as staged villages for tourists and as semi-permanent residences for their inhabitants. *Cultural Bomas* are

Therefore, bargaining is something that occurs to a small extent among Western tourists, and more so by those from the East. East Africa is increasingly popular with middle or upper class Indian, Chinese, South Korean and Japanese tourists. Bargaining, so tourists believe, is heavily practiced by the people whom they exoticize. While bargaining does occur in Maasailand, in cattle trades and at the markets, between Maasai or between Maasai and sellers or buyers from other ethnic groups, the kind of haggling tourist attempt is something many Maasai vendors are trying to, without being insulted, understand and come to terms with as a cultural difference. In the view of the Maasai *Mamas* who sold and made jewellery at the lodge I lived, this haggling game was a (negative) cultural trait of the tourists, an *Ulayan* practice ('that is how they do business in *Ulaya*') that tourists take with them from *Ulaya* to Ngorongoro.

Several eco-tourism operators in Maasailand even offer Maasai warrior training, starting at 3,000 USD per person.[54] This is a conceit that would not be possible without the cooperation and even management by the Maasai themselves. One of the most popular warrior training camps is run by a Maasai elder (referred to by clients online as a warrior) and his Italian wife. Tourists are promised ancient primitive living skills attuned to nature and to God (because the narrative is that we have lost this nature/God connection in the West) and are trained by Maasai warriors in order to officially graduate as 'Maasai warriors'. On TripAdvisor, tourists rave about this life-altering experience and that the Maasai warriors have brought them closer to spirituality and nature. One operator promises this unique, life-altering experience

connected to larger villages; they send their poorest, often cattle-less community members to live in the Cultural Bomas.

[54] There are many more, here are some examples: http://www.bush-adventures.com/maasai-warriors/ http://www.maasaicamp.com/warriorcamp.html http://www.eco-resorts.com/warrior-training.php http://www.responsibletravel.com/holiday/6712/survivor-training-kenya

from the comforts of luxury camps whilst others even promise 'traditional' *manyatta* life (with chocolates on the pillows at night, according to one TripAdvisor review). The websites of these 'eco-tourism' providers (see footnote 50) guarantee tourists unique access to a culture that has hardly changed since the dawn of history. They are invited to become temporary members of a society unaffected by modernity, all within a socially that is responsible, culturally sensitive and ecologically sustainable environment.

Tourists attest to their lives being forever altered as the Maasai have taught them to live sustainably with nature, feeling deep connections of a spiritual sort with the earth. As Comaroff and Comaroff (2009:3) write, 'The promise of self-discovery is the flip-side of self-estrangement'. These websites present a static, stoic culture, unimpressed upon by the decadent lure of Western lifestyle. The 'noble savage' is the romanticised indigene, one not corrupted by modern civilization. He is noble in the sense that his intentions are pure and unspoilt and his spirit is free. Yet, he remains a savage as he lacks enlightenment and an understanding of the concept of civilization. Depending on which stereotype you prefer, he is either like a child, a peaceful innocent soul or a fierce warrior, who uses his spear rather than his intellect to settle disputes. First mentioned in Dryden's 'Conquest of Grenada' (1672), interpretations of Rousseau's work on primitivism have helped to spread the concept beyond literature, making the character 'real'. The 'noble savage' is more than just a literary device, depicted in countless works of both colonial and modern works of art including novels and movies; he is one of the most powerful imaginaries of otherness. In a sense, Rousseau unwittingly popularised the term. Fairchild (1928), Diamond (1974) and McGregor (1988) all point out that Rousseau was not fond of how his

works on ‘primitivism’ were construed. They argue that his position thereon and the popular assessment thereof differ vastly. The ‘noble savage’ continues to figure prominently even in academic scholarship today. The ecological ‘noble savage’ (Alvard, 1993; Hames, 2007; Knech, 1995) perpetuates scholarly debate on environmentalism and conservation without much attention being given to the implications of what the ‘noble savage’ means.

Walter Benjamin, whose works on the flâneur have been explored in Chapter 3 section 3, readily drew comparisons between the savage and the flâneur, seeing the savage as a real life figure of otherness and the flâneur as more of a literary motif. Although he never met a ‘savage’, he imagined the savage to be real, as in existing in real life, versus the flâneur who he viewed to be more of an imaginary figure. His interest in particular was on ‘The Savage’ marginalised by capitalism and imperialism, much like the flâneur was. Alexandre Dumas (1863) wrote of ‘The Mohicans of Paris’, comparing the rebelliousness of the flâneur to that of the American indigene under attack and who was about to be besieged by modern civilization. The motif remains the same today. The indigene is defiant to civilization, even if he cannot stop its forward momentum.

5.7. Imaginaries as technologies of persuasion

Stasch (2014) calls for scholars to pay equal attention to tourists and visited peoples in order to understand the underlying mechanisms of tourism imaginaries and in underscoring the similarities both sides have in the formation processes of imaginaries. One of the most popular imaginaries that the Maasai form about tourists is that they are all rich. Nearly all *wazungu* are rich. What they lack in culture they

make up for in financial wealth. Ulaya is a place of abundance, especially since 'the cows are so big!' according to a lodge *askari* who went to Denmark on a trip sponsored by the Danish development fund, DANIDA. Tourists, in turn, are often convinced that the Maasai are either wealthy or very poor, depending on what narrative the guide convinces them to adopt. As laid out in Chapter 2, the debate concerning whether the Maasai are very rich or very poor goes back to colonial times and the Maasai themselves have varying opinions on the matter.

Aside from being rich, a common stereotype is that foreigners do not have *orkwaak*, culture (See also Chapter 3, specifically Francis' argument in Chapter 3 section 3, that only the Maasai and perhaps the 'Red Indians' have culture). For instance, the most popular telenovela on Tanzanian TV, a show followed almost religiously by all research participants with a TV, depicts a rich girl and a poor girl in the Philippines who were accidentally swapped at birth and are re-swapped as teenagers. The place of the show, to my research participants, was most definitely *Ulaya*, not South East Asia, and gossip about the show concerned the lack of respect, manners and culture of the rich girl. There is little distinction made between the geographic origin of foreigners. Other than the Danes having huge cows (a Danish developmental project in the NCA in the 1990's and early 2000's sought to 'upgrade' Maasai Zebu cattle), Americans being loud and that marrying them is never a good idea (I met three Maasai returnees with failed marriages to American anthropologists or biologists residing in Ngorongoro) and that Indians (East African Indians) are untrustworthy (for a broad Tanzanian stereotype of Indian businessmen, see Chapter 6), tourists form a fairly homogenous group of rich, culture-less people.

The Maasai have become the African ambassadors of a potent imaginary.

Acting upon this imaginary, in an effort to persuade tourists of its legitimacy, they use various forms of performance, ranging from 're'-enactments (dances, jumping performances and choirs) to *cultural bomas* to fake junior warriors. The imaginary of the African 'noble savage' is an imaginary so powerful that it drives a multi-billion dollar industry of cultural and eco-tourism (Akama et al., 2011). Many Maasai, such as the operator of the most successful warrior training camp or the increasing number of Maasai tour guides, are willing collaborators in immortalizing the perception of the Maasai as the 'noble savage'. Maasai, such as the owner of the aforementioned training camp, have mastered the craft of selling authenticity; 22 five-star reviews (and no lower reviews than that), this online credit speaks to that fact. Iconic movies, such as the academy award-winning *Out of Africa* (1985) and *Nowhere in Africa* (2001) or the box office hit *The White Maasai* (2005), portray the Maasai as savage people faced with the imminent 'threat' of modernization and with it the end of their culture.[55] All three movies are based on female autobiographies, the first two revealing how Westerners perceived the Maasai to be 'on the verge of extinction' as early as the 1930s and 1940s.

A widespread belief within Maasai culture unwittingly aids in reproducing the stereotype, apart from business-minded Maasai readily serving tourists enactments of the 'noble savage', and the belief that only the Maasai have culture (see Chapter 6 and the interview with Francis in Chapter 3). Since early colonial times, officials, ethnographers and tourists have systematically portrayed Maasai culture as something static, threatened with extinction. Not only has this informed the global view and local policy on the Maasai, or (the lack of) today's conservation efforts in incorporating the 'stubborn' Maasai in activities, this ongoing dialogue (or lack thereof) has influenced

[55] For an elaborate account of popular film and TV characterizations of the Maasai, see Salazar (2009).

Maasai culture itself. As Salazar (2009) argues, tourismified people groups, such as the Maasai, borrow from traditionalist anthropological ontology on culture (as stasis) in depicting their culture to tourists.

Hostilities from other people groups intensified in post-colonial times, such as during the *Ujamaa* era (1961-1985), and reinforced the idea of uniqueness through the culture that is alive in Maasailand. *Ujamaa* led to Maasai emphasizing their otherness in resisting to join the mainstream melting pot, pan-Africanist popular Tanzanian culture. This further cemented the idea that as a Maasai, one is a placeholder of a globally coveted good, culture. Tourism encounters only strengthen the Maasai view of themselves as safeguards of the unique (only) culture. Tourists readily confirm the Maasai's authenticity as opposed to the moral decay of Western culture.

Maasai research participants often lament how many Maasai make 'fools of themselves' by partaking in staged versions of their culture. Business-minded people (often themselves Maasai) realize the dynamics at play and knowingly persuade tourists of an 'authentic experience' filled with dancing and jumping, colourful beadwork instead of white purist, red *shukas* instead of blue *shukas* (as red is fiercer), elders dressed as warriors and fake villages, built to look like movie sets. The coming of age experience of graduating as a warrior has been altered dramatically in Ngorongoro, also due to constraints such as high school. Rather than living in *manyatta* on their own, learning skills of survival, in the tourist season, young boys with faces masked in white paste will walk up and down the slope leading towards Oldupai, Ndutu and the Serengeti (the main tourism route). Their experience is reduced to photo opportunities, one dollar per photo. Boys who speak English will tell tourists, if they have too much time on their hands, about imagined acts of bravery and

try to sell them jewellery. The entire act of becoming a warrior appears to have been reduced to a photo op.

Living at a *Cultural Boma* usually means that your social rank and mobility are low; however, some residents are particularly motivated to enter an upwardly mobile spiral through their tourism encounters at their *Cultural Boma*. I interviewed one warrior at a *Cultural Boma* who had not been schooled, but who had taught himself English and over time had perfected his accent to sound American and progressed to the unofficial leader of the *boma*. Hoping to meet a Western lady, he dreamed of starting a 'cultural' tourism company. *Cultural Bomas* are run by a larger village and elders deliberate about who to send to live in the *Cultural Boma*. Many inhabitants are cattle-less, have sick children or battle diseases or have a handicap. Women at *Cultural Bomas* are often widowed and some turn to prostitution (Maasai internal demand; driver-guides are not allowed on the roads at night due to risk of accidents with wildlife). A distinctive feature of Maasai tourism workers is that these are either upwardly mobile, many educated beyond high school, or that they form the poorest class, often cattle-less and unable to afford schooling for their children. Both 'classes' of tourism workers face harsh critique for selling their culture out. That being said, the main critique Maasai hold towards tourism is not the staged nature of small-scale interactions with tourists, but what I have explored in Chapters 2 and 5; namely, how the government, the tourism industry and conservation agencies have, since the 1950's, 'hijacked' Maasailand for tourism or conservation purposes, deporting Maasai off their lands and giving little revenue to the Maasai.

5.8. Concluding remarks

This chapter has explored imaginaries in relation to the research question of the dissertation: how are human mobility practices continuously constructed and (re)produced, through communication technology, in dialogue with members of a cultural group, and in its reaction to non-members? Imaginaries are tools that mediate knowledge; they are place-making, mobility-enabling and restricting, communicative tools that control and adapt to the socio-cultural environment in which they are produced and/or used. By focusing on the imaginaries of Maasai that many tourists share and re-create, the chapter has also analysed the role of 'non-members' in constructing and restricting mobility. This speaks to the objective of deconstructing discourses shaping a culture that is mobile/immobile.

I honed in on tourists, as opposed to non-Maasai Tanzanian citizens, for two reasons, one conceptual and one practical. Throughout the dissertation, there is an implicit and at times more explicit narrative regarding how many Maasai deal with the nation-state (and thus Tanzania and all Tanzanians), and how the nation-state deals with the Maasai. In Chapter 3, I explored the construction of place in reaction to the 'out of place' in terms of *Ulaya*, all things and concepts foreign, imported from the global sphere. Place is constructed in a complex matrix, from the body to the global (Massey, 1994). Tourists are a very concrete representation of the 'out of place' that is analysed in chapter 3. Their imaginaries, and the imaginaries that many Maasai share on tourists, are part of a global discourse I aimed to grasp here. The practical reasoning behind choosing tourists was my daily exposure to tourism and Maasai-tourist interactions.

In a society organised along the axes of gender identity and age-sets, gender imaginaries are abundant and important for the (re)-creation of gender roles; as such,

they form the glue of society (Taylor, 2004). Although women 'dominate' the domestic space and domestic tasks, functioning as moorings to a mobile system, this chapter has shown that mobile imaginaries of both men and women have shaped and are shaping Maasailand. The female role in the pastoral economy goes well beyond the domestic space; as traders at markets, women ensure the cash-flow necessary to support the household, as herds are long term investments. Myths such as 'the kidney', or 'she who gave birth to the land', are fascinating in terms of the insights they generate into the rationales behind gender division and about gendered mobilities. Within Maa society, Maasai women are often associated with the wild, with wild animals, and men with the domesticated; the fascinating outcome of this association, this gendered imaginary, is that women are best suited in homes, as moorings facilitating mobility, because their untamed nature would make them unsuitable to tame the wild.

The noble savage is also a gendered imaginary, he is fiercely masculine, athletic, on the move (by foot) and 'roams' the savannah. The stereotyping of the Maasai as intrepid warriors, as Hodgson (1999) argues, may have served to disenfranchise women from being viewed as Maasai. As argued, I partially depart from this view; Maasai ideals of beauty and warrior strength are not colonial inventions, what has disenfranchised women to some extent, however, is land tenure policies that the colonial and nation state have forced on the Maasai. I conclude that Maasai gender imaginaries and tourist imaginaries of the 'noble savage' only have a limited common ground.

In this chapter, I have analysed tourists' expectation of the 'unspoilt indigene' or of Maasai as noble savage. Reading Clifford (1988), I see the usage of the noble savage, as a meaning-making device, as being reflective of an unresolved challenge to

frame modernity so that it encompasses a plethora of futures. The noble savage is subject of either an immobile past or placeless nomadism. By analysing imaginaries on gender and 'the noble savage', I have made it clear how mobilities are discursive constructs. The discourse on the Maasai has, historically, oscillated between the native rooted in place and the nomad that has no place. Idealising mobility is as dangerous as romanticising place is, and the Maasai, to a certain extent, have found themselves torn between uneven power relations through which they have been framed as either mobile or immobile. This discourse has been set by colonial writers, policy makers, the Tanzanian and Kenyan public, the government, Maasai themselves as well as the popular imagery circulating the globe, enticing tourists to travel to Maasailand. Due to the opportunity to interview many tourists, it is mainly tourists' understandings and imaginaries of the Maasai-as-indigene or noble savage that have been analysed in the latter part of this chapter.

In Ngorongoro, tourists are only challenged to a very low level about their preconceived Maasai stereotypes, as the interaction between tourists and Maasai are often dictated by tour guides. Still, the tourism experience is viewed positively by many Maasai and tourism encounters fuel their understanding of their cultural uniqueness and distinctiveness. This often leads to an elitism and pride in the sense that the Maasai possess a very coveted thing, which the 'Others', so popular an imaginary, have all lost; namely, culture itself. Given their limited space in which to present their culture, the Maasai of Ngorongoro seek to persuade tourists of what tourists already interpret as 'authenticity' and Maasai understand as their 'having culture.' The chapter that follows further analyses what it means to 'have culture'.

Chapter 6: 'There is only Maasai culture': On cultural branding

6.1. Introduction

> *'There is only Maasai culture. That is why you are here. You have culture? That is why the tourists come. They want to know what this culture is.' Female elder at a ceremony, May 12th 2013*

This chapter does not define culture in any global sense; instead, it is devoted to the meaning that Maasai ascribe to culture and examines how it emerges out of dialogue (Mannheim and Tedlock, 1995) with both Maasai and with non-Maasai. I draw on Bashkow's (2004) 'neo-Boasian' conception of cultural boundaries by exploring a Maasai perspective on cultural distinctiveness. The previous chapters have examined the meaning making of human mobility practices and a 'culture of mobility'. This chapter examines the communicative, ritualized processes shaping a culture 'in motion' (see 1.3.3 and Urban, 2010) and the distinctiveness developed in reaction to the 'out-of-place' (see 3.6.). This chapter pays specific attention to this sub-question of the research question: How is a culture of mobility created and (re-)produced through communication? It is shaped by dialogue, with both Maasai and non-Maasai alike, as well as ritualized communication in the form of ceremony. The study of ceremonies here brings with it the benefit of engaging with emic concepts of culture. The objective of this chapter is to study the communication technologies used to shape cultural distinctiveness. This will allow me to examine the part of the research question that hones in on dialogue with members of a cultural group and reaction towards non-members. The objective is to analyse how this discourse constructs a culture of mobility.

While this dissertation has repeatedly examined dichotomies, such as mobility/immobility, members/non-members, in-place/out-of-place or with

culture/without culture, my aim is not to frame these as 'natural' and authoritative opposites, but rather to show that these concepts are interactive, permeable and relational (to each other) and are discursive constructs. Culture is emerging from dialectical processes by and for opposition. Cultural distinctiveness is established in this dialectical process which both excludes and includes, but also mediates, making cultural boundaries permeable.

Distinctiveness is cultural capital (it can be income-generating) and a potent legitimizer for anything, from land claims to intellectual property rights. Culture (in its emic, Maasai sense) is an active noun, it is performative and it is something that has to be practiced and it is something that begins with a form of ritualized dialogue which is ceremony. The first ceremony (*enkipaata*) initiates young boys to become future warriors. The ceremony ascribes culture to these boys, who, by definition of research participants interviewed, were considered 'without culture' before starting the journey to warriorhood. Culture is something you acquire by following ritualized order, you can be with and can be without culture.

Maasai cultural integrity and distinctiveness have been developed and strengthened in the alienation process that began first with colonialism (Hodgson, 1999) and then with the nation state, with alternating episodes of trying to 'protect the Maasai' or to assimilate them. In this process (described in chapter 5), the Maasai have taken great pride in their resilience, having come to believe that they harbour culture, while others have lost culture (see interview with Francis in 3.4.). Much like Clifford's (1988) description of Trobriand Islanders inventing their culture within and against contexts of recent and colonial history, Maasai culture is an emergent process, relational to the 'out-of-place' (see chapter 3 on *Ulaya*). Castoriadis (1975) describes how imaginaries of the world and of the self are two sides of the same coin. Whilst

there is a dichotomy of sorts between being in and 'out-of-place', the boundaries between the two are porous. Defiance and pride come with feelings of their being custodians of culture. This binary of others and self has been moulded over more than a century of confusing and contradicting policy-making in East Africa.

6.2. 'They do not have culture: Imaginaries of self and other

I concur with Bashkow (2004) in that there is something remarkable in how anthropologists, from Wolf (1972) to Ferguson and Gupta (1997) have kept criticizing how anthropologists contribute to a bounded notion of culture, whilst, ever since Said (1978) called out scholars for creating hierarchical binaries of the Other relatively few anthropologists have been guilty of writing up borders between people. Like Bashkow I kept noting how my research participants drew boundaries, or what I call cultural distinctiveness. Bashkow invites us to re-visit Boasian cultural anthropologists and take a selective approach that, similarly to Boas, recognizes boundaries as porous and permeable, as plural and contested and to focus on the distinctions drawn by research participants.

My research participants have an understanding of culture not as something abstract but rather as something that is actively practiced. They include traditions, dress, customary practices, pastoralism, stories, song and dance, age-set, male and female roles, ceremonies and language. This understanding, I argue can be grasped through Urban's (1991) discourse centred approach to culture. Viewing culture as a concrete and ongoing discourse localises culture in practices. For culture the Maasai use the Maa word *orkwaak* (neutral noun) in everyday context to describe practices, patterns and beliefs or *embukonoto*, which has a more ceremonial meaning. The

emergence of a new age-sets equals the birth of a new culture. To emphasize this, each age-set has a unique name. An age-set is a permanent grouping of men. Every 15 years or so, a new age-set is initiated, meaning that the oldest members of an age-set can be 7-8 years older than the youngest, but they form one unity, one group within which age is hardly differentiated. All men graduate together, a sense of community is formed through the ritual, but also through the tasks each age-set takes up. Practices bonding age-sets shift, as Hodgson (1999) explores, especially among boys who return to school shortly after the circumcision ceremony, the strongest bonding experience, living together in *emanyatta*, is cut short or left out all-together.

My research participants also draw clear distinctions between having culture and not having culture, and being culturally distinct as Maasai, whilst others have 'lost culture'. Cultural distinctiveness is a meaning-making Maa construct. Self-differentiation must not be equated with fetishizing 'Otherness', as explored in the section on cultural branding, cultural boundaries can be productive meaning-making devices. A boundary is not a separation or a barrier. Clifford (1988) writes that it is the predicament of 'modern' ethnographic accounts to alternate between two metanarratives, homogenization and emergence of culture. While the first describes cultural loss the latter portrays culture as something inventive, as being 'in-motion'. Considering how Maasai culture emerges, is born and reborn, through ceremony and age-set initiation, this chapter echoes the latter 'meta-narrative'. The emergence of culture is constructed through ritualized dialogue, through ceremony. As analysed in chapter 3, Maasai ceremonies are often lengthy and fluid, yet bound by strict ritualized protocol. These rituals are transformative experiences for those involved, cementing their role and commitment to Maasai culture. Ritual is a communication

form (Rothenbuhler, 1998) and ritual performance is a strong communication device providing mechanisms of order for people to live together.

The ordering mechanisms of age-sets form a template to (customary) practices of social mobility. Hierarchies, both the seniority rule and hierarchies within age-sets, are defined and enabled through ceremonious ritual. Following the code of conduct of ritual as precisely as possible (such as not crying during circumcision) is a gateway to earning a respected position within your age-set. Maasai culture values and celebrates competition. At the traditional leader ceremony (described in the vignette in chapter 6 section 5) one of the highlights of the outside festivities was the jumping contest, held before most of the honey brew had been brought outside, where warriors are organised into two teams, to the amusement of the women present who then have to decide which team jumped higher. Physical strength matters, but as Hodgson (1999) noted in her interviews with venerable elders, the 'power of the pen' is replacing the 'power of the spear'. My research assistant, for instance, does not look Maasai. His mother, having hopes for him to accomplish something outside of Maasailand decided not to pierce his ears due to how Maasai are treated by larger Tanzanian society. He is also very short. That he must have been adopted is a running joke, yet, being the top performer in his school, he was elected leader of his group of warriors in Endulen, even though he was one of the youngest in his age-set. The foundations for his success in larger Tanzanian society, as a university student and later as a business owner, were set by the ordering mechanisms of Maasai society. These mechanisms reward willpower and present those with the strength and courage to accomplish with additional responsibilities and challenges, such as being youth leader in Loserian's case or traditional leader in Solomon's.

My research participants would often equate the interest of others regarding Maasai culture with 'Others' not having culture at all. *'So you do not have culture.' 'So you are studying our culture to learn what is this culture so you can go to Ulaya and say this is what is culture', 'Why do you all look the same?', 'Tourists they come here so they know what is culture'.* In concur with Ross (1982) in that culture and ethnicity involve politics (Ross, 1982) and that identity involves tactics (Clifford, 1988), providing opportunities that are economic such as creating a branded identity as well as in forming political alliances.

Taking a stance of distinctiveness generates and fosters cultural identity. There are three races, according to a popular Maasai myth. God created the people of the cattle separately from the Whites and the Blacks. Following the logics of fierce distinctiveness, the people of cattle have managed what the other cultures have not, to preserve their cultural identity. Even the 'Modern Maasai' know of cattle, and few can be dismissed as *Ormeek*, as those who know nothing of cattle, because even though they inhabit cityscapes with jobs like lawyers, travel agents, activists, accountants, many keep herds in Maasailand. Much of this notion of having culture can be capitalized upon and the extent to which culture can or should be capitalised upon is a much-discussed question in Maasailand, both for internal cultural consumption and for 'Others', the wazungus and everyone else who has 'lost culture.' Culture, as a consumer good, is viewed highly critically within the social sciences literature (Lasch, 1979; Smart, 1999) and within indigenous cultures themselves (the retired politician quoted in chapter 3 speaks cautiously of *Cultural Bomas*, as does Francis regarding elders dressing like warriors for photo-opportunities). Yet, for some, the acceptance of culture being a good to be consumed opens up a number of possibilities both to diversify livelihood and even to sustain or to develop culture, even if it is only a

highly commercialised version of that culture, or aspects of it, are being sustained in this way.

Salazar (2016, in press) writes of how the Maasai are both represented and represent themselves as 'Other'. My research participants equate both the interests of tourists in Maasai culture and the colonial and later nation-state approaches to 'preserve' or to assimilate them into the culture-lessness of the outside world. The reactions expressed to a world-view in which the Maasai are judged to be inferior, to be people that offer a glimpse into the past of human history, preserved and locked away in a time-capsule, usually involves either not playing the part (beyond shows at lodges or *cultural bomas* or young *ilmurran* wandering up and down the tourist route from the Crater highland toward Oldupai and the Serengeti as walking photo-opportunities.) nor to prove that the 'Others' are wrong. It is an analysis that *'we have something they do not have' (elder).*

The Maasai understanding of otherness is as being the people of cattle and the people with culture. *'You may be rich [me] but you have no traditions. Your men even lay with other men!'* Marco, UNESCO consultant. In an earlier discussion, Marco had asserted that *'We need to show the world our culture. It can no longer be others who are making money from our culture. That is why we are opening the museum, to dispel the myths about us. Others show our culture in a wrong way.'*[56] While some Maasai are selling their marginality (Salazar, 2016, in press) this is especially true for the new-age set of junior warriors who, rather than experiencing the liminality of living together in *manyatta*, simply wander up and down the road leading from the Crater Highlands down to the Ndutu-Serengeti gate. They jump out of the thorny bushes onto

[56] The museum, at Lake Eyasi, is yet to open. This was in the spring of 2013 and it was about to open about two months later according to Marco's plans (but it still had to be built).

the road, often forcing tourist vehicles to stop, hoping for money in exchange for photographs. Many then return home to their mothers in the evening, or participate in this income-yielding activity in school holidays; others still are younger than real *ilmurran*, children and, thus, because they are still in primary school have more time to do this (most secondary schools are boarding schools off the tourism route). Others, such as Marco with his big plans for a Maasai museum, want to better control the narrative the tourism sector tells about the Maasai, and to profit from it in a more structural way, capitalizing on culture not from the fringes thereof, but by profoundly changing who profits from selling Maasai culture, from the government, hotel chains, global brands, safari outfitters to the Maasai themselves.

Sayer (2003) criticises social scientists for adopting an elitist view in condemning cultural commodification. Rather than being a dissolution of culture, as Bruner (2005) argues, commodifying it can contribute to developing skills, cross-cultural interaction and livelihood. Nash (2000, not to be confused with John Nash) argues that the imaginaries of Marx, whose thinking involved the claim that capitalism would lead to the commodification of everything, materialised themselves to an even more acute degree than Marx could have imagined. Yet, and even thought she is well-known for her anti-capitalist scholarship, rather than condemning commodification, she exemplifies how in the global-to-local exchanges of the tourism industry this flow of global people wishing to consume a local culture can work into the social reproduction of host cultures and which have positive effects upon cultural identity. Ethnicity is increasingly commodified and implicated in the economics of everyday life. To this, cultural identity is added, which implies two things: cultural identity is the object of choice and self-construction, often through consumption and it is conceived in dialogue between culture and communication (Fitzgerald, 1995). As

Comaroff and Comaroff (2009:1) argue it is 'the manifest product of biology, genetics, human essence.'

Maasai culture can be described as in an innovative cycle that is in constant relation to its (imagined) past (see chapters 3 and 5). Similarly, Salazar (2016) observes that it is reproduced and contested at the same time. In circulation, culture takes time, drops and picks up new elements or as Urban puts it: 'whatever [culture] is in motion tends to remain in motion unless someone stops it' (2001:15). The cross-generational passing on of myths (understood as customary explanatory stories, sense-making and knowledge generating devices on culture) for instance, keep cultures in motion by constantly drawing on the past to re-configure present and future. The oral nature of myths makes each individual's version of a myth slightly different, ensuring a culture that is actively practiced but also contested.

Culture relates to the 'out-of-place' (to which, for instance, tourists belong) and as explored in the previous chapter, tourism imaginaries are often reproduced to confirm the tourists' expectation on Maasai culture, the flourishing bead trade and jewellery production an example of certain economic success and opportunity for women involved, as the jewellery made for tourists looks little like, and is far more colourful than, what Maasai would normally wear. Additionally, there is not much of an internal market for Maasai jewellery, as most women make their own jewellery or make it for family members. The colourful reproductions made for the tourism market are, however, often worn by Maasai in cities or by those with office jobs, a bracelet with beads the colour of the Tanzanian flag or a chain worn under office attire as subtle acknowledgement of being Maasai.

Both tourism (chapter 5) and the indigenous rights movement (chapter 8) present the Maasai with options by which to mediate their culture (Salazar, 2016).

From a neoliberal perspective, they can manage and manipulate culture as a resource. However, the lens through which culture is mediated to others, like tourists, is a specific discourse, that, whilst the Maasai have a say in it, is largely set by non-Maasai and their expectations and imaginaries (see previous chapter). Chapter 8 further explores the rhetoric that appeals to an international donor crowd.

For Maasai, cultural branding is becoming a new trend, as reported by the BBC and numerous news outlets and among Facebook groups.[57] Cultural branding is a marketing terminology perhaps best associated with brands such as Apple, Nike, McDonalds or Starbucks and the lifestyles that these brands promote. The goal is marketing a specific world-view or 'culture' to consumers. Successful cultural branding leads to a direct association between a slogan (Just Do it), colour (Deutsche Telecom and Magenta) or even a season of the year (Pumpkin Spice Latte or 'PSL' season). Some companies will borrow from the Maasai to evoke a brand identity, American Express for instance featured Gisele Bündchen and Keseme and Kip, Maasai 'warriors' (Kip is apparently a married warrior, conveniently married to a HIV activist). The campaign text reads 'my card' as the tagline for the supermodel and 'my life' for the Maasai. The global campaign is set to associate the use of the red AmEx card with the fight against HIV.[58] The prominence of Maasai imagery associated with global branding has raised awareness in Maasailand to capitalize upon the Maasai brand. The global circulation of 'Maasai' imagery has sparked great interest not only

[57] Further discussed in Chapter 6. See also: http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-05-10/maasai-brand-firmhelping-indigenous-people-claim-ownership-their-cultural https://www.facebook.com/MaasaiIPInitiative http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22617001

[58] http://www.americanexpress.com/pes/uk/benefits/red/microsite/media/index1.html. There are various AmEx cards with colours symbolising the special 'power' of the specific card, the gold card symbolising financial stability, the red card is the 'charity card' with which consumers can automatically and conveniently 'help' the 'developing world'. While shopping a percentage of every USD spent flowing to charity, because for the avid shoppers, it is her card, the card she identifies with, but for the Maasai warrior, it is his life, in the hands of her card and her purchasing power.

in activist-men but perhaps even more so with the women who contribute to the production of cultural goods. It is embraced at the grassroots levels in both Kenya and Tanzania, information spread through various online channels by its activists. Maasai from all social classes are asking how to profit from being brand ambassadors of Africa and from being culturally distinct.

6.3. Intellectual Property and the *boma*

In Kenya, several ethnic federations are trademarked, commercial enterprises. (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009). New awareness regarding the possibilities of economic gain has been reached recently with the introduction of Intellectual Property (I.P.), the term circulating through *bomas* in Kenya and now slowly into Tanzania.[59] The new level of awareness includes campaigns to brand the Maasai label as an official label, as a trademark for Maasai from which to profit. Hundreds of companies across the world use the word Maasai in their advertising, but the attraction caused by the name does not benefit the Maasai themselves. In Ngorongoro, Moses, newly returned from his PhD studies on the topic of Intellectual Property in Munich, is working on these issues, making it clear to fellow Maasai that they have market value and that it is theirs to claim.

The commodification of culture is being more easily accepted; according to Moses, as it presents people with opportunities to benefit financially from their cultural distinctiveness. Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) examine how cultural branding can work as a form of cultural survival. Branding is about finding something essentially unique to a culture, something 'of essence' that can be sold as a brand.

[59] http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-10-24/africas-maasai-tribe-seek-royalties-forcommercial-use-of-their-name

Cultural branding, to an extent, defies economic rationale; as Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) argue, the quality of distinction and mass-circulation reinforces rather than depletes original value. An increased supply of 'the ethnic' works to boost demand. Ideally, the terms of the commodification are set by Maasai themselves, at their pace, tailored to their desires about what the Maasai brand should stand for internationally. If brands and models such as Land Rover and Toyota Land Cruiser wish to use the term Maasai or Maasai imagery, respectively, for their product range and if efforts go through in terms of international legislation then the Maasai will benefit from the use of their name. Raising awareness on the grass root levels of Maasai culture, being both distinct and internationally unique and as such generating economic value, Moses hopes that it heightens efforts to support, promote and reinvent culture.

Commodification is a part of this process and is a sufficient reason to re-engage with the concept of culture and the manner in which its essence might be distilled. Contemporary culture is, to an extent, both function and outcome of capitalizing on culture Engagement is also brought about by those who question the culture as its largest critics. Denigration sparks reaction, some of which is highly conservative and reactionary, such as the re-popularization of ritualised (non-human/wildlife conflict based) lion killings that can be seen as a response to the hostilities presented by conservation organizations. Goldman et al (2013) report that the motivations behind lion killings in the Ngorongoro are often emotional and political.

Ownership of cattle and other goods is already becoming increasingly an individual affair. The sharing of communal land is becoming less of a 'Maasai thing' and is becoming increasingly territorialised to family units. Cattle are then resold for much higher prices at the Arusha meat market. Women who make beadwork, and who sell their wares at lodges and hotels, each have 'their' own lodge that they share with a

specific group of friends, other women cannot intrude on that lodge unless accepted into the informal cooperative that the women presiding over the beadwork selling at a certain lodge have formed. The economic rationale is transforming rapidly into one in which personal gain is valued. The concepts of IP and the branding of culture fit into this economic rationale.

6.4. Culture for sale

> *'We're five in the land cruiser, speeding through roads that have not been traversed by cars for weeks; maybe months, the driver Sululu taking all the shortcuts even if this means driving off road through bush savannah. I'm on safari through Loliondo with 3 men from the Pastoralist Council, and a college student in the back of the car in it for the fun of wayfaring. The mp3 player attached to the radio plays Maasai songs, a boy sings about 'Yesu' (Jesus) and my company tunes in to the lyrics. Sululu drives the car off-road and as we race through the grassland he turns rapidly and sides 2 meters from an enormous gaping hole. I gasp at the unexpected sight of a 400 meter drop just underneath the car, the mouth of God, a crater next to Ol Donio Lengai, the mountain of God. Loserian chuckles as he explains some Maasai believe the mountain erupted (6 years ago) because too many people peed on it, and so God vomited it back up. We get out to take pictures, the Maasai with their Chinese smartphones or Samsung pocket cameras. Over the course of the 3-day fieldtrip hundreds, if not thousands of pictures have been taken of animals, sites and Maasai along the road.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 21 March 2013

The notion of a safari is one which is captured both in the Swahili meaning of journey, and in the English meaning of adventure and scene-viewing. The cultural and scenic safari described through Maasailand, which come together in the vignette above, involve Maasai goods, services and festivities. It is an example of what is rapidly becoming a considerable form of cultural capital; it is not just for tourists, but also for Maasai consumption. What struck me along this journey was the passengers' curiosity to document all things Maasai-related, to enrich oral narratives not with text alone but

with pictures and video. For Barthes (1972), taking pictures is a morbid act. Photographs freeze moments in both time and space, halting the mobile, the still acts as a symbolic death. Whilst they may symbolize the urge to capture something in passing, pictures add an additional layer to story-telling, not to preserving culture, but to enabling its continuation into the future. They are timeless, eternal. Pictures and videos make it easier for young people to 'continue what we are doing, so they don't forget' a junior warrior, documenting a warrior initiation with his blackberry, tells me as we are drinking Fanta at Loserian's mother's boma.

> *'Solomon asks how my tribe differentiates itself from others. I wonder first what my tribe is and second how 'we' can be told apart. I assess the clothes I am wearing: Socks from a Lufthansa overnight flight, probably Frankfurt-Narita. Shoes from Cape Union Mart, bought in a mall outside Cape Town. Trousers from Acne, found at a thrift store in the hipster Sofo area of Stockholm. Blouse by Banana Republic, the heritage collection, purchased at their signature store on 5th avenue and sweater by Lauren, from the Macy's mall in Bridgewater, New Jersey. Necklace, the African relief, from a mall near Port Elizabeth, white gold and a miniature diamond, allegedly all South African, and ring, Tanzanite, dug up from the mine near Kilimanjaro airport and crafted by a jeweller in Antwerp. Solomon asks and as I decline he asks 'how can you tell tribes apart in Ulaya?' This is a rhetorical question.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 21 March 2013

Solomon and other research participants view the foreigners' search for 'authenticity' as something which so many foreigners are seeking in their interactions with the Maasai, as something that might not be discovered in their own countries of residence. They equate it with, to quote Francis, the elder who founded the Pastoralist Council,

'We have culture, others do not', and Solomon echoes this understanding of Maasai exceptionality versus the cultural blandness of *Ulaya*. Much like the tourism industry, which emphasizes phenotypic differences (Salazar and Graburn, 2014) between host

cultures and guests, thereby exoticizing and creating binaries, the Maasai partake in this self-same phenotypic stereotyping. For instance, I was mistaken as Japanese a number of times, after interacting with Japanese tourists. Nur, a lodge manager from Mumbai, regularly got caught up in discussions in which Maasai maintained that she was most definitely white because you can only be white, black or Maasai. Perhaps you are *Wahindi*, but the lodge staff respected her and, hence, did not see her as *Wahindi*.[60] Not wanting to tell anyone else apart, the Maasai also act reactionary to mainstream Tanzanian culture.

Reactionary actions such as lion hunting (not in instances of non-human wildlife conflict, but in coming-of-age rituals) are sought to preserve the perceived uniqueness of Maasai culture. People seek ways to better consume this culture, to access it instantly through button clicks. On YouTube, Maa singers such as Naipasoi Tutuma or L-Jay Maasai are gaining popularity.[61] They sing Maa pop-gospel and their music is accompanied by professional music videos.

> *'Earlier on during the day, Solomon had bought jewellery for me and for his wife at a roadside town marked for destruction and eviction in Loliondo that has been spray painted with red crosses. The jewellery is of the tourist kind and not the traditional sort (which also shifts with fashion, in age-set cycles, right now it's white, white and more white), but Solomon always brings gifts from his safari and thinks his wife will be beautiful wearing them. At the 'Mouth of God' [a very abrupt and steep crater], some girls and women approach us with jewellery. The mother confirms her children are enrolled in school, but speaking to the girls they confess they are not allowed to go to school, but need to help their mother selling and making beadwork to sell to tourists, though business is slow in this area.'*

[60] East African Indians, whose history and presence dates back to British colonial times, are referred to as *Wahindi*. The Indian population, largely Muslim, is mistrusted and stereotyped by many Tanzanian's as being greedy, too business-driven and untrustworthy.

[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HTCN4_XeODk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2pNziFJkBE. Music is often downloaded once and then shared on Mp3's. Access to YouTube can be tricky, due to bad internet connections. In rural Maasailand, music videos buffer a lot while streaming. That said, whilst 'views' are relatively few, these singers are still veritable Maa pop stars.

Fieldnotes, 21 March 2013

Through purchasing tourist-style Maasai jewellery, Solomon seeks to meet his wife's expectation of bringing something from his trip, by shopping, he manifests his affection. Rather than confirming the classic critique of consumer consumption, thought to increasingly individualize and alienate people from each other (Lasch, 1979), the act of spending money on cultural souvenirs is a strengthening bond (See Miller, 1998).

> *'We drive on and Solomon asks me whether I like Maasai dances and I answer yes, asking him if he can dance. Yes, but we have to go to the cultural boma he answers, they are much better at dancing there than other Maasai. The cultural bomas are tourist attractions in Ngorongoro, where groups perform mash-ups of Maasai singing and dancing. 'What does it mean?' I once asked Loserian as we were watching a performance from one of these Boma groups at the Serena Lodge. 'Oh nothing. It's entertainment' he replied and continued explaining that this group was very good, it was a new group, the old one had just been fired because the men were drunk all the time and 'wouldn't even jump for the tourists!!' I recall Loserian's enthusiasm at Serena or the hundreds of pictures he showed of a group of tourists he'd guided watching this kind of performance as comparable of that to Solomon suggesting we go see a performance at a Cultural Boma. 'At the Cultural Boma, they do a good performance'.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 21 March 2013

It is not just entertainment for me, the Westerner, performed to purvey a false idea of 'authentic culture', it is entertainment for Loserian and Solomon too. In downtown Arusha, a large billboard from the NCAA reads 'Ngorongoro: Where Culture is a Tourist Attraction'. The image is of a Maasai dance group, flanked by two smaller images of a smiling Datoga man and two smiling Hazabe Bushmen. Culture has become widely accepted as a good, and this includes the trip to Loliondo with the photo-opportunity at Ol Donyo Lengai, the mountain of God. The NCAA is trading

on culture, just as it is on wildlife and the Maasai and are seeking to cash in partially upon their cultural capital. It seems as though many Maasai are embracing cultural commodification, not just as a means of income, as a show put up for tourists, but as entertainment and for their own purposes.

6.5. Culture starts here

'We face the cold with long dark coats, furry Russian hats and sunglasses. Shaking hands, grasping sticks and spears. The little man from Mto wa Mbu [the hired camera man] swears into his cell phone, telling his friends it's as cold as Ulaya. Chai is brewing inside the huts. Smoke exits through the doors, carrying the scent of the young cattle kept inside. Babus sit alongside the walls of huts, eagerly awaiting 'Maasai beer'.

'Becoming a traditional leader is not something you choose' Loserian explains to me over a cup of Maasai chai. The Mama who brewed it inside the smoky hut comes to us and asks us whether we like it, whether she added enough sugar Loserian continues: 'The elders discuss it for a long time, then they will come to your house, speak to you and your parents. If they think you are fit to become a traditional leader, they will tell you that they have a proposal, and ask you to say yes before they tell you what it is, and you have to say yes because it is your duty. So you say yes and then they tell you to become a traditional leader.

We are eventually asked inside, where my friend Solomon and another junior elder from the same village are being prepped for the ceremony. The leaders have been with them in the hut since the previous night. Francis is there too, the boma is part of his village-system. They are telling stories, the mood serious for the moment. Francis welcomes me in and explains that we have to get out soon, but we can come back after the first initiation, about to proceed inside the kraal.

Thirty minutes later, I am gathered with about one hundred men inside the cattle boma, women are not allowed, but I'm not really considered to be one, someone brings a stool, a fresh batch of cow dung on it. The two men stand in the middle, in front of a group of elders, behind these, the cameraman from Mto wa Mbu's in his 'business costume'. The benefit of not really being acknowledged as a woman, more as a friendly alien hybrid, is attending all these rites where only men are welcomed, as well as the ones held for women respectively. Dozens of cell phone cameras are on, pointing towards the happenings in the centre of the kraal. It's close to 8pm and there are a few blue breaks in the clouds, thick mist still sweeping inside the cattle-boma, my feet firmly positioned in the cow dung, I wonder how my 'sustainably farmed vegetable leather' will come out of this, once the dung has dried.

Milk and butter is brought, and one of the elders mixes it with the dung. Soon he proceeds to spread it onto Solomon's forehead. A joke is made about how these young educated Maasai don't like to get dirty. The elder spreads the dung and milk all over Solomon, down into the shuka, up the legs, the arms. Then another elder steps forward to continue the blessing, then another, and another still. Everyone is moving, trying to get a better position, jockeying to get a better video clip with their Techno or Samsung semi-smart phones. Once Solomon is covered head to toe, then it's the other guy's turn. Throughout half the blessings he has been texting on his phone. According to Francis, the milk-dung mixture symbolizes the Maasai relation to nature, the need for a co-existence, the dependency on cattle, to the soil they walk on; covering someone with the mixture, he immerses completely into the natural elements that give life, livelihood itself, to the Maasai and becomes one with these circulatory processes. After the proceedings in the kraal, they are led back to the hut, which they are not allowed to leave until the next morning, only then will they be leaders.'

Fieldnotes, 12 May 2013[62]

The ritual in the *kraal* captures the idea of a new culture. By becoming one with the earth, the leader-to-be is transformed and 'born' into a new culture. At the time, what amazed me the most was how the second leader-to-be texted incessantly throughout the ritual. To me this seemed about as shocking as a groom or bride texting while on the altar. After some further inquiry with senior elders at the ceremony, as to whether or why this was rude or not, I found that rather than 'checking out' or detaching himself from the event, he was texting so as to inform those who could not attend of what was going on, in real time, so that no friend or relative would be left out, whether physically present or not. The camera recordings are also transportation vehicles to the event for those who cannot attend. The camera man is hired to record every step of the process (but is not allowed inside the hut in which more secret proceedings take place). Getting a professional camera man to record the ceremony, in the midst of a sea of more or less advanced smart phones already recording, is

[62] Fieldnotes used in this section dated May 12 were written down in the evening after the ceremony.

justified by the senior elders as recording the culture of this ceremony properly so that the Maasai will get it right in the future.

Ceremonies are a departure point for a specific culture, the culture of an age-set or the culture of a traditional leader or the culture of marriage. Getting the ceremony right is of particular importance. Whether I should have been in the *kraal* (women are not allowed according to the rules of the culture of this ceremony) or in the hut (only Maasai are allowed, the camera man had to stay outside and there is a myriad of rules that I cannot list properly as to when which Maasai, in terms of age-set, role and gender can enter the hut) was also discussed. However, most elders wanted me to record this culture as 'she is a researcher, not a woman'. And as for the hut, although Francis (the prime moral authority on the ceremony) had some objections, he decided to welcome me in after the most sacred and secret passing on of information, for the same purpose (and also the men were starting to get drunk, and 'unlike women because they run away and hide', I could actually keep up with the drinking).

> *'We are soon allowed back into the hut, this time the mood is much lighter. I am passed a mug, my eyes slowly adjusting to the darkness, firm walls of soil and cow dung protecting us from the icy winds, a dim white light hangs over our heads, powered by a small solar panel outside. The mug is filled to the brim with traditional brew 'Don't drug her!' Someone jokes. The brew is made by placing aloe roots, honey and water inside a container for four days and it tastes like fermented wine or the apple wine brewed in the Hessen region of Germany.*
> *The stories being told are getting funnier and funnier, as the drinking proceeds and an additional canister contains a much stronger brew, thinned out with milk, and is being emptied quickly. The two leaders-to-be are sitting together on one of the bed-compartments, both typing on their cell phones, taking and making phone calls. 'Habari za outside?' What's the news outside?'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 12 May 2013

Both leaders-to-be maintained a dual commitment during the secluded part of their inauguration: Listening to the wisdom (and jokes) of the elders inside and informing everyone outside about what was going on inside, the constant phoning and texting defying the exclusivity of the hut-confinement.

> *'People comment on my drinking capabilities; they say that they are impressed. After a while, I leave the traditional hut and head inside a more modern structure, the solar panel is much bigger, and a huge satellite dish perched firmly in the ground. The new and ultimate status symbol. A DSTV, which casts hundreds of channels into African homes for 70USD/month. Inside, a brand new flat screen is playing an Iranian PressTV documentary on the Swedish Occupy movement.*
>
> *Outside, babus have gone from sitting down and drinking to lying down and the Nyama Choma is being prepared a few hundred meters away at the picnic site. 6 cows and 10 goats have been slaughtered. A few men are grilling meat on giant schachlick sticks, one man is rolling fat in a giant ball, from the back of a hide of a cow. A dog is eating away at the head of a cow. We go further down, Loserian and I, accompanied by a warrior who cuts the stingy plants so that we can lie down. Nyama Choma, grilled meat, arrives and the five of us share it, one man cutting away at the meat and passing it around. We sleep in the sun for a few hours until women start arriving up at the boma, singing, in choir groups, hundreds of women wearing their finest jewellery and brightest shukas. They sing, dance, and jump until some arrive 30 minutes later, men start arriving, also in choir formation. They have walked from all over Ngorongoro for hours to get to the ceremony. Women leave first, men afterwards. Walking by foot is an essential and spiritual experience. A jumping contest breaks out, two groups of men, the women have to decide which team was better. A catering crew, comprised of employees from the lodge that I stay at have prepared food. Mama Ana comes up to greet me; she comes to the lodge every day to sell jewellery together with two other Mama's. Both are around, enjoying the party she says. Another Mama comes up and asks Loserian if I am his new wife. He jokes yes and she answers 'Excellent! A man needs one wife in the city and one wife up here!'*
>
> *A drunk Babu with a CCM hat wants money. We fail at steering him away and trouble is added when a drunk young lad who seems to like me comes up. The young boy who 'is not mentally healthy' has also arrived to the party and 'walks around like a stork'. He only speaks to Sululu, because Sululu is nice to him. Sululu is away on a drive so he comes to us and says 'Sululu!' and smiles.*
>
> *Eventually a Babu, Joseph, picks up conversation with us. His English is good, his accent is almost perfectly American. He tells me how he lived on the Crater floor in the early 70s, when a researcher arrived. He helped her and after a year he moved to Portland, Oregon, with her but he only stayed*

> *together for one year. 'I didn't like it in America.' He states. 'Because in America there are white people and there are niggers!' And I am Maasai! Especially back then, it was very segregated. White people had organizations, Niggers had organizations. So I came back here. I visited the States one more time. But I prefer it here. It is beautiful, people are friendly, and this is my land.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 12 May 2013

The *babu's* commentary on race confirms the standpoint of Maasai exceptionality and uniqueness. To him, the Maasai were beyond race, to others, the Maasai are one of the three races to some, and the Maasai are the lost tribe of Israel (see Rekdal, 1998).

> *'Loserian confirms that it is not a good idea to marry an American woman and recalls the story of the 'Professor' from Olbalbal. The 'Professor' married an American woman and moved to the States, where he wasn't allowed to work so he stayed there for 5 years and wrote many books; however, the woman took all the credit and money for the books and he returned to Ngorongoro with nothing. Now you will often find the 'Professor' sitting around in Olbalbal, not doing much.*
> *It is half past five by the time we leave, informing Solomon who is still secluded inside the hut via cell phone of our departure. The Babus are in the kraal, to make sure everyone gets their share of the brew. Some are walking home, their canisters filled with brew.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 12 May 2013

It took me a considerable amount of time to figure out that the 'Professor from Olbalbal' is Tepilit Ole Saitoti, the first Maasai to become famous abroad with his (autobiographical) writings on Maasai culture, such as the iconic coffee table book *Maasai* (1980) and appearances in various documentaries. Saitoti is admired and recognized as 'The Professor' by many of my research participants, but is also scorned and felt sorry for, due to the notion that he is essentially selling out Maasai culture to the Americans, an undertaking at which he was deemed unsuccessful because an American woman 'stole' all of his work. Although the account of 'The Professor' was retold in similar versions several times by research participants of all

age-sets, it is highly inaccurate. Saitoti is a highly acclaimed author and Carol Beckwith, who took the photographs for the very famous book, did not steal his book. The moral of the story is to be careful of foreigners and while sharing your cultural insights with them not to sell out, or worse, or to marry someone from *Ulaya.*[63]

Every Maasai ceremony is a journey and rite of passage at the same time, the beginning of a new life and of a new culture. The graduating of age-sets, for instance, a rite solely for men, is essentially time-travel, taking the graduate to a completely new stage in life with radically different tasks and responsibilities. Ceremonies are considered to be journeys and are marked as having their own culture. *Enkipaata*, the first of a series of initiating ceremonies by which boys become warriors, is marked as the beginning of culture.[64] Ceremony creates social order; it is a contract to participate actively as a member of a culture. They are a formal mode of action (Rothenbuhler, 1998) with strong communicative effectiveness. Ceremony is the key to (traditional) social mobility. Culture is socially constructed through circulating discourse (Urban, 1991), ceremony being a patterned and formalized discourse and an accessible sign, a concrete, unfolding and emergent discourse. In the previous section, I wrote about Solomon's jewellery purchase and white beads being in fashion. With the advent of each new age-set, and a new culture setting in, this is celebrated in terms of a shift in fashion. Participants stress that now that the others, the *wazungu* and Tanzanians, have lost their culture, it is more important than ever to honour ceremonies and their rules and to acknowledge them as 'having their own culture'.

[63] While you best not marry a foreigner, setting up a second household, or 'small household' with one only gives you credit.

[64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcOegPjhkn0

6.6. Concluding remarks

This chapter pays specific attention to the sub-question: How is a culture of mobility created and (re-)produced through communication? Dialogue between Maasai and with and in reaction to non-Maasai, shapes, contests and re-produces culture, defining its boundaries, but it also shapes cultural mobilities. Ritualized communication, in the form of ceremony, is an equally important aspect in shaping both a culture 'in motion' (Urban, 2010) and a culture of mobility. Dynamics of culture and mobility are complex, with questions on what falls into the domain of culture arising. What is or is not mobile depends on discursive vantage points. The Maasai stance is that cattle are God-given and land is borrowed from and from this perspective, cattle is the static presence around which land revolves. Cultural divergence and convergence are both products of boundary-crossing and exchange and the motor for such processes. Imaginaries of the self and other are at the core.

This chapter has analysed culture with the Maasai notion of culture as a starting point. Culture is an active noun, and an emergent process, culture starts with a journey, a ceremony. Bound by strict protocol, these ritualised, dialectical processes mark the start of what is to be with culture. I was invited to attend several of these journeys during my stay in Ngorongoro, weddings, circumcision ceremonies and the more obscure initiation of new traditional leaders.

Each ceremony marks the start of a new culture and culture is something that is both concrete and practiced. Maasailand is a nation, or rather nations (as one could call each section or *iloshon*), with a culture that is in motion, in relation to (imaginaries of) the past. The chapter also engaged with a 'neo-Boasian' conception

of cultural boundaries (Bashkow, 2004), or rather what I call, cultural distinctiveness. The 'neo-Boasian' understanding of cultural boundaries is conceived as follows: 1) it recognizes boundaries to be porous and permeable, thus they differ conceptually from barriers 2) boundaries are plural and contested and 3) as anthropologists we must focus on the distinctions drawn by our research participants as well as those drawn by others in reaction to them.

This chapter has presented Maasai reflections on what being with or without culture is and has shown how cultural distinctiveness is being turned into a brand, for which research participants like Moses are seeking intellectual property rights. Branding is about presenting something 'of essence' to a culture that can be sold to others as a brand. The research participants interviewed in this chapter consider non-Maasai to be 'without culture' and explain the interest researchers and tourists alike have in understanding Maasai culture as being driven by a lack of culture. Participants like Francis, Solomon and Marco take great pride in their possession of culture and Marco, in particular, is looking to benefit from his position as a custodian of culture by building a Maasai museum in which he can show visitors 'real Maasai culture'. Whilst in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I analysed the Maasai 'culture of mobility', in this chapter I have examined the final part of the research question concerning '[..] the dialogue with members of a cultural group and in its reaction to non-members', in terms of how dialectical and discursive constructs define and contribute to a culture in motion.

Chapter 7: Mobile phones and human mobility practices in Maasailand

7.1. Introduction

> *The Pastoralist Council's main land rover was returning to HQ from an accounting trip to Nayobi, a remote market village on the north eastern edge of the Ngorongoro highland, perched just before a dramatic drop onto the plateau stretching out towards Ol Donyo Lengai, an active volcano and the mountain of God. A disgruntled mood lingered in the car, occupied by the chief driver, head accountant, a mechanic, friends and acquaintances looking to go on a little excursion and myself. The mood manifested itself in the driver's refusal to pick up hitch hikers. He'd slow down as if to pick people up, then speed away. The village book keeper had been nowhere to be found and this wasn't the first time. It was nearly six pm when the driver, Sululu, received a rather distressed phone call from a village that boys had lost a larger number of cattle in the highland forest on the crater rim We rerouted to the village where we picked up some ten warriors, the sun hung low half an hour before sunset, and sped around the rim to the place where the cattle had gone astray. We were met by the boys, who had called the warriors who had called our driver. There was no time for scolding the youngsters, instead the warriors entered the forest, cell phones ready. The forest itself is so dense you cannot see for more than ten meters, and due to the thickness of the bush any sounds are dampened dramatically. Being home to a large amount of leopards, lions, elephants and buffalo, entry is rather risky. The warriors organised and kept in touch via mobile phone as they combed through the rainforest, warning each other when they spotted buffalo. The cattle were found just as the sun set and then taken home in the dark.*
>
> Fieldnotes, 18 April 2013

This chapter is an adaptation of the *Mobilities* journal publication *Embedded and Repurposed Technologies: Human Mobility Practices in Maasailand* (Nilsson and Salazar, 2015).[65] The chapter explores a particular technology of mobility, the mobile phone and the meaning-making of human mobility practices in Maasailand. So far, I have inquired into how a culture of mobility is formed in respect to a mobile

[65] The aim of the article, originally published in the journal *Mobilities*, was to study mobile technology and to analyse how cultural patterns and social organization shape the meaning-making of human mobility and technology, and vice versa. The focus of the PhD work has shifted away from mobile technologies towards technologies of mobility and communication (something very different conceptually).

conception of land, explored interspecies interdependencies generating mobilities and have queried into the power of imaginaries as technologies of communication and power. I have explored how ritualized communication (ceremony) produces culture and how culture is branded.

Honing in on the mobile phone in this chapter, as a case study of a specific technology, was an obvious choice given the complete absorption of the mobile phone into Maasai households (Butt, 2015).[66] The chapter builds upon an analysis on 'herding by phone' (Chapter 4) I disseminate routines of mobility enabled by the integration of customary knowledge production with the use of mobile communication technology.[67] I inquire specifically into the historical continuity wherein human mobility practices are constructed and reproduced. The objective of this chapter is to explore 'what is new about what always has been'. I hope to show how the use of more novel technologies such as the mobile phone reflects the fundamental human desire and need to communicate.

The word technology stems from the ancient Greek tekhnologiā, the science or systematic treatment of skills. Ingold (2001) has analysed how common understandings of technology muddle its ancient meaning, blurring out skill. We tend to regard skill as a practical ecological adaptation. This view places the development and curation of skill as something of an inferior quality to technology. I concur with Ingold here, hoping to infuse some of the ancient meaning of technology.

[66] This is not to say other technologies are less integrated, but mobile phones being relatively new and well integrated made it compelling to hone in on them in a specific chapter, just as I have honed in on more time-tested technologies in previous chapters (such as herding in chapter 4). By choosing a relatively new technology I am hoping to show how communication technologies become embedded and repurposed to fit into a historical continuity of communication.

[67] As discussed in Chapter 1 section 3.4., many research participants equate technology with the gaining and passing down of knowledge.

Technologies of mobility are devices, tools, instruments, skills, techniques, systems, practices or methods that enable mobility. They are much more than simply engineered devices. Hence, understanding peoples' diverse mobilities is the core objective to analysing the use of technologies of mobility.

Mobile technologies are portable, like for instance, shoes, whereas technologies of mobility also encompass moorings enabling human mobility. Communication is mediated through technology, be it the shoes that carry a messenger from one village to another, or the organs responsible for speech production. Mobile communication is the act of bridging space through communication, which brings us to the intersection explored here, mobile communication technologies, technologies that have portable quality and are used for communicative purposes. Kavoori and Arceneaux (2006) argue that technology is culturally appropriated and internalized by its users. It is through this perspective that I exemplify how mobile communication technologies are embodied into (semi-)nomadic culture, where mobile communication technologies play a crucial role in how strategies of economic and ecologic mobility are negotiated around environmental and political constraints (also see 1.3.4. on how technology is understood and treated throughout this dissertation.)

7.2. The network was already there

> *'No Maasai wants to work at Ndutu Safari Lodge. Sometimes they start working there but they run away after a few weeks. It is also a problem also because it is only Sukuma, the fish eaters who work there. You know fish is like snake. The biggest problem with Ndutu Safari Lodge is there is no connection. How do you know what is happening to your cattle when there is no connection? We need to stay informed in order to make decisions but they don't have connection so is impossible for Maasai to work there long time.' Daniel, tour guide.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 1 July 2013

In this section, I aim to demonstrate that the phone is encoded culturally and socially to fit a continuation of a long history of mobility, in line with Cresswell's (2010) warning of a 'technophilia trap', rather than simply underscoring the novelty. Technology must be de-centred to reconstruct social practices and on this note Leonardi (2003) argues that technology differs fundamentally based on how it is conceived and socially constructed by its users. In this chapter, I explore the role novel mobile communication technologies play in relation to land and today's Maasai mobilities, given that imaginaries of land and mobility are very much intertwined. Dixon and Whitehead (2008) argue that mobile phones are a spatial technology, but also occupy technological space. In line with my distinction between place and space (see 3.1.), I contend that mobile phone technology occupies technological place, rather than space, at the point when the technology is put in use, and in its use, it simply articulates a basic and ancient human activity, communication. As Lull (2002:1) puts it: 'Symbolic exchanges facilitated by high technology and new networks of complex connectivity (Tomlinson 1999) are contemporary elaborations of what is really a very basic activity – human communication'.

In Chapter 3, I explored how technology is employed to navigate and understand *Oloshoo*, home, or Maasailand as place. Space is here understood as a neutral grid whilst place (both physical place and virtual dimensions) is inscribed with different relations, imaginaries and social circumstances. A well-functioning communication network was there long before the arrival of the technology studied in this chapter, the mobile phone. It is an intricate communication system bound and restricted not by Vodacom bundles and signal reception, but by cultural codes and rules (many of which still apply today) and imbued with contested and complex

meaning.[68] One such cultural rule, demonstrated in the following vignette, is women walking together, before men, so as to set up and fix the moorings (immobilities or 'anchored' places, see Urry, 2003) to the network of pastoral herding.

> *Three sister wives are migrating towards Ndutu on the plains under Endulen. The highland escarpment just behind them. They thank us for water bottles and explain that their husband is coming with the cattle later. They are headed for their temporary boma in Ndutu. They need to fix and repair it before the husband arrives. Men and women walk separately and hold different tasks in seasonal migration.*
>
> Fieldnotes, 1 July 2013

It had been a year since the temporary *boma* was last in use and whilst warriors had reported reasonable herding conditions (not too many wildebeest and zebra grazing), the mooring (the temporary *boma*) still needed repair. The warriors reporting good grazing grounds, the sister-wives repairing the *boma* followed by the husband arriving with cattle are three components completing the 'network': The network of Maasailand can be understood as a form of organization enabling adaptation to, and control of, the socio-cultural, political, economic and ecological constraints or environments found as the moving landscape shifted south and expanded over centuries. Tarrius (1993) characterises these as 'circulatory territories' to express how mobility affects places and cultures. Maasailand is one such case in which the circulatory nature of life and livelihood transcends boundaries and borders and, yet, it is still a tightly knit society. Ironically, in Western epistemology, networked societies (Castells, 1996; Wittel, 2001) or 'nomad' societies (Knafou,

[68] Since the 2005 liberalization of the Tanzanian cellular data network, a large number of actors including Tigo, Celtel and Vodacom compete for market dominance. Vodacom is the largest provider. However, many Tanzanians carry multiple cell phones and SIM cards to ensure coverage, battery life and being able to call someone at the best rate.

1998) are expressions used to categorize post- modernity, yet these perspectives can be well suited to understanding Maasailand in the present as well as in the past.

Here, I wish to examine how contemporary mobile communication technologies are making and reshaping Maasailand, replacing and enhancing the historical network of codes and rules (previously studied in Chapter 3) that made Maasailand an efficient circulatory territory with fast informational exchange. I seek to disentangle the 'constellations of mobility' (Cresswell, 2010), the patterns, representations and practices creating mobility within the context of my research. One such constellation is time. With a culture structured around age-sets (Rigby, 1995), and using a lunar twelve-month calendar to predict environmental changes, the Maasai have historically been a time-conscious culture. People move not just in response to seasonal change, but in planning and in anticipation of it. Space, or distance, are measured in day's walking. The rise of novel mobile and communication technologies allows for new planning in terms of time, as these compress time and space. Mobile networking reshapes, relates and adapts to already existing socio-cultural assemblages.

Madianou and Miller (2013) argue that a choice between different media of communication forges new relationships between the social and the technological, with implications for the ways in which interpersonal communication is experienced. Most of my research participants however, given the choice between the mobile phone and social media (see chapter 8), maintain the mobile phone, the phone call more specifically than the text message, as their interpersonal communication medium of choice. Social media is rather used for other purposes such as mass communication, which can be activism (chapter 8) or the spreading of positive (often religious) messages and pictures, or for contacting people abroad.

Owiny et al. (2014) argue that an information gap exists in rural East Africa; illiteracy and the exclusion of customary knowledge in the schooling system present a challenge to oral cultures in which knowledge is passed on from elders to younger people, who now spend more time in school. Following their argument, the integration of social media (explored further in Chapter 8) and mobile communication technology works to preserve and produce customary knowledge. Social media platforms are accessed primarily through the phone. Mobile phones allow for the documentation and dissemination of customary knowledge practices (the previous chapter has explored how ceremonies are recorded for future reference). To be stored and shared, these recordings need to be uploaded on social media platforms and the network speed in Ngorongoro presents a big challenge in this regard.

The network is too weak in most places for the uploading of video clips, so (smart-)phones often need to travel to the town of Karatu, which has 3G, to complete this exercise of 'cultural preservation'. At the time this research was concluded (early 2016), research participants reported smart phones to be the norm, in the sense that most households had access to at least one. This makes it easier to record and uploading injustices or clips and pictures from protests than it was at the time of my field research (see chapter 8). In early 2013, whilst most phones (predominately Nokia) had audio and visual recording ability, most phones were not online. This changed rapidly during my research stay, towards the end in October 2013, approximately half of my male research participants were online through their phones, favouring simple Samsung devices for their endurance, battery life and pricing. The intuitive user interface also enabled research participants with limited literacy to go online.

The mobile phone is well incorporated into the organization of everyday Maasai life (Sife, Kiondo et al., 2010; Rutten and Mwangi, 2012) and it also helps people to organize efficiently during distressing events or unplanned circumstances. Cell phone coverage, provided by a large number of companies, is impeccable not only in inhabited areas, but also on the plains most frequently used by Maasai herdsmen to graze cattle. Being able to communicate instantly, with persons not within their direct vicinity, aids in the organization of their life on several levels and increases daily communication among herders. These new communication systems are tools in sustaining and developing economic livelihood, in organizing social life and entertainment, in displaying social status and in forming political awareness. The mobile phone as a non-human agent of contact enables people to be in several places at the same time, and as my fieldwork in Ngorongoro suggests, Maasai do not necessarily value the indirect experience as being inferior to the one in which a place is experienced physically. Instead, the overall experience of sociability is enhanced and made more efficient.

As much as it is useful in situations of emergency, prosperous livestock trading has become difficult without mobile technology as both trading parties, the seller and buyer, wish to stay informed about the market prices across northern Tanzania or to use asymmetrical information to their advantage. If a trade is very sizeable, the accountants of the Pastoralist Council (PC) double as mobile banks. For smaller transactions, mobile commerce systems are used and most commonly M-pesa is the service applied to transfer money instantly from one bank account to the other by the sending and receiving of text messages. M-pesa is more versatile than a credit card. The SMS-based technology in many ways covers the essentials of what good

technology is understood to be, both in Maasailand in particular and in Eastern Africa in general; it is simple (not a smart phone app like versions currently launching in the U.S. and Europe), efficient, versatile, practical and mobile. M-pesa, first introduced in Kenya, is a strong example of mobile technology both created within and influencing Africa.

A 2014 survey by a telecommunications company suggests that over 10% of Tanzania's GDP is generated by mobile commerce and that the systems find higher usage in rural areas than urban areas.[69] Communications is the fastest growing economic sector in the country. Whilst South Africa's Vodacom is the biggest network provider, Halotel, a company controlled by the Vietnamese Defence Ministry, is investing 1 Billion USD into the Tanzanian mobile phone market in 2015-2016 to broaden 3G coverage and to reach 95% of Tanzania's population with 3G by the end of 2016.[70] If Ngorongoro's network is upgraded to 3G by the end of 2016, this will significantly impact the possibility for mobile phone users to upload and share images and video clips: Images and videos of grasslands and problems with cows that are ill (Chapter 4), for 'cultural preservation (Chapter 6) and sharing images from protests (Chapter 8).

[69] 'Tanzania - Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband - Market Insights and Statistics.' http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/1556454/tanzania_telecoms_mobile_broadband_and.pdf

[70] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-telecoms-idUSKBN0IH18320141028 and http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/home-news/45752-hello-tanzania-as-3g-halotel-plans-panterritorial-coverage

7.4. Scraping *vochas*: Sociability in the digital age

In Ngorongoro (and in the rest of Tanzania), you need to buy vouchers, or *vochas*, in order to call or text someone. These can be complemented by a large variety of bundles or short-term subscriptions for calling, texting and Internet surfing. 10,000 Tanzanian Shilling (TZS), roughly 5 Euro, is the most expensive *vocha* you can buy at any *wakala* (selling point) and just for Vodacom there are well over 150,000 *wakalas* around Tanzania. Elaborate telecommunication ads take up most of TV commercial space.[71] In Ngorongoro, you rarely find *vochas* for more than 1,000 TZS (50 Euro cent) meaning that if you wish to buy a monthly Internet bundle, you will need to scrape together 40 *vochas* and you might need to visit several *wakalas* in order to gather enough *vochas*. Travelling by car entails constantly stopping at *wakalas* to recharge phone credit. Maasai will often stop somewhere, buy *vochas* for 3,000 TZS and then proceed to make phone calls until the credit is finished, only to buy another few thousand TZS worth of airtime somewhere else. Since wakalas often run out of credit and most Maasai are on foot, transferring air time via M-pesa is a popular alternative, yet there is adversity to tapping your bank account to get credit.

While there is no real plan behind buying credit, and many people complain that they are spending a great amount of their income on their mobile phone, much thought is given to how a person might optimize their network reception and save money, and it is common to have at least two phones from two providers (sometimes with dual SIMs) so that your contacts can reach you regardless of where you are and what network you are using. With the recent surge in smart phones, having WhatsApp is a new sign of prestige. The short life span of smart phone batteries is an additional

[71] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T7yacA9uIEg

argument in favour of carrying many phones, especially in the absence of a power grid or solar energy at every *boma*.

Research participants mentioned that calling, texting and Facebooking, both via smart phone and through their computer, have impacted social life and seems, to some extent, to be replacing face-to-face sociability. It is difficult to speak to someone for more than ten minutes without their phones ringing or without the person suddenly picking up his or her phone to make a call in the middle of a conversation. What I initially mistook for phone calls, which were completely insubstantial, was culture being recoded through a new medium. The caller can ask (they will address us in either English or Swahili instead of Maa) *'habari za asubuhi, habari za leo, habari za watoto, habari za wewe, habari za bibi habari za….'* or 'what is the news regarding the morning/the day/the children/you/the grandmother…' you answer 'good' to every question and as soon as the ritual is over they hang up on you. It took several calls, exactly of this sort, and many inquiries to understand the ritualistic nature of making these phone calls; they are just an extension of a long history of informational exchange built upon strict social rules. Long, extended greetings, which vary depending on hierarchy, gender and age difference are a prerequisite to sociability, regardless of whether an exchange of substantial information will follow or not. It is a pro-active 'checking in' on people, which may or may not lead to news being exchanged, now or in the future.

Not engaging in these greetings, these every day rituals, whether in a physical meeting or via a non-human medium, will exclude a person from accessing information. Rothenbuhler (2008) makes a distinction between rituals as ceremonies (explored in Chapter 6) and rituals in aspects of social life. The ritual phenomenon of the phone call creates social order, it is a daily commitment to partake in social life

and if the ritual is disrespected, the penalty is exclusion from information. For herders, it is especially important to respect the ritualistic codes of phone calls. Not partaking (because one wants to save money, avoid having to go to a *wakala* to scrape together more *vochas*) can get a herder excluded from information on good grazing grounds.

7.5. Missing ingredient?

In *Mobile Technology in the Village* (2008), Tenhunen explores mobile phone usage in rural India, embedding it into a process of communication transformation that both draws upon traditional forms of communication and replaces them. Any exchange of information can only follow after a specific and long drawn out form of greeting, varying depending on age and context. If there is no news to be exchanged, the process is just repeated as a form of ritual, the ritual becoming so intrinsic that there is no expectation of actual contents or deeper message. With Maasai, there is not much distrust of the medium itself, but more as to what is said through it. For instance, some herders report that they were given false information over the phone as to where to graze their cattle. However, as Butt reports (2015) although herders sometimes spread false information to each other when it comes to foraging for good grasslands, they act united against threats, information regarding the presence of rangers, if herding on land controlled for wildlife, is accurate. Mobile phones also facilitate the addressing of health issues (cows giving birth for instance).

Butt (2015) finds that hired herders (these are non-Maasai in some instances) are more dependent on instructions via the phone to make correct assessments regarding cattle health, yet the quality of help they receive from fellow herders via the phone will be lower as their ties to the social network is weaker. In Chapters 3 and 4, I

have written about love, what Tsing (2012) terms the 'missing ingredient', and I conclude that in regards to hired herders, weaker social ties, paired with less passion for the herd, leads to poorer decisions and to less help. Overall though, the distrust in mobile phone technology is rather limited in Maasailand and is not necessarily experienced as being an inferior form of sociability than direct contact.

Cultures that skipped the use of landlines may be more positive towards using mobile phones in various social settings. The idea of indirect communication being 'less real' and more impolite does not persist within Maasai society. Sociability and mobility have always been negotiated around a non-human fabric; namely, cattle (see Chapter 4). One could argue that communicating via mobile technology is superior even to direct communication. If someone calls, a conversation is interrupted but the person you are face to face with is not going anywhere. The phone call, however, transports you to another place and to an unknown situation and research participants respond that both pragmatism and curiosity (and avoiding paying the calling costs) spurs someone to pick up a call. It is the people and their already established networks and rituals of information, sharing that shape and take ownership over technology.

Age-sets (applied to boys and men), as explained in Chapter 6, are a vital concept to Maasai social organization where one graduates into a new age-set after a certain period of years (Morton, 1979). Upon graduating into a new age-set, a Maasai man will take on new responsibilities and tasks. For this purpose, new knowledge is required and it is the responsibility of men of a higher age-set to pass this knowledge down. Often, the most vital lessons are passed on during the ceremony. However, the phone transforms this ritual into one in which the secluded person has direct access to all aspects of the ceremony. Equally, people 'outside' get an insider's take on the proceedings. It highlights just how valued the phone is to its user, and that constantly

cutting off traditional leaders who have travelled for days, something that is indicative of impoliteness, but is taken for granted with little objections from the traditional leaders. The phone allows for traditions to become transformed when someone, who was originally supposed to be 'cut off' for a while, is enabled to follow curiosity and be everywhere at the same time. Physical seclusion is now a mere ritual upheld out of tradition.

In *Mobile Phones, the New Talking Drums of Everyday Africa* (2009), De Bruijn highlights the dialectical process that takes place between culture and technology in societies in which M-pesa is perhaps one of the strongest African technological outcomes of mobile phone culture. Whilst information and computer scientists, such as Williams et al., (2008), recognize that societies in which the mobile phone was the first successfully introduced communication technology provide great intellectual resources for the creators of technology to enhance their products, few innovations stem from collaborations between African and Western or Asian tech companies.

Innovations in the fields of mobile technologies often stem from Africa. These include M-pesa, Mxit (a smart phone 'micro world', much like WhatsApp), and DsTV as a pan-continental cable TV via satellite system (and the most advanced and wide-spread of its kind) or portable solar energy systems.

Failing to take the creative and sometimes revolutionary approaches to technology that cultures in Africa have adapted into account, international network companies or producers of mobile phones have long neglected or mistrusted these markets. As analysed in Chapter 3, the Maasai adopt a guarded and selective approach towards new technologies combined with a rapid appropriation and embedding of selected technologies. Shying away from understanding what sort of technological

advancements are valued and which are not, by certain markets, has cost corporations such as Nokia, once one of the largest companies in the world, their independence. Ignoring reports by an in-house anthropologist about the demand for simple smart phones in emerging markets, the company was near bankruptcy when it was swallowed by Microsoft.[72] Vodafone was equally afraid of emerging markets and only fully merged with the highly profitable Vodacom in 2008. Equally, few scholars recognize the actual potential stemming from African cultures to drive the technological revolution forward. This may be based upon a 'modernity bias' that has long been perpetuated by the more exact sciences (Andradea and Urquhart, 2012).

7.6. Extending oneself

In an informal conversation about my research project and the Maasai's application of mobile technologies, Cameroonian anthropologist Francis Nyamnjoh reacted 'But, Maasai are a mobile technology!' Sharing this statement with Maasai research participants online, their feedback was: 'My phone is an extension [of myself]'. Describing a person as a mobile technology might be one step too far, though. However, seeing mobile phones or other technologies as an extension or prosthetic explains the fast and smooth transition into the digital age and the eager embodiment of these technologies as a form of optimizing oneself and one's livelihood. Most Maasai move by foot. Saitoti has a good job (he is an accountant), owns a car and a decent number of cattle (50) and explained to me that he can hardly turn down doing favours as it is socially and culturally expected of him to share his success. The burden of having to accommodate many requests has had him invest in coastal land

[72] https://medium.com/ethnography-matters/why-big-data-needs-thick-data-b4b3e75e3d7#.d7prrzio6

where, disconnected from the expectations of his community, he can let his new cattle herd roam. Expectations, such as the one brought upon him, mean that Maasailand is being expanded, both south and to the coast, defying government pressure to have the Maasai abandon cattle herding.

The expansion eastwards to Bagamoyo by rich Maasai, a Swahili coastal town far east of traditional Maasailand, also highlights this pragmatic stance towards land. Land can be holy, mystical and intertwined with family histories, yet it is nothing without cattle. The land purchase in Bagamoyo (Swahili Coast) went through on the eve of a Chinese-Tanzanian deal to turn Bagamoyo into one of the largest and most high-tech harbours in the world, a deal which has led to property prices downtown soaring.[73] Maasailand is wherever it makes most sense to herd your cattle. Cattle management is largely a male duty. Hodgson (2000), however, argues that this was not the case historically and that Maasai women were disenfranchised and devalued by British (or imperialist) interference in Maasai livelihood. Although access to education and to new mobile technologies shifts power relations, educated girls often fall back into 'traditional' roles when they return home from schools or universities. While women can manage herds of cattle, typical tasks and responsibilities include raising children, building houses, collecting water and firewood and trade. However, mobile phones have made it easier to outsource herding duties and women are slowly benefitting from this. Female research participants reported that they could perform all their home-making tasks, acting as moorings to a mobile system, while keeping control over smaller herds by staying in close touch with herders via their phones, whom they also pay by phone.

[73] See http://mpoverello.com/2013/06/09/chinese-president-has-sealed-tanzanias-bagamoyo-mega-portproject/ and http://www.tzrealestate.co.tz/Listing/Houses_for_Sale/2076.html

Cattle transactions are still largely dealt with at markets and participants report that markets in the NCA have grown over the years. Yet, phones and the internet are increasingly used to replace work done at markets (examining, price negotiations etc.). Due to M-pesa's transfer limits, larger transactions require traditional banking. As banks are far away, accountants and mobile banks come to markets to settle trade. Owners of large herds, such as Saitoti, herd by phone, delegating tasks and responsibilities to others. Herders, in turn, rely on their phones to exchange information on where to graze and where not to. While hired herders rely less on these networks, cattle owners who herd have a higher incentive to participate and, as some say, at times falsify information on where to herd to gain advantages over others. Forced migration aside, Maasai presence has shifted in areas across Kenya and Tanzania over time. It is a network of relative cultural unity and economic exchange. It is a moving landscape, movement generated by socioeconomic and political restraints as well as imaginaries of promising land (such as Bagamoyo in this instance).

As useful as mobile technologies are, strategies of economic and ecologic decision-making are bound by both an inner-socio-cultural context and by the political realities and histories of oppression and further militarization of many Maasailand protected areas by the Tanzanian and Kenyan governments. Maasailand has been contested for centuries (Morton, 1979). Cresswell (2010) emphasizes an approach to mobility studies that acknowledges and analyses historical factors, not as something entirely new. Although relatively novel, the phone is encoded culturally and socially with values and meanings created through an ongoing discourse with the past. Practices involving the mobile phone, such as the outsourcing of herding tasks, attest to this relation. Herding has, in the past, been delegated; problems with herders reporting

correct facts have existed, yet the phone simplifies the delegation, providing both tools of further control and opportunities to report lies. In the context of Maasailand being a contested space, the phone is a political tool replacing physical messengers in reporting land disputes or evading rangers.

A social class shift is emerging (within larger Tanzanian society), with upwardly-mobile Maasai accumulating large herds and outsourcing tasks and a cattle-less class often tending to cattle of wealthier Maasai. Outsourcing enables the owner to both pursue a career not germane to Maasai culture, and to expand a herd of cattle through which they can still exert control due to novel technologies. The herder, or 'livestock manager', that takes care of livestock from multiple parties may not have the means to own livestock and be a cattle-less professional herder or may herd his cattle together with that of others. Outsourcing herding tasks also often brings the benefit of allowing your livestock to migrate. Migratory herding has been in steep decline and cattle are often left to (over)graze on limited land as Maasailand has been marginalised, there is not enough migratory land for the increasing number of Maasai. Having your livestock migrate as you stay sedentary often results in your livestock migrating between three or four different *bomas* in Ngorongoro. Unlike make-shift *bomas*, made for semi-nomadic pastoralism, these are often occupied by family members who welcome the cattle into their *boma* when it is most ecologically rational to let them graze in that specific area. Owners stay in daily contact with herders and often visit their herd during the weekend or when they are on leave. Rather than investing in a mainstream Tanzanian lifestyle, many career-Maasai use their income to build up complex and often successful structures of delegated migratory or nomadic pastoralism. These developments suggest a close relation between mobile technologies and social mobility and how they influence new class relations.

7.7. Warriors as rebels: Challenging the right of access to information

> *'Olikapi, a senior elder from the village of Endulen, an important market town in the North-West in the NCA, went on a long tirade regarding cell phones as he was waiting for a friend at the Pastoralist Council. He was charging a set of high tech equipment including two smart phones, a tablet and a pc. His anti-mobile phone monologue was interrupted by two calls he received. He lamented how mobile phones erase the rituals surrounding how news is exchanged. Cattle may be the fabric of Maasai culture, but exchanging information is paramount to keeping the culture together. The importance of instant informational exchange becomes clear for instance in restricted areas of the Maasai Mara and areas surrounding the Serengeti, where the mobile phone is a key strategic source to outsmart park wardens and graze cattle on confiscated land.*
>
> *Speaking to senior elders, I often hear that I would be surprised at how fast news used to circulate in the days before cell phones and cars. I am often reminded that news can only travel fast and efficiently if channelled via strict rules, these rules are no longer known to younger generations however.'*
>
> Fieldnotes, 26 July 2013

The vantage point I take on this network culture is that it is warranted by systems of land use, rather than being a mere response to environmental constraints. This echoes Noyes's (2000) work on nomadism, portraying the nomad as an agent acting on rational, economic grounds rather than as a victim of environmental hardship. One could argue that the mobile phone does not automatically strengthen intricate structures or systems of land use. The critique voiced by elders on news spreading via phones and Facebook is that it is partial, rumour-based and that there is just too much information flowing for people to channel out what is relevant. There is also no age restriction on who can know what. Where previously, in order to gain access to certain knowledge you needed to graduate to a specific age-set, now massive amounts of intelligence are stored online and accessible universally. In addition, several male research participants lamented the increasing popularity of smart phone and computer

use by women, as female users are perceived to be more emancipated and more likely to be lured away from Maasailand. The consequence is arguably a cultural change, a case whereby (mobile) technologies have actively influenced culture rather than where they are adapted into the culture.

Knowledge is power, gaining knowledge outside traditional forms changes structures. Yet, activists argue that this is symptomatic of our day and age. Activists for education and the democratization of access to (mobile) technologies maintain that those people, predominantly senior elders, who experience this as threatening the culture, use culture as an excuse to maintain their traditional power. In a quantitative anthropological study, Burton and Kirk (1979) present findings that young women and warriors are most likely to revolt against hierarchy structures, and frame this within the time-tested and popular tradition of adultery between young women (who are married and hence belong to the age-set of their husbands) and warriors (who cannot marry). Llewelyn-Davies (1978) further characterises warriors as the rebels of Maasai society. In the light of this research, I argue that younger people using mobile technology to uproot traditional power relations are not doing anything 'new', rather they are simply using a relatively new tool to accomplish what generations before them have always done, namely to rebel to a certain extent.

> *'I asked Olikapi just how information would have been restricted to a certain age set, and how a ritual to transport knowledge would have looked like and he gave me the example of a death in the family: 'Now, you may receive a phone call from any random person saying: 'Hey, did you know your uncle died?' You ask them how and they answer that they do not really know and they heard it from someone else. The information may either be false or if true, you are likely to receive a dozen calls over the next two or three days from random people. In the past, if a close relative died, senior elders, who are the first to be informed, would come by your house in the early morning hours, when everything is still peaceful and quiet and sit down with the family over*

Chai and explain in detail what had occurred, leaving out no questions or room for speculation.'

Fieldnotes, 26 July 2013

In Maasai culture, power relations and social mobility are undergoing a change from within, yet these same structures have always been contested by the younger generation. The contesting of power relations is now more driven by access to education and interaction with Tanzanian society, in whose interactions age is no longer the driving factor that determines either hierarchy or knowledge, and is driven less by achievements in stealing cattle from elders and conquering their women. Social mobility is further detached from ageing and time. Following this argument, the case of increased knowledge access is already embedded in ongoing changes rather than a radical culture change through a novel technology in itself. Novel mobile technologies are, to some extent, perceived of as being threatening by senior elders in turning traditional hierarchy structures around, yet they admitted that youth have always challenged these structures. Mobile phones should, thus, be seen as new tools in an ongoing dialectic between generations rather than revolutionary devices. Hodgson (1999) explains that historical tensions and disparities between warriors and elders could be expressed by the following dichotomies: 'communal/individual, wild/domesticated, freedom/authority sex for pleasure/sex for procreation' (Hodgson, 1999:127).

The circumventing of customary structures is nothing new. Through extensive archival research, Hodgson (1999) argues that colonial administrators, fearing the *ilmurran* for their perceived savagery, influenced elders by extending their political powers. They consulted only elders to turn customary laws into Colonial law, on, for instance adultery, divorce and cattle theft. Male elders were able to take advantage of

their political influence, strengthening their power over younger men and women. By the 1950's, administrators had become disillusioned with the 'uneducated' elders' ability to progress Maasailand, and then shifted political opportunities to younger men. Chapter 8 will further explore why it is that pre-dominantly younger men (and increasingly women) push the indigenous rights agenda in Maasailand. In her study on youth and their every-day cell phone use in Mozambique, Archambault (2012) describes how youngsters challenge notions of respect towards elders through their mobile phone customs. Stories, such as Olikapi's, show a similar change in perception of what 'respectful' communication is, with young Maasai, and which is embedded in a larger process of youth challenging their elders.

In the past, information would always move together with a person moving physically. Some mobile phone sceptics maintain that in the loss of physical movement, accountability is lost too. As Maasai become more sedentary, in terms of few families still shifting between *bomas* following seasonal change, mobile technology is replacing some of the need to displace yourself in space. Let me briefly explain the sedentarization processes. Parks and protected areas decrease grazing grounds. Simultaneously, the Maasai population has increased dramatically in the past fifty years and schooling contributes equally to sedentarism. Furthermore, with the diversification of income, nomadic tasks are being outsourced to groups of young men with little personal assets. In other words, herding is being carried out as a practice less by the warriors of their own family and instead is outsourced to professional herders who may watch over the herds of a large family or group of friends. These herders are given airtime by their employers so that they can warn and inform them about any matters regarding grazing or disease and are often paid by M-pesa immediately. The task of herding is carried out by fewer people because many young

Maasai seek higher education or jobs in the tourism sector, either in the region or in coastal areas.

Senior elders, often portray the past in a very poetic, romantic way, pointing out that when Maasai were still constantly 'on the move', in search of greener pastures, visiting people or simply for the joy of walking you could meet someone as you were walking, establishing who you knew in common and could then proceed to give detailed accounts of the news from your home. Senior elders generally portray the past in a very nostalgic way, laden with rich contextual anecdotes of freedom, roaming and moving about. Yet, these stories constantly clash with the livelihood chosen by these elders today. In order to assess how political activism is negotiated around mobile technologies, one needs to situate these in an already existing struggle against marginalization and access to land. A geo-political context in which land is not simply taken or conquered as a response to a shifting ecology but where land is territorialised by outside forces.

7.8. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have explored how human mobility practices are continuously constructed and (re-)produced, through the mobile phone. I argue that, rather than causing radical cultural change, novel mobile technologies are embedded, rationalised and become re-purposed. The Maasai case shows how the mobile phone has been adopted into a socio-cultural, political and economic network in which it becomes an extension of well-established and historically influenced practices. Customary mobile practices have paved the way for the successful integration of mobile technologies, such as the mobile phone, in Maasailand. Although younger Maasai research

participants report how their lives have improved, senior elders often lament how mobile technologies aid younger generations in surpassing traditional hierarchy structures. This enables new social mobilities, within both Maasai culture and Tanzanian society in general. Yet, rather than assuming that it is technology that radically changes culture, this process should be viewed as an ongoing (historical) dialectic between generations.

One issue with conducting this research is the rapid expansion of the Tanzanian telecommunications industry. As reported, it is the fastest growing industry and changes, both in terms of network coverage and in phone types that are in use (the replacement of simple devices with smart phones), are so quick that it is hard to keep up as a researcher. Most of the qualitative data here was recorded in 2013. The mobile phone landscape looks different as I concluded this research in 2016 and, thankfully, my research participants remind me of this daily, via Facebook and WhatsApp.

The mobile phone has been integrated into Maasai culture at an interesting time in history. Increased pressure from the government through the imposition of land use plans places a stress upon the land. Additionally, population growth has forced many Maasai into a sedentary lifestyle. The phone opens up possibilities of cultural reinvention and new kinds of mobility as well as ways around government control. Mobile technologies are an additional tool providing access to an international arena for the causes of economic independence and indigenous rights. The potential to make substantial changes in land rights is, however, limited. Strategies of economic and ecological decision-making are bound by the political realities of oppression and further militarization of many Maasailand protected areas by the Tanzanian and Kenyan governments. The upgrading of the mobile phone network is crucial for people to fully grasp the potential of mobile phones, especially smart phones. At the

time at which this research was concluded, in the beginning of 2016, research participants from the NCA had to travel to Karatu to upload video clips. At this point in time, an upgrading of the mobile phone network was under way with projections of 3G access throughout nearly all of rural Tanzania by the end of 2016.

By taking a broader view of the Maasai case study, this chapter has shown how larger cultural patterns and social organization shape the meaning-making of practices of mobility and technology. Whilst mobile communication technologies like the phone have an impact on culture itself, and upon the organization of everyday planning, their use also influences politics of resource access, land rights and the ways in which nomadic cultures are sanctioned to use their land. Mobile communication technologies compress time and space and the user does not often differentiate between physical or 'face to face' and virtual or 'over the phone' interactions. One is propelled into different social settings simultaneously. This chapter has analysed the mobile phone and the meaning-making of human mobility practices in Maasailand, with the objective pf answering 'what is new about what always has been?' I have demonstrated that the mobile phone is used for a basic human need and activity, communication. It has been adopted into a socio-cultural, political and economic network where its use becomes an extension and a catalyst of well-established and historically influenced practices.

Chapter 8: Pursuing Maasailand: The social network and activism

8.1. Introduction

Discussion log on Facebook Group Kenyans for Sustainable Conservation, 12 January 2012

> *'Saidimu: We need to do something about k4c facebook group [Kenyans for Conservation] dear people…we should all report them to facebook.. they have created a hate environment for people to attack a specified community, that is how genocide begins, create a media for stirring up people's sentiments, spread hate material and let people share their sentiments on an issue until that time when the genocide execution is ripe enough to be done by the master planners. They will then send out choreographed attacks on the target… such attacks can take different dimensions as those mentioned and clarified A one Janet Ghoss in which most of us have sharply reacted against. What is your observation on the k4w matter in relation to wildlife conservation and hate against the Indigenous Maasai people?*
>
> *Elong'o: Those ignorant imbeciles have blocked their page!*
>
> *Saidimu: THE [white elite] MIGHT EVEN BEGIN TO POSON [SIC] (OUR RIVERS, WE ARE ALREADY SUFFERING FROM THE POISON THEY SPRAY THEIR FOWERS [SIC] ON THE LANDS TAKEN FROM OUR PEOPLE. AND WE LIVE THERE.'*

This exchange took place on a Facebook page where Maasai indigenous rights activists (Kenyan and some Tanzanian), conservationists, tourists, politicians and members of the general Kenyan public alike, discuss human-wildlife conflicts and land rights. This chapter, which is the final one, uses netnographic data (See Chapter 2 sections 4 and 5) to explore how social media is used as a communication platform to mobilize (towards both Maasai and non-Maasai) for Maasai indigenous rights.

This dissertation has shown how, through communication technology, human mobility practices are constructed and (re-)produced continuously, in dialogue among members of a cultural group and in reaction towards non-members. This thesis's central premise, and this chapter specifically, concerns the effects, usage and meaning-making that technologies of mobility and communication technologies have

among the Maasai in Ngorongoro. This chapter turns to social media platforms and how an online dialogue between Maasai and non-Maasai spurs an (online) indigenous rights movement. Social networks are here defined, following Riles (2000:3), as 'a set of institutions, knowledge practices, and artefacts thereof that internally generate the effects of their own reality reflecting on themselves'. Intricate social networks have played a decisive role in 'place-making' and the shaping of one of the largest areas claimed by a single ethnic group in Africa, many pre-existing networks are now replicated, established or re-established online, whilst other networks are entirely novel, such as those linking 'clicktivists' in Maasailand and beyond (see 8.4.).

In an analysis of social networks, Lentz (2013) argues that: 'The success of expansionist stateless societies in Africa and elsewhere has been attributed to their effective socio-political and, by implication, military organization' (2013:31). The challenge presenting itself to activists, to quote Elong'o, is 'those ignorant imbeciles' (the state, corporations, large scale land owners) fighting back. To defend Maasailand, the social organization of Maasai society foresees the teaching of responsibility, independence and interspecies interdependence at the earliest age possible. Toddlers are sent out to herd small livestock. A strong bond to the social network is created at an early age through the responsibility of herding (see Chapter 4), the non-human-to-human component in social networking. Young children (both boys and girls) learn to communicate and read animals at a pre-verbal age. One of the foundations for the Maasai social network is thus a non-human component (see Chapter 4). This network has been stretched, given an additional non-human layer through the embedding of the digital. Maasai culture is forged as mobile (see Chapter 3 and 6), mobility is both an imaginary concept drawn on from a more nomadic (imagined) past (see Chapters 3 and 5) and is justified for the purpose of herding (see Chapter 4).

It can easily be argued, that the rapid expansion of the mobilization of social networks is key to defending land. Apart from the inter-dependence and independence taught at the earliest age through herding responsibilities, and the bond with land and animals that this creates, coherence is also derived from a struggle and oppression paired with imaginaries of a past of abundance, freedom and wayfaring. Maasailand is made up of different sections, different Maa speaking groups; the question as to whether the Samburu, the *Warusha* or the *Ilkunono* are Maasai or not, is one with no clear answers. Yet, when faced with threats or when presenting themselves towards potential donors or supporters, representing Maasailand and the Maasai as being aligned is strategically important. The same applies to 'micro-threats', as explored in the previous chapter, where herders may falsify information about good grasslands when speaking to each other. When it comes to avoiding wildlife rangers when 'trespassing', Butt (2015) demonstrates that information is solid and that herders work together to avoid rangers. Presenting oneself as unified (even though the reality is one in which Maa-speaking stakeholders have very different cultural, economic and political interests) facilitates the mobilization of digital and non-digital social networks to take action. The digitalization of the social network overcomes physical space and thus accelerates the speed of mobilization, whilst the issue fought over remains very physical, being land. As Bernstein (2005) writes, activists are faced with strategic dilemmas when the identities around which their movement is organized are also the basis for oppression. In the Maasai case, the identity is that of the (semi)nomadic pastoralist, as he or she is often politically unwanted.

Activist face this dilemma from two sides, both from broader society and from Maasai who see activists as *ormeek*, as having lost connection to cattle, and as having sold out to 'the modern world' and from those oppressing Maasai for being pastoralist

and resisting full integration into mainstream society. The 'Maasai activist' is typically a younger (warrior or junior elder) educated man with the 'power of the pen' (Hodgson, 2002a) or rather the keyboard, as the arena for indigenous rights activism has moved online. By having achieved certain authority at a young age, activists challenge the age-set system (Hodgson, 2011). Social media amplifies certain voices, such as those of young, educated Maasai, whilst it silences those using more traditional channels of political debate or activism. Younger activists embrace contemporary international discourses, including ones on intellectual property rights or anything labelled or related to 'Maasai', to a vigorous extent (see 6.3). This results in a distancing, both from Maasai culture and from the support of senior elders who were traditionally 'in charge' of politics. On this path, the support of the international online community has become an imperative to activists.

This chapter explores social networks and indigenous rights activism. Prior to the fieldwork in Ngorongoro, conducted in 2013, I had a year in which to prepare the PhD project and to conduct netnographic research. By 2012, there was already a thriving and very vocal online community of 'keyboard warriors', discussing issues of Maasai land rights, intellectual property and conservation. I had just read Hodgson's *Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous* (2011) and while I recognized a great deal of her analysis in my own experience, what I saw online was very different. Activism has, through social media platforms, very much shifted from when Hodgson analysed the movement. Activism is less driven by Indigenous NGOs and on more individualist terms. Focus has shifted somewhat from 'donors' towards 'supporters'. Aside from pursuing support from the UN, NGOs and government bodies, activists also chase clicks, likes, tweets, shares, online petition signatures and so forth. My aim, at that time, was to capture the indigenous rights discourse online and the Maasai pursuit of a

mobile indigenous identity. Throughout the course of this research project, the focus has shifted, and the overarching theme of this dissertation now questions the role of technologies in creating and redefining the mobility of the Maasai people. Technologies, both digital and human, were central to my research at the very start, but in doing netnographic research I was yet to find the right framework. Nevertheless, much of the work conducted at the beginning of this project was very relevant as it queried the use of communication technology in mobilizing the Maasai in the pursuit of their rights.

Most online conversations analysed for this chapter were observed on Facebook, on groups in which activists from both Kenya and Tanzania, despite their political realities and problems being acutely different, interact.[74] As discussed in the ethics section in Chapter 2, I consider Facebook groups to be in a grey area between the public and private domains. The reason behind this ambivalent stance is that most groups I conducted research on have a 'closed' status, or have admins who switch between statuses. Hence, group names have been changed to protect anonymity. Save the Serengeti Highway, on the other hand, is not a group but a page, and as such, publically accessible (so I have not changed the name). The decision to not give real names remains an ambivalent decision, because many research participants consider their activist work to be public work,

Increasingly, the petition platform Avaaz[75] has played an important role, provoking presidential tweets and millions of global signatures demanding Maasai not

[74] On Facebook there are groups and pages, one may 'like' a page and then post to it; however, posts not made by administrators land on the side with little visibility (and the chance to go viral) meaning discussions typically only arise under posts made by administrators. Groups have a more dynamic format, any member can post and a post is pushed to the top (or under a pinned post) whenever a comment is made. Groups provide more interactive user content. Group administrators may, however, remove members' posts and exclude members.

[75] http://www.avaaz.org/en/save_the_maasai_sam/

to be displaced from 'ancestral lands'.[76] Spearheading this debate, when I started my research, were Maasai indigenous rights activists. Since then, and with the proliferation of smart phones in ordinary households, this has become more and more of a 'democratic' debate. 'Ordinary' herders, mamas, elders, high school students and other members of Maasai society join protests not only on the ground, but also through global debates about the rights of the indigenous. This chapter discusses both the online mobilization for a higher degree of autonomy and the networking that takes place on the ground. The netnographic research engages with both Kenyan and Tanzanian struggles (and outsiders supporting the Maasai), fieldwork on the ground is narrowed down to the District of Ngorongoro (that is to the NCA and to Loliondo). The netnographic research has created opportunities for comparisons, highlighting discrepancies both in 'debating culture' and in socio-political realities that Maasai on both sides of the border find themselves experiencing.

8.2. On becoming indigenous

In 1989, Moringe Ole Parkipuny (†2014), a Maasai human rights activist and parliamentarian from Tanzania, addressed the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations in a landmark speech for African Indigenous rights activists. Being the first African to represent 'indigenous African communities', his cause remains questioned, even today, not only by authorities throughout Africa, but also by prominent Western indigenous rights activists (such as Martinez, 1995) who refutes the idea that African minorities should be given special recognition or a voice in the

[76] A commentary on the tweet from a Maasai of Arash village, Loliondo, Ngorongoro: http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/OpEd/comment/-/434750/2539350/-/item/0/-/pvemtbz/-/index.html

international indigenous rights movement. Since the time of Parkipuny's historic speech, Maasai in both Tanzania and Kenya have started to position themselves increasingly as indigenous, resulting in the Maasai becoming an influential force within the global indigenous rights movement. According to 'Cultural Survival', an indigenous rights advocacy group that boldly promotes and defends the Maasai as indigenous, there is no universal working definition of who is indigenous and who is not.[77]

The United Nations has not adopted an official definition but does have a working definition that highlights self-identification, cultural distinctiveness and having profound ties to a specific land or territory are markers of indigeneity.[78] Motivations for 'becoming indigenous' for many Maasai is the land right claim that inherently follows the claim of indigeneity. If Maasai are indigenous to Maasailand, then the Maasai can claim the right to reside there without being evicted, or they can regain the land they have lost. This chapter shows that the fight for recognition, as an indigenous minority, is not over but is starting to blossom once more and that the Internet plays a crucial role in the new wave of indigenous rights advocacy. At the Paris 2015 Conference of Parties of the United Nations Climate Change, for instance, a delegation of Maasai indigenous rights activists from Kenya and Tanzania addressed world leaders on their land rights struggle through the Indigenous Peoples' Pavilion of the International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change.[79]

Parkipuny's appeal, the first international one of its kind, is replicated hundreds of times each day on Facebook towards a growing international community of supporters and anti-Maasai activists. Posts, such as the one by Saidimu, are often

[77] https://goo.gl/KsjIn6
[78] http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/5session_factsheet1.pdf
[79] http://www.eturbonews.com/66463/land-conflicts-distract-tourism-development-leading-tourist-park

reactions to online attacks on Maasai and the partial anonymity offered by the web leads to arguments being more poignant, more aggressive and more extreme; this may well be one possible reason why the Internet is reviving the discourse of indigeneity. Recurring arguments in the discussions of Facebook group forums have been based on the idea of mobility as being a key argument concerning why Maasai are indigenous to 'Maasailand'.

Maasailand, as a 'moving landscape' (Chapters 3 and 7), has been territorialised from the pre-colonial times until today. By territorialized, I mean that it has been utilized by humans. Raids on other cultural groups or between Maasai sections as well as negotiations between groups as shared land use between Maasai and agriculturalists have led to (albeit fragile) alliances of mutual benefit (Galaty, 1993). In colonial and post-colonial times, game reserves, national parks, long-term leases of mining grounds, semi-industrial farming, sharp increases in human population and a national border have added to the complexity of land use. Inhabitants relating to this land, through a mobile way of life, are marginalised and forced to rethink and reposition their relationship towards land, even adapting their imaginaries towards a conceptual approach that harbours notions of 'ownership', 'claiming' and a romanticization of lost land, such as the Serengeti.

The Maasai are increasingly pressured and risk losing their land. This makes different Maa speaking sections cooperate against those who question the Maasai's right to land. On the note of cooperating against outsiders, Gupta and Ferguson (1992:11) write that, 'Territoriality is thus reinscribed at just the point it threatens to be erased.' In the Maasai case, this spurs an indigenous rights movement and a stressing of distinct and unique cultural values; spatial meanings are re-established and 'ancestral' bonds to land claimed. A unified culture is presented to the world, as

opposed to one that is and has always been in flux with sections at war with each other. The politics behind identity formation in opposition to oppressing stakeholders work to unify the Maasai as one people group, one culture, as opposed to a set of Maa speaking factions. This becomes clear with cases such as the Ilkunono, a Maa dialect speaking group, considered by the Kenyan government to be a sub-clan of the Samburu, but who are not recognized by the Samburu for not keeping enough cattle and for 'bringing bad luck'. As such, they occupy a very liminal space in central Kenya, their attempts of seasonal migration made impossible by Samburu. Today, they are largely sedentary and without much livestock as they find themselves to be received in hostile ways if they migrate with cattle, with Samburu often refusing trade or chasing them away.

Ibrah, a junior elder and head of an organisation working to limit human/wildlife conflict and to promote indigenous led conservation efforts, explains, via

Facebook, when questioned on what technology is that, firstly, Saitoti is not a pure Maasai[80] and that the Ilkunono used to be the innovator clan of the Maasai, their duty developing new and better weapons and other technology; he also agreed that Saitoti had given me an interesting explanation, see chapter 1. They once held a well-respected place in Maasai society, also believed to be able to cast powerful spells. They are now considered a bad omen.[81] Although shunned by the Samburu, indigenous rights activists work to include the Ilkunono into Maa culture and society.

[80] Saitoti is allegedly only half Maasai. This usually means that one person does not like the other and tries to undermine their status as Maasai by declaring them to be impure.

[81] Hodgson briefly mentions the Ilkunono in regards to the Church (2005). I have not researched as to whether the liminal status of the Ilkunono is the influence of the Church, but would encourage anthropologists to seek out the reasons why certain clans and factions are considered more or less Maasai.

Ibrah considers the Ilkunono to be Maasai as do many activists.[82] The more Maa speaking people you include as Maasai, and the more you picture them as being one people and as having one culture, the bigger Maasailand appears to those appealed to for support for the 'the Maasai cause'.

Imaginaries of lost land, such as the Serengeti, are drawn upon to reinforce the idea of a past in which land was abundantly available and the Maasai moved freely through it (see Chapter 3). Imaginaries of place are powerful political technologies, tactically employed by those constructing them to unify a culture and, by activists, to represent the culture to the world as the culture that rightfully belongs to the land that is at stake of being taken. Imaginaries of belonging, and the ways they are represented to others, change in response to political circumstances. The approach taken by the Maasai to 'securing' or 'reclaiming' land is one that engages heavily with discourses concerning indigenous rights and even intellectual property rights. These frameworks clash with original notions of land use and traditions, yet they are heavily utilised by Maasai rights activists. The identity of the movement is imposed externally; it is formed in relation to a framework that has been set by the international community, an agenda borne out of a Western discourse on human rights and ownership. Activists present a version of the Maasai life-world, which appeals to Western imaginaries to the world.

Inevitably this, paired with activists often living as 'modern Maasai' in cities, leads to certain mistrust of activists by the Maasai. Senior elders advocating for Maasai rights (such as the founders or current members of the Pastoralist Council) maintain stances, such as: 'we have traditions; others, other Tanzanians, foreigners,

[82] http://goo.gl/RQ6tvN

they do not'. Alternatively, they express a sense of belonging in the Serengeti, paired with the experience of victimization by both colonial rule and the current government.

8.3. Facebook as a battlefield

Opposing stakeholders, such as many conservationists and their supporters, are also making use of digital social networking in claims to Maasai land. When I began netnographic fieldwork on 'Stop the Serengeti Highway', I came across extremely aggressive debates between Maasai activists demanding access to Serengeti land and the construction of a highway through the national park, white conservationists and tourists or people who want to travel to the Serengeti. Fans were unaware of the administrator's sympathies with big game hunting and the eviction of Loliondo Maasai for that purpose, so what I often saw on this page were entries by the administrators that were subtle manipulations and accusations against Maasai and how they ruin or murder Africa's wildlife; this. in turn, causes a storm of outrage among the supporters of the page and Maasai activists and a few supporters of Maasai, leading them to counter-attack.[83] I call to mind Nyamnjoh's work (2006), on negative stereotyping towards migrants in South Africa, and find that 'counteractivists' on Facebook express similar sentiments towards the Maasai with a (worldwide) bashing of Maasai gaining momentum as a counter-movement to the global support of Maasai indigenous causes. Through the 'Stop the Serengeti Highway' page, I came to find Maasai activists engaging in both wildlife-concerned forums, such as 'Stop the Serengeti Highway', and more internal indigenous or

[83] The main administrator of the page at the time was on the board of the infamous 'Dallas Safari Club', notorious for its auctioning of rhino hunting permits in Namibia.

pastoralist rights forums (who were Tanzanian in the main, though there are pages and groups intended both for Kenyan and Tanzanian users).

In 2011, Dorothy Hodgson noted the demise of the Maasai indigenous movement, given that activism was bearing little fruit, both internationally and among local authorities. Sifting through endless and tirelessly passionate threads on 'Stop the Serengeti Highway' and 'Kenyans 4 Wildlife', I came to believe that there was, in fact, a new rise of indigenous rights activism, perhaps not corresponding to the one Hodgson saw falling apart, but one which was much more alive and vital in many senses. It is lively, tense and interactive with messages instantly exchanged with those contesting the place and rights of the Maasai in Maasailand. This form of activism is open to anyone literate and equipped with a smart phone. Even though the network provider, Tigo, has rolled out Facebook even for old-fashioned phones, interactions remain text-message based, like M-pesa.

Through political mobilization online, the mobile identity of Maasai is being reaffirmed and a 'mobile indigeneity' concept is being spread. This concept challenges particular definitions of indigeneity, as synonymous to autochthony, which lie at the heart of the advocacy in question. An indigenous relation to land need not be a sedentary one. The arguments that I have observed doing netnographic research centre around an interpretation of indigeneity that is somewhat complex and sometimes contradictory. Pelican (2009) showcases why indigeneity in general is politically contested nationally and internationally, and is subject to local and national interpretations that can occasionally produce paradoxical outcomes. Indigeneity cannot rightly be framed in opposition to settlers, especially within the African indigenous movement (Hodgson 2002b). 'Mobile indigeneity' breaks with the understanding employed by British rule (Kenya 1985 -1963, Tanzania WWI -1961) in

setting up a Maasai reserve, the idea that 'traditionalist' cultures need to be protected and shielded from outside influences, sedentarized and immobilized (see Chapter 5).

The Internet amplifies hostile interactions between Maasai and 'conservationists'. Maasai often go as far as to argue that this system created the ecosystem of this land, that it is the nomadic herding of Maasai that enabled the 'Great Migration' of wildebeest and zebra across the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem; hence, their presence is pivotal for any conservationist efforts. Environmental arguments lie at the core of Facebook activism, with most pressure coming from people urging a displacement of Maasai for the benefit of animals. Maasai activists maintain that Maasai are one with Maasailand, that Maasai are one with conservation. Maasai are as indigenous as the animals that migrate through Maasailand and, hence, it is both their human right and an ecologic necessity that they be given access to what they see as their land. Participants readily drew animal metaphors: *'…Maasai young run back and forth like well-fed calves'* (popular poem), placing the Maasai as custodians and safe-holders of the land, above all (other) animals. Their pact with God is not to kill wild animals, other than for ritualistic purposes or in defence of cattle (see Chapter 4). Human life is not intrinsically more valuable than animal life and cattle even have a divine character, needing protection by the Maasai.

Seeing themselves as an integral part of the environment has come to be a central argument in defending land rights. This comes at a cost, both wittingly and unwittingly. The comparison of nomadic herding to the Great Migration coincides with tourism imaginaries of 'The Big Six'. The tourism imaginary stems from an idea of more primitive and animalistic versus advanced people. In Western discourses, human-animal comparisons have a dehumanising character (Santa Ana, 1999). Binaries between humans and animals are set up (Brandes, 1984). As Urton (1985)

argues, this stems from a problematic relation between the human and the animal, a schism ordering humans above animals. His studies on human-animal metaphors in indigenous cultures in South America find that human-animal metaphors can help in explaining social relations in societies.

Many activists wish there to be one Maasailand; few take it as far as advocating for a separate country, but at least for some form of autonomy, hardly anyone actually takes any steps to unify Maasai across the country border. On both sides, very little knowledge exists about what Maasai are actually doing, online or offline, to fight for indigenous rights or land rights. Most participants, in private messaging or in face-to-face interviews, wished to increase communication across the border, to the 'brothers and sisters', but actual contact is limited, at times strained. Tanzanian Maasai feel that they are being overrun or poorly understood by Kenyan Maasai who struggle more for political power and to buy or claim land, whereas in Tanzania the major topic is defending land you are living on from being leased out to foreign investors, such as hunting corporations or incorporated into the 'Serengeti National Park' or other government controlled areas. Often, the contact does take place between Tanzanian and Kenyan Maasai was initiated by non-Maasai activists defending Maasai against the 'conservationist lobby'. The persisting paradigm, also cutting across the sections dissected by the Kenyan-Tanzanian border, is that: 'Temperamentally, the Tanzanian Maasai tend to be calmer and slower than those in Kenya' (Saitoti, 1980:20). This is common stereotyping between Kenyan and Tanzanian societies at large, Tanzanians being peaceful but lazy and Kenyans as assertive and productive.[84]

[84] This stereotyping goes back to the very different agendas the founding fathers, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, of the two nation-states followed, the neo-liberal Kenya (independent in 1963) where ethnic identities were not challenged in favor of a nation-state identity and the socialist, Ujamaa Tanzania (independent in 1961).

The access to Facebook and to the Internet may be too low to imagine any large scale political uprising enabled by this technology (see chapter 7).[85] It has sparked political activism and it has also democratised it; in 2012 and 2014 there were heavy Maasai demonstrations at 'Klein's Camp' against Tanzania National Park Administration's plans to push the Klein's Gate past village land, that would probably have passed without much attention outside the Klein's Camp area, but with Facebook, Maasai and Maasai-supporters all over the world were sharing pictures and films from the demonstration and calling for action against evictions There is a new awakening of indigenous rights activism, facilitated in much the same way by Facebook.

In May 2012, I travelled to Bonn in Germany to meet one of the activists, Saringe, a young, educated Maasai with a leading role in a local Tanzanian pastoralist NGO. He was at the United Nations conference on issues of climate change to promote the interests of indigenous groups. Addressing the strengths and weaknesses of Facebook activism, Saringe explained to me what he sees the four purposes of online activism as follows:

> *First, there is networking with people that you would otherwise not be able to communicate with, this also allows you to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of your allies and of your opponents, and connect with people from abroad, or with Kenyan Maasai.*
>
> *Second, you have exposure and instant sharing of information, the opportunity to engage in discussions and form opinions.*
>
> *Third, 'Cold fighting', because it allows your counterparts to know where you stand and use your information against you.*
>
> *Last, we need to better move from social media to the ground, using social media as a tool to become active in reality.*
>
> Fieldnotes, 16 May 2012

[85] I cannot speculate on how many Maasai households are online as I do not even know how many Maasai there are.

Problems for realizing the fourth purpose include facets of financial, physical distances, commitment and the fact that many Maasai are not online (or even literate for that matter) and cannot be reached through these debates. While Saringe, and many other Facebook activists, agree that Facebook helps to connect all Maasai to unite for the cause of defending their rights, everyone I interviewed had a different opinion on just how effective Facebook really is, how far messages are being spread and the extent to which information from the internet can be trusted. Benson, a junior elder from Narok involved in local politics, is confident that 'there are spies all over Facebook, but this must not scare us to share our message and make our voices as Maasai heard.' Perhaps the most vocal advocate of Kenyan Maasai, in the wake of the Kenyan elections, returned with cryptic messages on the Facebook community that were interpreted as signals that he had been kidnapped by the Secret Service. While Kenyan Maasai activists may get more notice online, Tanzanian activists say that they use Facebook for internal communication. It is not so much what the world thinks about the Maasai, it is about bringing change to communities in Tanzania, about educating fellow Maasai on their rights and how they can have their voices heard. Most Maasai are very unconcerned with what they post and how this could be used against them. One exiled Kenyan activist told me that yes, he knows he is being monitored, probably even what he writes in private messages, but he wants to show his enemies that he is not afraid and that they can come after him and his fellow Maasai; he wants to show that they have nothing to hide. Specifically, to this end, many activists (both Tanzanian and Kenyan) asked me that I do publish their names and their positions, which I will not do given the potential harm this could cause to their security.

8.4. International clicktivism and local activism

The international-to-local rapport alluded to in the closing section of the previous chapter, concerning Maasailand, is established via Facebook, YouTube[86], Vimeo[87], blogs[88], Twitter[89], crowd source initiatives and online petitions.[90] International-to-local is here understood as the process of activism that is globally transmitted, with key activists both on the ground and contributing on the Internet. Success is heavily reliant upon the capabilities of educated young Maasai activists to communicate in the jargon of indigenous rights discourse (Hodgson, 2011) and to induce imaginaries of a pure and noble lifestyle that is at peril. This is a balancing act. While within the indigenous rights discourse, activists will try to position their cultures as being 'progressive', the agency and right to decide the fate of one's own culture is also stressed. Micah White, one of Occupy Wall Street's most instrumental activists, refers to online activism as 'clicktivism' and defines it as 'the polluting of activism with the logic of Silicon Valley.'[91]

> Imaginaries of the 'noble savage' need to be upheld in order to communicate to an international audience of potential donors and

'clicktivists' of 'the Maasai cause'. The imaginaries often have little to do with the reality of Maasai life. This places a stress on the Maasai's allegedly peaceful relationship with nature and campaigns that succeed in appealing both to

[86] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7knZOEVxO0k; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opjPeX8kUIU
[87] https://vimeo.com/144043661
[88] http://silomasays.com/
[89] https://twitter.com/loitokitok
[90] http://www.avaaz.org/en/save_the_maasai/ ; https://vimeo.com/144006642#at=1;
[91] https://micahmwhite.com/clicktivism

environmentalists and human rights activists have the highest global impact, such as the Loliondo land grab campaign that reached global support through two separate campaigns, which had more than two million signatures each. Angela, an American who set up an NGO to mitigate human-wildlife conflict, complains that 'I keep sharing pictures of lions and Maasai and people keep liking and commenting and wanting more and more but none of them donate, they just like, what good does it even do when they're just liking and not supporting our cause'.

Activism is as commonly undertaken from within villages as it is online, with film clips of injustices snapped by everyone's mobile phone cameras: women practicing sit-ins, cattle being confiscated by park wardens, heavily armed security personnel shouting insults and pushing back crowds.[92] Although the success of activism depends upon the relationship between activists and communities, there are also discrepancies between the two. Given that activists mostly have a college education and often break age-set rules in terms of who has a political voice, they are often scorned by 'conservative' Maasai leaders. With the de-regulation of information access, younger generations are increasingly politically mobile and eager to challenge power relations within Maasai culture.

Maasai rights advocates are young, mostly male, educated and often living outside their traditional Maasai homes. Many are employed by NGOs or the UN and are married to non-Maasai or are raising children with little or no knowledge of Maa. They form a new elite, one not recognised by Maasai society but by the standards of Eastern African mainstream society, leading both to respect and scorn in Maasai society. They advocate for the survival of their ethnic minority and yet many find

[92] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iqP2MRuJ4Ac ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7knZOEVxO0k and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcOegPjhkn0

themselves and their cause to be challenged by elders or, rather, they challenge the power relations within Maasai society by forming a separate elite. They face challenges similar to those of transmigrants (Schrooten et al. 2016) who have to shift between different modus operandi and in between several networks, both local and global. Many advocates maintain that traditional leaders in the Ngorongoro use tradition as an excuse to withhold information and to remain in power. Powerful elders will discourage younger generations from using the Internet or mobile technologies extensively and yet they use these technologies themselves. Mobile technologies have become a game changer in the sense that they enable access to information that was traditionally restricted. For instance, ceremonial knowledge is shared through phone calls and video recordings and passed on to persons who would not know what the 'mystique' of the ritual entails. Additionally, general knowledge that extends beyond cultural particularities of the Maasai is readily available in cyberspace.

The relationship of the advocate towards his (or her) own culture is often contradictory. He may travel abroad and wear the traditional attire (*shuka*) at international conventions, or wander around Tokyo wearing it, but he wears a suit at home. He owns cattle, but he does not take care of them himself. He drives a Land Cruiser and owns a house in the city. Many advocates are successful cattle owners, as they buy and trade with foreign cattle and employ grazing and nurturing techniques that draw upon both tradition, but also the latest bio-technological scientific advancements. Despite the sometimes-hostile relation they have towards their own culture, the Maasai community are as reliant upon the advocate or 'keyboard warrior' as the inverse. Close ties to the communities provide the material necessary to organize global crowdsourcing, getting an article published in The Guardian or the

delivery of petitions to the President of Tanzania. The community depends upon the advocate to reach a wide audience and the advocate depends upon the cooperation of the community for a successful career. Yet, the advocate's position is disruptive to traditional systems of power and, hence, the advocate is subject to both scorn and admiration at the same time. Hodgson (1999) interviewed senior elders who were both sceptical and approving of younger Maasai who moved beyond customary Maasai life. These elders reported how the spear is being replaced by the pen. With 21st century activists, it is the keyboard that is replacing the pen. Yet, not all activism is carried out this way and female protest in terms of 'sit-ins' or 'walk-aways' have a long-standing history.

Men and women protest differently. Men demand their rights, start petitions, travel to conferences. Female protest has long taken the form of sit-ins, a quiet matter carried out in groups and not alone (Hodgson, 2011). Women will also stand up and walk away, collectively, when disagreeing with someone speaking (at political rallies or meetings). This can be humiliating, especially if the speaker is a person of authority and the audience is divided in half. Educated young women are not necessarily changing the boundaries; instead, they are reinventing female protest and emancipation. With wildlife management being the most popular university course taken by men, often followed by a career in tour guiding, Maasai women pick social sciences in order to become social workers or community project managers. The young women who are now (re-)integrating into Maasai society after finishing their degrees, work to change culture from within, work to promote education, women's rights and issues of self-empowerment.

Meeting two of these young female rights activists, two sisters, was one of the few times I encountered the expectation to behave like a woman, rather than a man.

Both had just graduated with social science degrees and had returned home; their willingness to serve the men and to maintain the strict cultural separation was strong. Quickly, they took me into another house in which they had me rid their MacBook's of viruses and malfunctions that, for some reason, they assumed I would be capable of. The two women then showed me clips from their universities, style-selfies, Maasai gospel videos and some of the latest US TV series. They maintained how they wanted to change the perspectives Maasai girls have, quoting feminist theory whilst a TV show based on fashion in LA played on the MacBook. The MacBooks were gifts from admirers; accepting these gifts did not clash with their feminist outlook, a gift is merely a gift. Advocating for women's rights, they immersed themselves in the traditional roles of women, trying to influence women directly and hardly bothering with the men. 'Will you marry a Maasai?' I asked them. 'No! No never' was the resolute answer one of the girls gave me; the younger sister responded: 'maybe, if he respects me and that I have a job.'

8.5. The Loliondo conflict

Loliondo is a large area within the Ngorongoro District (not to be mistaken with the NCA).[93] Loliondo borders the NCA, the Serengeti National Park and Kenya. Lake Natron, East Africa's only breeding spot for the lesser flamingo (this is relevant as there are conservation stakes to the area), as well as Ol Donyo Lengai, the mountain of God, an active volcano, are all parts of the ragged landscape of Loliondo. Given its religious significance, one could that argue it is the very heart of Maasailand. Loliondo is home to over 100,000 Maasai. Several agricultural people-groups also

[93] https://sema.fzs.org/files/cache/6f7fa093c968a510b1529d07d696cee2_f1631.jpg like most Maasailand maps this one is concerned with wildlife routes.

reside in Loliondo. The Serengeti's 'Great Migration' passes through Loliondo land and it is the preferred destination for hunting-tourists. Loliondo is a highly sought-after area in terms of luxury tourism. Luxury safari outfitters, particularly, take their clients up to Loliondo as it is more secluded. Two large 'land grabs' took place in Loliondo in the late 1990s; Thompson safaris purchased a lease on land previously held by Tanzanian Breweries and the Ortello Business Corporation (OBC) obtained land from the Tanzanian government for hunting purposes, thereby evicting Maasai in the process.

The OBC is controlled by members of the Dubai royal family, who frequently hunt in the area. OBC-controlled land is guarded by a private militia, cars drive with Dubai license plates and cell phone reception welcomes visitors to the U.A.E. The land is, de facto, in the hands of the royal family of Dubai and is not controlled by the Tanzanian state.[94] Maasai herders, including children, trespassing have been shot, cattle have been confiscated and activists claim that police in Loliondo are 'owned' by the OBC. A large airfield is operated on OBC land and jets are rumoured to fly in without registering with customs at airports that do have these services. If you move on OBC land, you are in the Emirate of Dubai, not in Tanzania.

OBC land notwithstanding, conflict over areas controlled by Thompson Safaris, a major Tanzanian/American tour operator, have also caused major controversy. Thompson claims to have obtained land legally from Tanzanian Breweries, yet most of Loliondo residents maintain that this was not the case and that the Tanzanian state stole the land and gave it to Thompson. Tanzania has a land lease system, meaning that all land belongs to the Tanzanian state and is leased out. Tanzanian Breweries never evicted Maasai from herding on the land. When the lease was sold to

[94] http://africageographic.com/blog/maasai-locked-out-of-loliondo/

Thompson, however, they decided not to allow grazing. Thompson does have Maasai supporters and these supporters tweet, blog, Facebook or give interviews in favour of Thompson and its charity work in the region. According to Susanna Nordlund, a Maasai rights activist who writes a blog on Thompson and the OBC, these supporters also operate online, under fake accounts, trying to befriend and influence both foreigners and Maasai or by penetrating closed discussion forums, spying on the activists campaigning against Thompson.[95] She maintains that Thompson supporters have been bribed by Thompson. The Maasai are not allowed to herd cattle on Thompson land, and at least one instance of alleged trespassing resulted in a shooting.[96]

Since 2011, the OBC has been trying to acquire more land totalling 5,000 km^2 – for their hunting purposes; effectively, this would disenfranchise 40,000 Maasai from their grazing grounds. The deal between the OBC and the Tanzanian government would set up a 'wildlife corridor' for the benefit of alleged conservation efforts and OBC interests. Livestock grazing would be prohibited. In recent years, indigenous rights activists have been fighting the plans at both the local and international levels. The deal has fallen through a number of times, only to be frequently revived. In 2014, the case gained its largest international media coverage when an article in The Guardian claimed that eviction was acutely in mind and that villagers would be given less than 13 British pounds per person as compensation for their imminent eviction.[97] After the article made headlines, Avaaz and hundreds of other news outlets spread the details of the eviction plan across the globe.

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[95] http://termitemoundview.blogspot.com

[96] Susanna is a Swedish Maasai rights activists who blogs passionately about Loliondo on: http://termitemoundview.blogspot.com, her last post, entitled: 'trespassing into Tanzania', lead to her being locked up in different prisons for several days.

[97] http://goo.gl/aVh7my

The Guardian article, which ran with the headline: 'Tanzania accused of backtracking over sale of Maasai's ancestral land' included a quote from Samwel Nangiria, an outspoken indigenous rights activist:

> *'I feel betrayed,' said Samwel Nangiria, coordinator of the local Ngonett civil society group. 'One billion [the total compensation offered to the entire community, in Tanzanian shilling] is very little and you cannot compare that with land. It's inherited. Their mothers and grandmothers are buried in that land. There's nothing you can compare with it.' Nangiria said he believes the government never truly intended to abandon the scheme in the Loliondo district but was wary of global attention. 'They had to pretend they were dropping the agenda to fool the international press.'*

Samwel Ngangiria appeals to readers by stating that the land has special meaning because it is where the Maasai bury their ancestors. While the idea that land cannot be given away or compensated for is true in Maasai culture, land is not sacred because of the burial of people's forefathers. Traditionally, the Maasai do not even bury their dead. A dead body is left for the hyenas. Earth is God-given and burying a human underneath the Earth poisons something divine. Bodies are disposed of as soon as they turn cold. Yet, Ngangiria chooses the wording because this appeals to a Western audience. In many texts written for an international audience words like 'ancestral' or 'sacred burial grounds' appear and they appeal to this, largely Western, group because they have been sensitised by Native American indigenous rights, and can grasp the spiritual importance of a place of burial as it carries meaning in Western religions too.

Baptista (2014) writes that the empowerment of a group happens where they engage in the value system of those with the intention of empowering themselves. What follows as self-representation is an invention of history that addresses the expectations of this broader, world community from which support can be gathered. The empathy levels are enhanced as imagining oneself in the Maasai's position

becomes easier. In the same fashion, internal imaginaries around landscapes with restricted access, such as the Serengeti or parts of Loliondo, are vehicles of the Maasai desire to reclaim what was lost, to strengthen pride and to reinforce a bond to Maasailand. Loliondo is presented as belonging to the Maasai. While Loliondo is Maasailand, the international community is unaware of the strong presence of a variety of other people groups in the area, some pushed aside by the Maasai themselves, others are affected by the evictions in the exact same way as the Maasai. Some inhabitants of Loliondo are
Ujamaa settlers, whilst others trace their roots to Loliondo from long before the Maasai arrived in the area.

The issue with the Loliondo campaign specifically, and with Avaaz in general, is its oversimplification of very long, drawn-out processes. When news circulation regarding the eviction peaked, a generic, anonymously created Avaaz campaign generated more support than the one created by Maasai elders. The issue was framed as though the evictions were just about to happen, as though none of this had been known to anyone beforehand. The campaign was based on rumours about increased visits by government officials to Loliondo and not on anything concrete. Finally, the Avaaz saga unfolded much like a fast-food version of an indigenous rights battle; the President of Tanzania tweeted that no Maasai would be removed from their ancestral land. The tweet was taken as proof that the Avaaz campaign had worked; Avaaz spokespeople were quick to formulate that the Internet had given the Maasai a powerful tool to connect with the world and succeed in their cause.

Global media attention died down almost instantly and many Maasai even believed that they had won the fight. First, one has to understand that Loliondo is not recognised as indigenous or as consisting of ancestral Maasai land. The only land with

special status is the NCA. Therefore, the President never tweeted any assurance regarding Loliondo. Secondly, a tweet is not a formal document. Tanzanian elections were coming up and the CCM risked losing its otherwise strong support within Maasai communities (see 4.6). The OBC plans may have been, at best, delayed. While activists on the ground are very aware of these issues, the international support and attention is now close to zero. Drumbl (2012) characterises the biggest flaws of 'clicktivism' being the short attention span of 'clicktivists' and the limited shelf life of online campaigns.

In negotiating land rights and protecting 'ancestral' lands, Gardner (2012) finds that Maasai in Ngorongoro place faith in market-based solutions and view the issues of land grabbing predominately as a battle between community and the state. He further distinguishes between private tourism and conservation initiatives, between communities and tour operators and, where the state is involved as an actor, characterizing transactions that involve the state as being bad for communities, while private initiatives offer promise. The neo-classical tone in Gardner's articles (2012) is different from the analysis by Hodgson (1999). The battle for what many activists call 'the Maa Nation' or the 'Maasai Kingdom' (if not simply Maasailand) is often framed as a battle for economic and political autonomy, As a struggle for liberation. Moreover, the traditional stronghold of the socialist CCM party within Maasailand is fading with the uprising of politically conservative and economically neoliberal Chadema.

8.6. Negotiating and justifying territorial claims

The Tanzanian state has chosen to view indigenous land tenure as dysfunctional and incompatible with any 'modern' schemes. This view is fuelled both by certain development organizations and by conservationists. Today, the largest competing stakeholder in land rights in Maasailand is the tourism sector. In a country with weak and shifting land rights, persuading both the other and oneself that one is the rightful caretaker of a particular place becomes especially imperative. Hence, one of the most important strategies in defending Maasai territory is by cajoling other interest groups that the land belongs to the Maasai.

The activist needs to both assert his (or, in the rare case, her) position in the Maasai community, by investing in Maasailand, by making it seem like him (often) leaving Maasailand was a decision made for the benefit of the Maasai community and that he is, in fact, successful in the city (regardless of whether he really is or not). Activists need to take the fact that it is a complex crowd when they are appealing for land use rights into account. The government, conservationists, Foreign Direct Investors, NGOs and foreign aid organizations, tourists and indigenous rights activists, from other parts of the world, all play into the equation and are all stakeholders in what the Maasai can do and on which pieces of land. Each group has a different interest or agenda that needs to be accommodated. What is omitted in appealing to interest groups is that, be it during precolonial, colonial or postcolonial times, traditional land tenure was never a non-violent system. As recently as the early 1990s, the Datoga were evicted from a village near Nainokanoka, and chased down to the basin of the rift valley. Land tenure has always been contested.

As examined in the introduction and in Chapter 3, the NCA is unique in terms of land rights and tenure. It is the only land in a country that has no private land

ownership, and which is technically owned by Maasai, although their rights to use the land are heavily impeded and monitored. The Tanzanian state firmly views any indigenous land tenure systems to be dysfunctional and has succeeded in ending most of them through *Ujamaa* (see Chapter 1). Constant pressure from the state gives the activists an ideological arsenal by which to affirm their position as precarious and in need of international support. Much of the research on (indigenous) land rights in Africa focuses on conflicts induced by colonialism, post-colonialism or anything researchers choose to coin 'neoliberalism' (i.e., Hogdson, 1999; 2001; 2011). Yet, conflicts (between Maasai, the state, private concessions and other people groups) regarding exactly what constitutes Maasailand are centuries deep, just as the racism and distrust by other Tanzanians (and Kenyans) is not merely a colonial construct, but is actually based on a long history of dispute. Surely, colonial officials greatly aided in drawing up and deepening ethnic lines, but a discourse blaming any set of issues on colonialism is a romanticization and gross simplification of the pre-colonial situation. You cannot claim to be the first settlers in a region believed to be the cradle of mankind; you migrate into it, and then you push other people groups out on your way.

The construction of imaginaries of Maasailand are central to cementing Maasai identity and belonging in disputed areas, both as internal and external technologies of power. Although colonial archival notes, academic research and Maasai narratives support a wide network of engagement with other people groups and high historical mobility, there are few and very blurry narratives concerning where the Maasai came from (Berntsen, 1980). Maasai narratives are wide open to speculation and disputation. This is because no collective memory of practices of remembrance point to a precise area; no imaginaries of landscapes go beyond what is known as Maasailand today. Furthermore, with the cultural importance of the passing down of

stories or myths of origin, each narrator tells his or her story in their own unique way. Although no line of passing down stories is isolated, people share and sync their versions with each other; still, with each individual who tells an oral story, a unique perspective is passed on and interpreted in a unique way by the next individual.

While many of the moral narratives on right-to-land are based on divine rights, for Maasai, the divine right is not land, it is cattle. Herding cattle in semi-arid drylands, however, demands access to vast areas. Cattle were given to the Maasai by God and it is in their solitary possession. Any other groups with cattle are not legitimate owners of cattle and the Maasai may repossess these cattle. While several sites in Maasailand bear strong religious meaning, the right to land is primarily a necessity based on the right to cattle. It is secondary to the right to cattle in the sense that it is not quite divine for the well-being of the herd, but it is equally important. As demonstrated comprehensively in Chapter 4, a Maasai is not a Maasai without cattle and without land.

Maasailand is tenured by, to quote Geisler and Daneker (2000), a 'bundle of owners'. There are several layers of rights on using land and several stakeholders who are granted access to the same land (agriculturalists, hunter-gatherers, other pastoralists, safari companies, etc.). Ideally, the authority on settling issues in a customary tenure system is negotiated by elders and leaders from the different groups. Maasai elders will argue that, without state presence in negotiations, peace negotiations in and around the NCA has led to working compromises. Datoga or Iraqw settlers maintain that the Maasai had the ultimate authority and often took land by force, the spear being the authority. For Maasai, it is widely regarded as immoral not to share, not to allow others to come and take when the need to, so that you can come and take what you need in times when you need it. This philosophy has

arguably aided in keeping Maasailand a fluid, organic landscape with disputes with other groups over subsistence usage being relatively contained.

Dispute over subsistence usage by Maasai in times of need is what led to the torching of a Ndarakwai ranch in 2014. The prestigious conservationist project in West Kilimanjaro was burned to the ground after a long dispute during which Maasai demanded they use the land to graze. The British owners had erected high fences and would chase out any herders. In times of drought, the conflict reached its boiling point which culminated in the total destruction of the lodge. The owners took pride, on their website, in saying how they had saved the land from Maasai herders; the text was taken down shortly after the torching. They maintained that they had required the land legally from the state of Tanzania; the Maasai maintained that it was their ancestral land, but that they would tolerate the wildlife ranch under certain conditions. A similar dispute was resolved on the grounds of what is set to become a multi-billion dollar university outside Arusha. The 'Aga Khan Foundation' is building a large international university on the grounds. After fences had been erected, the Maasai started cutting them down. Eventually, an agreement was reached that the caretakers of the university grounds would throw over bales of hay.

Both literature and policy-making in late colonial and post-colonial times regarding indigenous land tenure regimes are contradictory (Hodgson 2000). Lentz argues that academic literature has overemphasised stability and harmony, whilst most scholars (Galaty, 1994; Hodgson, 2001) maintain that the debate was wrongly skewed towards the 'tragedy of commons' and to other Western assumptions. It is safe to say that much of the debate has been based on questionable hypotheses, such as the 'tragedy of the commons', political agendas and urges to over-romanticise the past. Additionally, there are poor, generally accepted definitions of what customary or

indigenous land tenure really means, and there is little flexibility in these understandings. The indigenous rights discourse and international online outlets, like Avaaz, connect activists to other interest groups and provide activists with a powerful toolkit for social networking. Yet, it remains a set of tools, an instrument that can be re-worked in various ways that may not necessarily accurately reflect the situation as it is lived. Land disputes essentially become disputes in who can better persuade the audience, such as the Loliondo case and the case of the presidential tweet.

Maasai land claims highlight the imperative nature of mobility and access to the immobile resource necessary to being mobile, namely land. The ability and potential to be mobile is referred to as motility. Kaufman et al (2004) also call motility the capital to be mobile. Motility is spread out unevenly across societies and is sometimes heavily restrained (Salazar and Smart 2011). This presents participants, in today's discourse, with conflicting and contradictory arguments and narratives because land relates to herding in a mobile way (see Chapters 3 and 4). The cow is at the centre, the cow comes first, the land, life, revolves around the cow. The cow is the immobile resource, the pillar, and everything else relates to the cow in a mobile way. The landscape moves and shifts and the herd is that with which you stay.

8.7. This will get likes and shares: 'Ancestral burial grounds'

The activist has to orient him or herself to a powerful meta-narrative of the immobile native, the first-comer, the indigene rooted in place, described, most poignantly I believe, by Malkki (1992:30). She writes that '…it is hard not to see this very heroization – fusing faraway people with their forests – may have the effect of animalizing while it spiritualizes. Like 'the wildlife' the indigenous are an object of

enquiry and imagination not only for the anthropologist but for naturalist, environmentalist and the tourist'. I would like to add the 'clicktivist' and the international supporter of the indigenous rights cause to this list. Ironically perhaps, indigenous rights activists regularly contradict or ignore traditional land usage in trying to secure land for their people. Customary land use schemes may not make sense or appeal to this international audience, and its definitions of place and belonging also because the Maasai were, more often than not, not 'the first'. The first nation argument, however, is central to the working definition of indigeneity. This is a definition completely at odds with the people inhabiting and using up to 25% of the world's land mass (Blench, 2001) - the world's pastoral people who are, across the world, from the Mongol empire to the African steppe, known as warrior groups who both raid and evict and form alliances with other people groups using the same land.

Pastoral grazing does not require absolute ownership of land. On the contrary, mixed land use may be beneficial to all stakeholders for the regeneration of land. By stakeholders, I mean pastoral, agricultural, hunter-gatherer groups and wildlife. The discourse on indigenous land use and ownership make it very hard not to lobby for an absolute claim to land over a temporal, mobile one. The framework that has been given to Maasai activists is defined by a discourse that largely 'out-of-place' (see Chapter 3) in Maasailand. This frame of reference is rather narrow and is defined by a largely Western, and to lesser extent Eastern and Oriental (Said, 1978) discourse, on land rights, belonging and indigeneity. Activists need to present a culture that is sufficiently distinct, but one which is still relatable. Self-other relations remain a question of power and rhetoric (Clifford, 1988).

On social media, power relations are set by a largely Western hegemony on history and culture require a tweaking of the indigenous narrative. One such

'tweaking', recently displayed across international media, was a construct spread by several activists in interviews as well as a group of *mamas* who had participated in a filmmaking workshop. The message was, like the presented in the Guardian article (analysed in the previous section) or Avaaz campaign, that Loliondo is an ancestral burial land. It is especially appealing to international crowds when 'sacred grounds' are destroyed. That the Maasai do not actually share this Western (and Native American) understanding of ancestral sacristy is willingly omitted. Instead, land is sacred because cattle, who have a divine component, are herded on it, not because of ancestors, but this is hard to explain in a short interview or Avaaz campaign for which 'sacred ancestral land' invokes greater sympathy and understanding.

Additionally, the international press have touted the Loliondo campaign as championing Maasai women's rights.[98] It has been framed as an awakening of the female voice, with men at first having been passive in terms of advocacy. The Pastoralist Women's council, spearheaded by Maanda Ngoitiko, is presented as being the key defender of the Maasai's land rights campaign in the area.[99] Although Ngoitiko is a crucial voice in Loliondo, the female narrative is pushed and favoured by the press and development agencies.[100] The emphasis on women in defending Loliondo is another example of framing an indigenous rights struggle from a perspective that appeals to those who 'like', 'click', 'share', 'tweet' and donate. Just like the 'sacred' burial grounds, the international crowd of donors and 'clicktivists' can empathize with the narrative of women rising up.

The lack of maps and clear territorial boundaries has led to interpretations, such as Goody's (1969), that pre-colonial governmental forces demonstrated power that

[98] http://www.vice.com/read/casualties-of-conservation-0000649-v22n5
[99] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUt9HH_Lcq8
[100] https://vimeo.com/144006642

‘tended to be over people rather than land’ and, thus, Africans not being rooted in physical space. Bohannan & Bohannan (1967) and Colson (1963) have examined how claiming and taking ownership of land must have been ideas planted onto African people groups by colonialists, which they derive from their ethnographic research. However, if neither sons nor land can be given away, then this logic does not entirely apply to one of the most mobile people groups in Africa. A working-hypothesis, in indigenous land tenure policy to explain the claiming of territory, is that specific land has religious meaning. Land embedded with spiritual meaning can be seen as legitimate and, as an outsider, one can more easily sympathize with concepts like ancient burial grounds and spirits living on the land. In his interview, Samwel comes back to this notion and so do the women in the video. A religious claim is more sympathetic than one based on autarchy, political power or competition over resources.

Territorial disputes cannot and must not be romanticised by scholars. This is not to say that a land claim based on political or economic interests is any less legitimate. Competition over resources is a process that goes well beyond colonialism and is not a neoliberal idea planted by alien capitalist imperialists, as suggested by Hodgson (1999, 2011). To understand conflicts and debates, instead of denying indigenous notions on property, we must rethink the ways in which property and land rights and land access are framed. Rather than thinking from a Western, grossly mislabelled to be a neoliberal perspective, the often-elaborate local discourses must be accepted as the framework from which to debate land access.

8.8. Concluding remarks

This chapter has explored social media as a communication technology that enable dialogue with Maasai and non-Maasai on mobilizing for indigenous rights. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, 'the network was there before'; this is true also for the social network, social media use, shifting and to an extent reviving existing networks rather than creating new ones. The activist, though often connected to indigenous NGO organisations, can be anyone with a smart phone. He or she also becomes a 'clicktivist' and next to donors, they also appeal to people 'liking' and 'sharing' and 'clicking', adopting language and rhetoric that appeals to the supporters of the international indigenous rights cause.

Few indigenous rights activists live traditional rural lives. However, all participants interviewed maintain a strong bond to *Oloshoo*, validating their roots and their positionality as indigenous (rights activists) by keeping a large number of livestock or by preaching the importance of the Maasai people to remain 'whole'. Lentz (2013) reports that first-comer narratives are important when a people group claim ownership or belonging to a certain land, and gives examples both from the US and West Africa. Whilst the Maasai do often adopt this strategy, it is common to focus on a discourse of who is best suited to make use of specific land, much like early settler rhetoric in the United States, South Africa, or Australia. In Maasailand, this kind of rhetoric stems not from an imperialist vision to conquer unchartered territory, but in dialogue with a very different kind of activist who also lays claims to Maasailand: The conservationist.

No matter what research topic I inquire about, be it with activists or educated elders, any in-depth conversation or interview leads to the participants justifying their right to land with their being the best guardians thereof, with the ideologically loaded

notion of the ‘first conservationists’. Imaginaries are drawn up by research participants that make Maasai the perfect wildlife guardians. The debate at present strongly influences imaginaries of the past. These are more than stories told to foreigners; these are, to certain extent, beliefs shared within the community. Imaginaries are powerful technologies in asserting belonging to a place. Much of Maasailand was agricultural land or hunter-gatherer land before it was conquered by Maasai, or was land which was shared with agricultural and hunter-gatherer groups. Pastoralism is considered to be a more sustainable practice in conserving the environment than agriculture is. When arguing from an emotional perspective, pastoralism is also an ideological arsenal because it is deemed to be more peaceful than hunting, even if bush meat hunters take only what they need and for which they are heavily persecuted by conservationists, especially pro-hunting (against royalty fees) conservationists who were quick to spread the rumour that bushmeat hunters had started the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. The Maasai having abstained (almost completely) from hunting and high intensity or invasive agriculturalism has largely contributed to a peaceful coexistence and co-usage of land. Whether it be hunter-gatherers or agriculturalists, all have made efficient use of Maasailand at the same time.

Disputes regarding the use of land are nothing new. The paths through which they are navigated are shifting, and so are the technologies that mediate them. Social media platforms give rise to a new form of activism, or ‘clicktivism’, and novel ways of engaging in land rights discourse in Maasailand. Often, the activist needs to bend the Maasai cause to fit with what an international audience would like to hear. Whilst for the Maasai, it is cattle that are sacred and God-given, and land is the mobile entity from which one borrows, dialogue with an international audience leads to a reframing

of the needs and demands of the Maasai. Land that is otherwise simply and pragmatically needed to herd cattle, because these certain areas of land are well-fit for herding cattle, becomes sacred ancestral burial grounds even though burying ancestors is not a widespread Maasai activity. The dialogue with the international donor-crowd or 'clicktivists' frames land within a sedentary discourse and understanding of what it means to have land or be in-place. It remains to be seen just how efficient social media is to the Maasai indigenous rights cause as it gives a voice and channel to some, but silences others. This chapter answers the research question by focusing on social media platforms as communication technology. It has shown how the Maasai mobilize for *Oloshoo* and indigenous and land rights, and by doing so, their own potential for being mobile (motility) by means of social media as a communication platform. I have shown how the discourse is framed and adjusted to fit the expectations of Maasai culture that non-members, specifically those which potential donors and external 'clicktivists', possess.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1. Re-examining 'What is new about what has always been'

Throughout this dissertation I have explored the research question: how are human mobility practices continuously constructed and (re-)produced, through communication technology, in dialogue with members of a cultural group, and in its reaction to non-members? The objectives of this dissertation were to study the cultural processes at the interstices between communication, technology and mobility, and the imaginaries shaped therein, and to examine 'what is new about what always has been' in regards to communication, technology and mobility. The usage of communication technologies was examined in relation to how mobility and intricate social networks have played a decisive role in 'place-making'. To be mobile, one needs place. I will come back to this argument in the closing section of this chapter, and in criticizing some of the developments in mobility studies. Maasailand is a moving place, imbued with meaning through cattle, which are God-given, whilst the land is something from which one borrows. This places cattle as the stable entity with both land and culture revolving around cattle.

Coming to Ngorongoro with the aim of studying 'Maasai mobility' (see the opening remarks) it quickly became clear to me that I had to de-construct the discourses that shape mobility. Communication is central to understanding the implications for Maasai regarding being mobile or immobile (or considered as such by others). I began studying how mobility/immobility is discursively labelled and how these concepts are mediated, locally and globally. I examined the intricate social networks of human but also and human-animal communication that shape Maasai mobilities. This entailed the realization that technology mediates mobility and that I

had to change the ways in which I had perceived technology up until that moment. I frame technology in the broader anthropological sense of techniques, skills and practices and not just devices, which brings the question whether new technologies are always socially-transformative innovations, or build on what was there before. Analysing the interactions between mobility, communication and technology I came to situate imaginaries at the interstice and analyse their role in the meaning-making of place and mobility.

'What is new about what always has been?' the title asks, and to conclude this dissertation in social and cultural anthropology, I will evaluate the question in relation to the key concepts that the dissertation has examined. Technologies, in the Maasai case study, rather than being disruptive to culture (a stereotype I had prior to doing fieldwork, see opening remarks) build upon well-established and historically influenced practices (Chapters 4, 7 and 8). Technologies, by its ancient Greek definition, are a systematic treatment of skills, such as herding, or knowledge production, a task senior elders and women (mothers) are entrusted with (Chapter 4). Lull's buzzword 'communication age' or Castells's (1996) 'information age', as characterizing the advent of the 21st century, are problematic concepts indeed. I argue this because these notions create the idea that there is a rupture between what has been and what is (i.e., the so-called communication or information age). I conclude that regarding the two as separate entities, which I implicitly did before my fieldwork (see 1.1.) when I viewed 'technology' as culture-altering gadgets, is a mistake. Similarly, the quote from my father '(…) Technology is the application of science. What the Maasai are doing is not technology, it's a pre-stage of technology, you have to write that! Make a distinction!' (see 1.3.4.) is based on what I view as a misconception. I believe this dissertation has shown that the relation between cultural systems and

practices is constructed and reproduced continuously throughout time with the aid of technology. Additionally, I hope to have shown there are, as Clifford (1988) argues, multiple futures, multiple modernities.

It takes pre-existing technologies to infuse meaning to newer technologies and while culture in itself is ever changing and evolving (Chapter 6), the use of technology is reflective of cultural processes (Chapter 7). A fusion of customary knowledge and mobile communication technology serves to enable human mobility practices. As Emmanuel's Facebook status, introduced in chapter 1 (section 3.1.), reminds us, *'The type of a person u want to be is a person of yesterday who will live tomorrow SUCCESS IS NEVER AN ACCIDENT'.* The status reveals an aspiration to innovate based on respecting the past. This is very much reflective of the cultural processes examined in Chapter 6. Maasai culture is in motion, born and re-born, in constant relation to an (imagined) past. The past, or imaginaries thereof, shape place, imbuing place with meaning (Chapter 3), defining a culture of mobility in which it is the imaginary of a mobile past that shapes identity and culture rather than actual physical mobility. Mobility, as such, is a discursive construct (Frello, 2008). In the Maasai case, colonial writers and policy makers would alternate between two binaries to define and understand the Maasai, one framing them as nomadic, the other as sedentary. This confusing framework lingers on, and my non-Maasai research participants (other Tanzanians, people working at lodges or in conservation and tourists) struggled to make sense of the Maasai and were often left frustrated, seeing the Maasai as a stubborn people who refuse 'progress' or who live in the past. Rather than seeking dialogue with the Maasai they worked with, travelled with or encountered, a great many non-Maasai whom I met during fieldwork resorted to colonial staples to explain and rationalise their observations or interactions with

Maasai. Many Maasai would also resort to colonial stereotypes to make sense or to explain their culture, or to profit on their cultural distinctiveness.

Scholars who write about a 'mobilities turn' in the social sciences (Urry, 2007) subscribing themselves to the 'new mobilities paradigm' (Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006), may have forgotten that in the past, anthropologists and other scholars did pay attention to how human history is characterised by mobility (Salazar, 2016). I hope that this dissertation has shown that mobility, rather than being the condition characterizing 'modernity' (Adey, 2010), is and has always been culture-shaping and integral to human life. With regards to mobility studies, the Maasai case study mirrors the basic human need and desire to be 'on the move', physically, socially and culturally. I examined the continuity wherein human mobility practices are constructed and reproduced. Mobilities (and technologies of mobility) reflect basic human activity, such as the need to communicate.

Communication is the locus for sociality (Schegloff, 1987) and this dissertation has particularly inquired into aspects of sharing and fostering dialogue. Facebook has become an important place for sharing imaginaries of a mobile, unrestricted, past and mobilizing for the right to access restricted land. Equally, it has become a place for people to contest Maasai activism and to question Maasai belonging in Maasailand. As I have argued in Chapters 7 and 8, a social network mediating communication on topics such as indigenous rights was there long before social media. What social media has done, whilst silencing some voices such as those of senior elders who used to push political agendas through traditional channels, is to amplify certain voices and to create more (but not necessarily more productive) dialogues between Maasai and non-Maasai. The network was there, but its actors are

different; activists who are increasingly young and educated, warriors and junior elders, taking on political roles.

Imaginaries have been examined as potent communication devices through which discourses on mobility and immobility are framed and explained (Chapters 3 and 5). Maasai imaginaries of land, mobility and the past are greatly entangled. The concept of imaginaries is crucial to the Maasai understanding of 'nomadism'. Here, mobility has less to do with actual physical displacement and more with a mind-set derived from imaginaries of the past. Although the 'Maasai-as-nomad' is a colonial construct and the Maasai adopted the term 'nomad' from colonial policy makers seeking to disenfranchise the Maasai from their right to land (see chapter 8), imaginaries of a nomadic past greatly fuel contemporary Maasai identities (Hodgson, 2001).

Conducting this research has further complicated and challenged my understandings of land rights. What I can say, however, is that there is little new in terms of conflict over land. Maasailand has a long history of eviction, a history in which the Maasai have evicted other groups, where the Iraqw even resorted to building underground hamlets and tunnel networks to safeguard and escape with cattle. The question that resurfaced, in my mind, time and again was 'who's land is this anyway?' How much use do you need to make of land to make it your own? Can land be owned by a cultural entity, as opposed to an individual and if so, what is the basis of exclusion and inclusion? Is land yours if you or your ancestors have evicted others therefrom? (Whilst this particular question is not widely discussed by Maasai, it is a recurring topic in dialogue with those criticizing Maasai land use). How much time is enough time for land to be yours? And what about wildlife? It is safe to say that I have much more questions than answers. Although not much is new regarding

conflict over land, the paths through which these conflicts are fought over are shifting, as are the technologies that mediate this conflict. I hope reading this dissertation has raised these questions, regarding land rights, with readers as well and I am hoping to find answers or perhaps, more questions, in discussion with readers.

9.2. Revisiting the chapters

Chapter 1 introduced the context of this study, providing readers with basic insights into Maasai culture and pastoralism. The working definitions of the key concepts of the dissertation, along with a literature overview, were embedded in the introduction. The key concepts of this dissertation have been mobility, technology, communication and imaginaries. Background information on Tanzania has been presented. A methodological overview explaining research sampling, participatory observational ethnographic fieldwork and netnography was given in Chapter 2. Research ethics were discussed and here I would like to come back to my ethical concern regarding whom, as researchers, we are accountable towards and who needs to permit our research. As I was conducting this research, several journalists, activists and bloggers (and to my knowledge no scholars) were arrested, detained and deported or prevented from entering northern Ngorongoro (Loliondo) carrying out research with the Maasai.[101] They violated the terms and conditions of doing research set by the Tanzanian government. This has fuelled my cynical stance when it comes to obtaining research permits from a government. The academic community aside, we are indebted to our research participants when carrying out research.

[101] http://www.vice.com/read/casualties-of-conservation-0000649-v22n5; http://termitemoundview.blogspot.com

In the third Chapter, four themes (marriage, pleasure-walks, home and *Ulaya*) were addressed to analyse place-making and meaning-making, the 'ground-works' for mobility. I find that human mobility practices are moored in meaning and place. I studied the ways in which Maasai understand and imagine Maasailand to be, both as a place and as a space, space and place bearing two separate meanings and relating to each other the way movement relates to mobility. Landscape is a moving, shifting entity from which one borrows, rather than something over which someone has a dominion. The landscape moves from the perspective of the God-given cattle. This chapter has laid the foundation for further analyses of how technologies of mobility reflect nomadic lifestyles, particularly by attempting to fuse older conceptual notions with newer ones whose complementarity has been established. Rather than being a conceptual examination primarily, I looked into more long-standing societal staples in the form of the interwoven lines created by marriage as a foundational mobile technology that shapes Maasailand as an organic, transforming space. Taking another, equally longstanding element of life, home, also allowed for highly abstract concepts to be analysed against the background of the 'meshwork' of Maasai society. Finally, the Maasai engagement with *Ulaya*, loosely translating as a Maasai understanding of 'modernity' was also examined.

The global economy is in a process of de-industrialization, de-centralization and de-territorialisation. The Maasai economy, I argue, fits well into this new model as it harnesses the power of sharing (land, labour and livestock) and is indicative overall of a kind of 'footlooseness'. The indigenization of 'modernity', as practised by the Maasai, problematizes the pan-Africanist premise that cultures benefit from being embedded into a nation-state and cannot evolve without one. I hope that this will make for interesting further research into post-modern societal modes of organization.

What really moved me when conducting the research that went into Chapter 3 was when Francis asked me 'How far can you walk?' The complex layers behind that question, or rather statement, go further and deeper than what I could grasp. The question is an invitation for anyone to step outside of and to consume and engage with landscape, with all the sensory capabilities we possess. It is a call, from a venerable Maasai elder who has travelled the world, to all of us, to build a deeper and more meaningful relationship with the land or cityscape that is around us. To recapitulate, the research question is: how are human mobility practices continuously constructed and (re-)produced, through communication technology, in dialogue with members of a cultural group, and in its reaction to non-members? The third chapter contributed to answering this question by demonstrating that what first needs to be explored are the dialectical place-making processes that attach meaning to both space and movement and the technologies mediating these processes.

By having examined place-making, next I turned to human mobility practices and the tools that construct and (re-)produce them. Moving from the application of conceptual ideas to the field, the fourth chapter turns to an analysis of an aspect of the fabric of Maasai life in itself; namely, cattle and how cattle are herded. Herding has been presented as being an intrinsically mobile act that teaches those involved about the dynamics of mobility that lay at the foundation of Maasai society. This chapter has illustrated how customary herding practices have been complimented by experimental managerial techniques and differentiated herding tactics. Herding has changed, due both to political constraints and to new technologies making the outsourcing of tasks and the diversification of income opportunities much easier. That being established, a class of cattle-less Maasai who actively participate in herding has emerged and whether these, often young herders, will be able to afford cattle of their own remains

to be seen; this is certainly an aspect of further research. Increasingly, well-off 'modern' Maasai are reclaiming their stakes in Maasailand by building large herds that are tended to over the phone. This is a fascinating trend in the preservation of cultural identity formations and which involves the adoption of novel lifestyle choices.

The relationship between the herder and his cattle is an interspecies relationship. The symbiosis works so well because of the strong bond nurtured from a very young age. What happens when herding becomes more of a professional and less of a family affair? Is love truly a 'missing ingredient' in 'modern' food production systems, as Tsing (2012) argues, and if so what are the implications for the Maasai-cattle relationship and the increasingly outsourced affair that is herding? The meaning-making of Maasai mobilities comes about not only through abstract concepts or imaginaries of place and of the past, but also through physical manifestations. Herding is the most physically active human mobility practice explored in this dissertation and it is also the most salient, it enforces a mobile bond to place through daily rituals.

The fifth Chapter has dealt with how Maasai mobilities and immobilities are formed through means of imaginaries as communication devices. Imaginaries function as tools of knowledge, shared dreams and ultimately, power. Replicating and disseminating other discourses, they are re-entextualized and reproduced in altered forms. Through the diffusion of imaginaries, it is hard to trace where they are from, yet Salazar (2006) compellingly explores how global discourses become locally reproduced. I explored imaginaries as 'sense-making' tools of Maasai culture, I looked at how they connect and separate place from 'out of place' examining globally produced and locally (re)produced imaginaries and their influence on Maa culture.

The fifth Chapter honed in on two specific imaginaries, imaginaries of gender and imaginaries of the mobile, primitive and pristine, the noble savage. These imaginaries exemplify the discursive production of mobilities and immobilities. Imaginaries are produced and reproduced and Maasai society is structured along two lines, gender and age-set (or time). Imaginaries of the noble savage are gendered (and temporal) imaginaries. I have analysed how they are shared by tourists who travel to Ngorongoro, oftentimes only to have their imaginaries later confirmed. On the receiving, Maasai, end they form technologies of persuasion, communication and an increasingly important livelihood strategy. The chapter has asked how the Maasai in Ngorongoro, who engage on a very frequent basis with tourists, interpret and act upon their desires. Whilst the freedom-seeking wanderer is an empowering figure that many Maasai identify with, it has been 'mistranslated' into 'noble savage' stereotypes perpetuated, by colonial and postcolonial policies as well as tourism service providers, and even by some Maasai themselves.

Age-sets, the second line (next to gender) along which society is structured, mark the beginning of culture as it is understood by the Maasai. These are marked by ceremonies, each with their own distinct culture. Throughout this dissertation, I have analysed Maasai culture as a 'culture of mobility'. Both cultural processes shape mobility and mobilities shape culture (Salazar, 2010). In the Maasai case, this 'culture of mobility' means that culture is born and reborn with the initiation of a new age-set and age-sets determine who, how and why someone is mobile, physically and socially. Conversely, mobilities inform culture, as culture is not static, but is instead involved in a process relating to the past, the present and to future prospects. Chapter 6 explored the ceremonial birth of culture and the branding of culture. This chapter honed in on the sub-question: How is a culture of mobility created and (re-)produced

through communication? It is formed through dialogue, with both Maasai and non-Maasai alike, as well as ritualized communication in the shape of ceremony.

Maasai culture is very much an emergent process and a work in progress and this did at first seem counter-intuitive to me when I researched the value that my research participants placed on the past and honouring the past (how, for instance, a person's *enkanyit*, respect, grows with age because an older person is a mirror to the past.) It took me some time to grasp how Maasai culture is, by my research participants, understood as an active practice that constantly relates to the history and the myths of the Maa people. Awareness and reflection on Maa oral history, knowledge production as the task of senior elders, the harnessing of the past to produce the future, these are not in any way symptoms of a static culture. Ceremonies, as journeys into new culture, very much express that there is something new about what has been, and that what has always been is at the same time being renewed. In dealing with both the external and internal representations of cultural rites and practices, the sixth Chapter has explored the tools that attempt to commodify Maasai culture. The chapter was framed from a perspective of power, agency and cultural self-determination. Maasai culture is undergoing transformations in terms of commodification, but change is driven by internal agency, as it is a culture that is transforming, transformative and never static.

In Ngorongoro, tourists rarely challenge preconceived Maasai stereotypes. Still, the tourism experience is viewed positively by many Maasai and tourism encounters fuel their perception of their own cultural uniqueness and distinctiveness. This often leads to an elitism and pride in the sense that the Maasai possess a very coveted thing which the 'Others', so popular an imaginary, have all lost; namely, culture itself. Given the limited space in which to present their culture, the Maasai of

Ngorongoro seek to persuade tourists of what tourists interpret as being somehow 'authentic' and what the Maasai understand to be the ones who 'have culture.' I urge readers of this dissertation to consider culture through the Maasai perspective - an active set of practices, as a culture that is born out of ceremony and to both place culture in a historical and at the same time how view culture as an active noun, an ever-emergent concept. Culture is reborn through ceremony, emergent out of ritualized dialogue. In this chapter, I have found that cultural distinctiveness is shaped in dialogue with members of a cultural group and in reaction to its non-members. That said, the chapter is by no means an attempt at 'Othering', rather I focused on the porous and permeable boundaries between cultures.

Chapter 7 advances a discourse on the interaction between old and novel technologies, honing in on the mobile phone as a case study of how novel mobile communication technologies are embedded, rationalised and repurposed in Maasai culture. I have argued that, rather than causing radical cultural change, novel mobile technologies are in fact embedded, rationalised and re-purposed in a seamless manner. The Maasai case serves to show one instance concerning how technology has been adopted into a socio-cultural, political and economic network in which it becomes an extension of well-established and historically influenced practices. The chapter aimed to advance anthropology and mobility studies by expanding upon the definition of mobile technologies from engineered devices to tools that support a people's customary practices through activism and information dissemination.

The lack of disruptive effect that mobile phones have had upon Maasailand has led to, at least among the young, an easy transition for the phone and has facilitated its swift incorporation. This may seem surprising given that, since early ethnographic writing, there has been a constant narrative in ethnography, policy and popular media

that the Maasai are at odds with 'modernity' and are losing the battle. The mobile phone is another layer of mobile technology that only mirrors a culture of mobility and a dynamic culture, in which younger age-sets are known to challenge older ones. One way in which this might be observed is in the disclosure or unmasking of coming of age rituals which allow younger Maasai to have covert or unknown things that await them, explained to them in full (as shown in chapters 6 and 7). For this reason, senior elders often lament how mobile technologies aid younger generations in climbing or circumventing certain traditional hierarchy structures. This also enables new social mobilities to come into being, within both Maasai culture and Tanzanian society in general. Yet, rather than assuming it is technology that has radically changed a culture in some foundational or fundamental way, this chapter has suggested that this process should be viewed as an ongoing (historical) dialectic between generations. One challenge in writing this chapter has been the fast changes in the telecommunications industry. Ethnographic research was conducted in 2013 and the market for smart phones, network connection and mobile commerce has since expanded rapidly. Staying in touch with some of my research participants on Facebook and WhatsApp has helped in grasping these changes immensely.

The specificities of the Maasai case notwithstanding, this chapter has shown how larger cultural patterns and social organization shape the meaning-making of practices of mobility and technology. While mobile technologies have had an impact upon culture itself, and are endemically involved in re-patterning what culture itself looks like, its use also impacts upon the politics of resource-access, land rights and the ways in which nomadic cultures are sanctioned to use their land. Mobile technologies compress time and space and the user often does not distinguish between physical or 'face to face' and virtual or 'over the phone' exchanges. One is propelled into

different social settings concurrently and distance does not make any communication less real or less important and sociability or any interaction that allows physical disconnection is often seen as increasing efficiency or of the overall experience. Rather than taking technological determinism for granted, I have found that it is people and their already-established networks and rituals of information-sharing that shape and take ownership over technology. In a culture in which land and mobility are near-synonyms, imaginaries of mobility become a transformative force within a moving landscape.

The eighth Chapter has explored social networking, activism and competing claims in the discourse of indigenous rights activism. This chapter has explored social media as a communication technology enabling dialogue with Maasai and non-Maasai on mobilizing for indigenous rights. I have shown how the discourse is framed and adjusted to fit the expectations of Maasai culture that non-members, specifically potential donors and external 'clicktivists', have. A mobile identity is forged, online, in relation to the use of technologies of mobility. Researching the topic involved ongoing netnographic. By 2012, there was already an outspoken and vocal online community discussing issues of Maasai land rights, intellectual property and conservation. My aim at that time was to understand the nature and direction of the indigenous rights discourse and the Maasai quest for a mobile indigenous identity as it is represented online. Technologies, both digital and human, were central to my research from the very outset.

This online indigenous rights debate has been spearheaded by various Maasai indigenous rights activists all throughout its implementation. Since that time, and with the proliferation and presence of smart phones in ordinary households, this has become a more and more 'democratic' debate. The netnographic research has engaged

with both Kenyan and Tanzanian struggles, fieldwork on the ground was focussed on the Ngorongoro (that is to the NCA and Loliondo). The netnographic research created opportunities for comparisons, highlighting discrepancies both in 'debating culture' and in the socio-political realities that Maasai on both sides of the border find themselves experiencing.

Few indigenous rights activists live customary rural lives and many even shun the *shuka* entirely, unless they attend international conferences, at which the *shuka* is an imaginary, and imagined, necessity. However, all of the participants interviewed kept a strong bond to their homeland, validating their roots and their positionality as indigenous (rights activists) by keeping a large number of livestock or by preaching the importance of the Maasai people to remain 'whole', to remain cultured in a cultureless world. No matter the topic, be it with activists or educated elders, any in-depth conversations or interviews lead to participants justifying their right to land with being the best guardians of it, with being the 'first conservationists'.

Much of Maasailand was agricultural land or hunter-gatherer land before it was conquered by Maasai, or land was shared with agricultural and hunter-gatherer groups. Pastoralism is considered to be a more sustainable practice in conserving the environment than agriculture (Homewood, 2009). The Maasai have abstained (almost completely) from hunting and from any large scale or invasive agriculturalism, which has largely contributed to a peaceful co-existence and co-usage of land. Whether they be hunter-gatherers, agriculturalists or slave traders, all have made efficient use of Maasailand at the same time. It is most certainly a fascinating avenue for further research to see whether this efficient use can still be re-instituted in the future, or why land use today is characterised by so much conflict and marginalization.

9.3. Limitations of this study and further avenues of research

One limitation of this study has been in not examining the impacts of schooling and religion upon Maasai mobility; instead, my objectives have revolved around technology, communication and imaginaries. I do hope to encourage further scholarship on factors such as schooling and religion. Schooling ties families to one place and with, according to the Pastoralist Council, over 70% of Maasai children in Ngorongoro getting a primary education, schools impact not only upon motility, but also the ways in which knowledge is transmitted and how bonds to Maasailand are formed. Children spend less time with elders or (boys only) bonding in *emanyatta* as junior warriors and more with teachers. Spending two days at a primary school, I did catch glimpses of how knowledge transmission is shifting and how sedentarism is being promoted. I interviewed teachers (all but one staff were non-Maasai) and their perception was that Maasai children were slow and stubborn and held back because of their being Maasai. My impression, from this brief glimpse into the Tanzanian educational system, was that teachers tried placing children at odds with their cultural identity.

Similarly, the advent and popularity of the Catholic and Pentecostal Churches in the 1970s and 1980s was a topic I have largely ignored in this dissertation. Studying the success of churches could greatly explain how sedentary modes of living are becoming more prevalent. An additional factor, largely omitted too, is climate change. Droughts, such as the one in 2009, have forced many families to re-strategize and for *bomas* to be built in different areas. Not speaking Maa, and altering my research focus, further limited the scope and quality of fieldwork, as it made it much harder for me to engage with women, as many only speak Maa. As Hodgson (2005) has written

about so eloquently, Christianity was largely ushered in by women; my own shortcomings in engaging with women in this dissertation could have been met by inquiring into the role of women in Maasai Christianity and its impact on mobility/immobility.

While Chapter 5 has dealt with tourism more expressly, there has been an implicit tourism-related thread throughout the dissertation. I never explicitly studied how and if tourism has pushed many Maasai into a sedentary life-style (or perhaps made many Maasai more mobile if they follow tourism seasons and flows). I hope it has been made evident, throughout the text, that tourism and not (just) impersonal models of environmentalism are a big factor in evictions, as well as in the creation of game reserves on Maasailand. I have also largely ignored labour mobility or migration, mostly young men leaving Maasailand to take up jobs in cities like Dar es Salaam and tourism destinations such as Zanzibar. I focused my study on the Ngorongoro Conservation Area and only briefly travelled to coastal regions. In hindsight, I could have grasped the opportunity to conduct research with returnees or the families of labour migrants. One could further research whether migrating to the coast or cities constitutes upwards or downwards social mobility, or whether it decreases or increases motility, on whose terms and based on whose discourses. Mobility is always relational, what may be seen as an upward movement in Tanzanian society, may not be regarded as such by the Maasai at large.

There are great prospects for scholars within anthropology to further analyse the meaning-making of technology, instead of simply taking them for granted. This dissertation has provided readers with a case study of the Maasai's implementation of technologies of mobility and has aimed to set a precedent for a broader understanding and engagement with technologies within mobility studies and within anthropology

more generally. The focus of this study has been on the interstices between mobility, communication and technology. These are broad, interrelated concepts.

I call upon anthropologists to further examine technologies and how these co-exist, complement or replace each other in (dis)enabling mobilities. How are discourses shaping mobilities/immobilities mediated through technology? Are new power regimes being established through new mediums or is there really not that much novelty in how knowledge is produced and transmitted across the world and how this restricts or enables mobility?

I call for scholars in mobility studies, and in anthropology particularly, to give technology and communication further attention. This would entail a treatment of technologies not as 'dead objects', but as something integral to the dialectical creation of culture and organic to humanity. This, I contend, would make an intriguing advancement in the direction of unravelling constellations of mobility and immobility. At present, technology is rather ill-defined and is often taken as a given, albeit a disruptive one, almost dumped upon society and into the lap of the individual. Scholars have to ask themselves challenging questions such as: what is new about what always has been? In so doing, we can come to see technology as a continuum, one that needs to be understood in order to analyse the developments in society.

Binaries have been a recurring topic in this dissertation. These have included mobility/immobility, members/non-members, in-place/out-of-place, Maasai/non-Maasai or being with culture/without culture. This was certainly not an attempt at 'Othering' (Said 1978). My aim was not to frame or bound static and authoritative opposites, but rather to show that seemingly binary concepts are subject to continuous renegotiation. They are discursive constructs that are interactive, porous and relative (to each other). I believe that by focusing on processes that interact and extend across

time and space, anthropologists can overcome critiques on 'cultural boundedness' (Bashkow, 2004) and come to focus on the cultural boundaries that our research participants both actively create and overcome.

Mobility studies lie at the intersection of anthropology, sociology, human geography and the natural sciences and for this scholarship to remain relevant to researchers, I strongly believe that we must revisit the work leading up to the scholarly focus on mobility. Academic inquiry in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Clifford, 1988, Malkki, 1992, Tucker, 1994) has enabled better analytical visibility in regards to the meaning-making of place. Theoretical shifts from place to mobility, in the late 1990s to early-2000s, (Appadurai 1996, Clifford 1997 and Urban, 2001) then paved way for the 'new mobilities paradigm' (Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006). I hope to have demonstrated that the meaning-making of place, and understanding discursive constructs on what is mobile and what is not (Frello, 2008), is integral to understanding dynamics of mobility and immobility. Rather than questioning or criticizing the alleged 'spatial turn' in social sciences (Hannam, Sheller and Urry 2006), to re-assess mobility, I hope that this dissertation has shown that we, as anthropologists and social scientists, need to re-examine the making and unmaking of place and the meanings and discourses attached thereto. I conclude this research project with the strong belief that, as anthropologists, analysing what makes us human should be done foremost from a perspective that recognizes and digs deep into facets of human mobility and place-making. I hope to have demonstrated that these aspects are integral to the shaping and meaning-making of culture.

Appendix One: Maasailand

The Maasailand map, as presented here, is the property of 'Precious Lie InternationalMinistries', P.O. Box 672, Narok: Kenya-East Africa.

This was the most detailed map of Maasailand I could retrieve yet it must be noted that the Maasai do not use maps to define Maasailand (no Google entry on Oloosho+Map) and that maps such as this one are disputed as there are no clear

boundaries. What this map does is show the ‘borders’ between Maa speaking sectors and how these dissect the Kenyan-Tanzanian border. Although this map does not explain what Maasailand is or where it is (to Maasai), it serves here as a reference to those unfamiliar with East Africa and the Maasai.

http://www.preciouslifeint.org/images/maasai_map.gif

Appendix Two: Ngorongoro Conservation Area

Map retrieved: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/39/multiple=1&unique_number=1639. UNESCO photographs and maps are the property of UNESCO, which holds all rights in connection with their usage.



Finding any map containing Maasai towns and villages proved impossible, in part because the Maasai make no or little use of maps.

Appendix Three: Tanzania

Retrieved: www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/tanzania.pdf United Nations photographs and maps are the property of the United Nations, which holds all rights in connection with their usage.

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Summary

The research question that this thesis addresses is: how are human mobility practices continuously constructed and (re-)produced, through communication technology, in dialogue with members of a cultural group, and in its reaction to non-members? This anthropological research concerns how the Maasai, a semi-nomadic group in East Africa, relate to mobility. This dissertation examines how technologies of mobility and communication are making and reshaping Maasailand, replacing and enhancing the historical network of codes and rules that made Maasailand an efficient circulatory territory with fast informational exchange.

The objectives of this dissertation are to study the interstices between communication, technology and mobility and the imaginaries shaped there and to examine 'what is new about what always has been' in regards to communication, technology and mobility. The dissertation de-constructs the discourses shaping a culture that is mobile. I study the concerns, the effects, usage and meaning-making that technologies of mobility and communication technologies have among the Maasai in Ngorongoro. I engage with the disentangling of the patterns, representations and practices creating mobility. Cattle is often described as the fabric of Maasai society, infusing meaning and legitimacy to the traditional forms of movement shaping the land.

The usage of communication technologies is examined alongside questions concerning how mobility and intricate social networks have played a decisive role in 'place-making' and the shaping of one of the largest areas claimed by a single ethnic group in Africa. I ask: How is a culture of mobility created and (re-)produced through communication? How is a mobile identity forged in relation to the use of technologies

of mobility? How does the meaning-making of place and mobility come about and how do imaginaries shape this meaning-making?

This project aims to bridge and to enhance the anthropological body of work on mobility studies, communication and technology. The dissertation analyses how technologies of communication and mobility have expanded or restructured the Maasai's traditional social, cultural, economic and political networks. Fieldwork was conducted continuously online on Facebook from 2012 to late 2015, and in Ngorongoro from March 2013 to October 2013, a participatory-observational approach was taken and was strengthened by interviews and drawn from collections of secondary sources. This dissertation aims to provide readers with a thorough examination of one case study of the Maasai implementation of technologies of mobility and communication; in this work I have set a precedent for a broader understanding and engagement with the interstice between technology, communication and mobility within anthropology. I find that human mobility practices are moored in meaning and place. Practices such as herding cattle are corporeal demonstrations of mobility and as important in manifesting a culture of mobility as imaginaries of a more 'nomadic' past are. Mobilities are discursive constructs. Cultural mobilities are shaped by (imaginaries of) history and in relation to and reaction towards non-members of a cultural group. Larger cultural patterns and social organization shape the meaning-making of practices of mobility and technology. Technologies, rather than being disruptive to culture, build upon well-established and historically influenced practices.

Samenvatting

De onderzoeksvraag is hoe via communicatie technologie de menselijke mobiliteit beïnvloed en opgebouwd wordt, door de leden van een culturele groep en in reactie tot de niet-leden van deze groep. Dit antropologisch onderzoek betreft hoe de Maasai, een seminomadisch bevolkingsgroep in Oost-Afrika, zich verhouden tot mobiliteit.

De doelstelling van dit proefschrift is het snijpunt te bestuderen waar communicatie, technologie en mobiliteit zich treffen en te onderzoeken "wat er nieuw is in wat altijd geweest is" in verbond met communicatie, technologie en mobiliteit. Dit proefschrift analyseert de dialogen die kenmerkend zijn voor een cultuur van mobiliteit. Ik bestudeer de bezorgdheden, de impact, het gebruik en de zingeving dat mobiliteits- en communicatie technologieën hebben op de Masaai in het Ngorongoro gebied.

Deze thesis onderzoekt hoe het land van de Maasai hervormt onder de invloed van technologie op mobiliteit en communicatie. Hierdoor zijn de historische netwerken, bestaande uit regels en codes, die van het land van de Maasai een efficiënt territorium van rondtrekkende en goed communicerende Maasai, versterkt en gewijzigd.

Met als doelstelling om het samenspel tussen mobiliteit, technologie en communicatie te bestuderen verdiep ik mij in het ontrafelen van de patronen, symbolen en praktijken die de mobiliteit aandrijven. Veehouderij is vaak beschreven als de kern van de Maasai maatschappij, en bron van zingeving en legitimiteit van de traditionele semi- nomadische levenswijze die het land karakteriseert. Dit project beoogd de reeds bestaande antropologische studies en inzichten over mobiliteitsstudie te verbinden met inzichten over communicatie en technologie.

De thesis analyseert hoe telecommunicatie de traditionele netwerken van de

Maasai op sociaal, economisch en politiek vlak heeft gewijzigd en uitgebreid. Het veldwerk om inzichten te verwerven bestaat uit een participatieve observatie in Ngorongoro van maart 2013 tot en met oktober 2013, aangevuld met interviews ter plaatse en lokale secundaire bronnen. Verder was het veldwerk versterk via een permanente online dialoog en analyse van sociale media (Facebook) vanaf 2012 tot einde 2015.

De thesis beoogt met behulp van een grondige analyse van de Maasai case studie, de lezer een bredere context te geven om de wisselwerking tussen technologie, communicatie en mobiliteit binnen de antropologie beter te begrijpen. Ik concludeer dat mobiliteits-gebruiken verankerd zijn in zingeving en plaats. Gebruiken zoals vee hoeden zijn fysische manifestaties van mobiliteit en zijn even belangrijk in uiting van een mobiliteits-cultuur als imaginaries zijn van een meer nomadisch verleden. Mobiliteiten zijn beredeneerde samenstellingen. Culturele mobiliteiten zijn gevormd door geschiedenis (en hun imaginaries) en in relatie tot en reactie tot niet-leden van een cultureel groep. Grotere cultuurpatronen en sociale organisaties scheppen de zingeving van mobiliteits-praktijken en technologie. Technologieën, eerder dan disruptief te zijn voor een cultuur, bouwen op wel geetableerde en historisch beïnvloede gebruiken.